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nal that addresses the development of accounting thought and 
practice. AHJ embraces all subject matter related to accounting 
history, including but not limited to research that provides an 
historical perspective on contemporary accounting issues.
 Authors may find the following guidelines helpful.
1. Authors should provide a clear specification of the research 
issue or problem addressed and the motivation for the study.
2. Authors should describe the method employed in the re-
search, indicating the extent and manner in which they intend 
to employ the methodology. Manuscripts are encouraged that 
draw on a variety of conceptual frameworks and techniques, in-
cluding those used in other social sciences.
3. Manuscripts that rely on primary sources should contain a 
statement specifying the original materials or data collected or 
analyzed and the rationale used in selection of those source ma-
terials. Authors should provide the reader information as to how 
these source materials may be accessed.
4. Authors who use a critical or new theoretical framework to 
examine prior historical interpretations of the development of 
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and take adequate account of the social, political, and economic 
contexts of the time period examined and of other en viron-
mental factors.
6. While historians have long debated the ability to assign cau-
sation to particular factors, we encourage authors to address 
and evaluate the probable influences related to the problem or 
issue examined.
7. Authors should clearly state all their interpretations of re-
sults, and the conclusions they draw should be consistent with 
the original objectives of and data used in the study. Interpreta-
tions and conclusions should be clearly linked to the research 
problem. Authors also should state the implications of the study 
for future research.
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 1. An abstract of approximately 100 words on a page that 
includes the article’s title but no identification of the 
author(s) .
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is accepted, the editor will request the submission of a diskette 
prepared in Microsoft Word. If time permits, authors will be 
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 Authors will be provided with 3 copies of the AHJ issue in 
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NOTE FROM THE CO-EDITORS
2010 Manuscript Awards
We are pleased to announce the following winners of the an-
nual AHJ Manuscript Competition for Volume 37 (2010) which 
awards $300 and a plaque for the article judged best by the edi-
torial board and $100 for each of two others for excellence.
 WINNER: Warwick Funnell: “On His Majesty’s Secret
  Service: Accounting for the Secret Service in
  a Time of National Peril 1782-1806”
RUNNERS-UP: Nicholas Praquin: “The Credit Lyonnaise in
  France (c. 1871-1918): Using Cash Flow
  Analysis to Assess Risk in Banking”
  Louis Stewart: “A Contingency Theory
  Perspective on Management Control System
  Design among U.S. Ante-Bellum Slave
  Plantations”
Congratulations to the authors for these fine pieces of work.
It should be noted that every article in Volume 37 received at 
least one vote on the ballots submitted.
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and
Linda V. Ruchala
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VEBLEN’S PLACEBO: ANOTHER 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL 
Abstract: Thorstein Veblen was a turn of the 20th century American 
economist concerned with the implications of financial capitalists 
directing the means of production. Veblen proposed that the rational-
ity of “material science” as practiced by the “production engineers” is 
fundamentally different from the rationality of market capitalism. If 
this claim is valid, our previous contentions regarding accounting, as 
a facilitating technology, for administrative evil warrant reconsidera-
tion. Veblen’s position provides a historical perspective on one dimen-
sion of administrative evil that is generally unquestionably accepted, 
especially within accounting. That is, technology, such as accounting 
and the related information systems, is amoral, and it is only through 
ideologically instigated applications that any moral value accrues. We 
discuss administrative evil and the role of instrumental rationality 
generally, and accounting specifically, in creating it. Veblen’s charac-
terization of financial capitalism and production engineers and his 
arguments for the primacy of economic efficiency versus “pecuniary 
gain” provide a basis for evaluating the legitimating action. We con-
sider how Veblen’s work relates to notions of instrumental rational-
ity and then undertake a critical assessment of the ideas. Some of 
Veblen’s ideas, while utopian, might be seen as an elixir for the detri-
mental influences of financial capital; however, at best, they provide a 
placebo for the ills of administrative evil and, as such, do not provide 
an amoral basis for legitimating the associated accounting systems. 
INTRODUCTION
Ideology and technology form a nexus in fostering and 
Acknowledgments: The authors wish to acknowledge the constructive com-
ments provided by participants at the 2004 Joint Academy of Accounting His-
torians and Public Interest Section History Conference, referees of the fourth 
Accounting History International Conference, and Barbara Merino. We also ac-
knowledge support provided by the Center of Professional Integrity and Account-
ability, School of Business Administration, Portland State University. 
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perpetuating conditions that deprive innocent people of their 
humanity. In previous work [Dillard and Ruchala, 2005], we 
argue that the ideology of capitalism and the instrumental ra-
tionality of accounting, as a facilitating technology, advance this 
administrative evil within work organizations. Thorstein Veblen, 
an American economist writing in the early 20th century, recog-
nized the possible dangers associated with financial capitalists’ 
control of the means of production with their sole perspective 
being reduced to financial returns.1 As the solution, Veblen pro-
posed that the conduct of “business” be removed from financial 
capital and placed in the hands of the “production engineers.” 
Such a move shifts control from a group whose legitimacy is 
based on the rationality of capitalist markets to one predicated 
on the rationality of “material science.” Similar arguments have 
been made by Johnson and Kaplan [1987] and others with re-
gard to “management accounting.” That is, the relevance of the 
technology of cost and management accounting (information 
for running the productive core of the work organization) was 
lost when it was colonized by the rationality and information 
demands of financial capital (financial reporting). If the ration- 
ality of Veblen’s “material science” is fundamentally different 
from the rationality of market capitalism, then our previous 
contentions regarding accounting and administrative evil war-
rant reconsideration. 
By gaining an historical perspective on instrumental ra-
tionality, we extend the previous analysis exploring the nexus 
between ideology, technology, and accounting and how instru-
mental rationality has been used to legitimize the actions within 
and through large work organizations. Veblen’s work represents 
an early socio-economic analysis of large corporate enterprises 
[Raines and Leathers, 2001], providing a critique of capitalist 
ideology and the role of technology and technicians and being 
severely critical of the former while adamantly embracing the 
latter. He proposes the shift in control as a response to the de-
humanizing and inefficient march of financial capital. If Veblen 
is correct, then it may be possible to ameliorate the effects of 
administrative evil by “returning” to the spirit of the halcyon 
days before management accounting became colonized by finan-
cial accounting. That is, returning to the conceptualization of 
management accounting systems based on relevant production-
related data needed by production managers in managing pro-
1 As discussed more fully later, while we also rely on many of Veblen’s writ-
ings, our primary source is Veblen [1921]. 
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duction and output, not the reductionist demands of financial 
capital. Can proposals such as activity-based accounting [Coo-
per and Kaplan, 1988], activity-based management [Johnson, 
1994], or the balanced score card [Kaplan and Norton, 1996] as-
sist in enhancing human dignity through work and production 
as Veblen implied? Can these ways of framing, understanding, 
and acting provide a means for ameliorating administrative evil? 
Veblen’s work provides an historical perspective on the 
generally accepted legitimacy of technical expertise as justifi-
cation for corporate action. That is, technology as applied by 
professionals/experts is amoral and only through ideologically 
instigated applications do any moral implications arise. Because 
of their superior technical knowledge of production and uncor-
rupted nature, Veblen proposes that society would be better 
served if technicians replaced absentee owners/capitalists as 
the primary guardians and managers of corporate resources. 
Engaging Veblen’s ideas helps articulate more clearly the differ-
ent manifestations of expertise, especially within work organi-
zations and helps recognize technicians as implementers, pur-
veyors, and repositories of technology. As such, these “experts” 
represent the human manifestation of technology, taking on its 
cloak of amorality.
Veblen differentiates between “physical” and “financial” 
expertise and lays out a plan whereby the former is to replace 
the latter. This proposal purports to be a panacea for the evils 
of capitalism and absentee ownership that follow from the 
self-serving programs of the “captains of industry.” At one level, 
 Veblen’s recommendations/remedies seem imminently “logi-
cal” in that the capricious, socially grounded, and legitimized 
controlling/organizing systems of self-motivated financiers are 
replaced with those grounded in the “laws of nature” and imple-
mented by those who understand, respect, and are held account-
able by these natural laws. 
Writing in the same era as the development of management/
cost accounting,2 Veblen’s arguments are useful in understand-
ing the underlying logic of these systems of management and 
cost accounting. We believe that Veblen’s position provides a 
perspective on one dimension of administrative evil that is gen-
erally accepted, especially within accounting. That is, technol-
ogy, particularly as associated with material science, is amoral, 
2 See Chandler [1977], Johnson and Kaplan [1987], Miller and O’Leary [1987, 
1994, 1998], Hopper and Armstrong [1991], Arnold [1998], Fleischman [2000], 
and Hoskin and Macve [2000].
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and it is only through ideologically instigated applications that 
any value accrues. While this, in fact, does displace one instiga-
tor of administrative evil, we argue that the primary culprit for 
divorcing moral context from collective action is still very much 
activated, and maybe made even more insidious, because it is 
now masked by the legitimating veil of physical laws of nature 
and their perceived amoral status. These “laws of nature” are 
no less a social construction than those Veblen proposes they 
replace. “In reality, technology is nothing but a form of applied 
economics, which is determined by a certain problem, since 
in the last instance each technician asks, What does it cost?” 
[Weber quoted in Swedberg, 1998, p. 148]. Both, we argue, are 
legitimated and perpetuated by appeals to and the application of 
instrumental rationality. 
The technological imperative is one of the primary struc-
tural foundations upon which administrative evils is predicated 
and legitimized. We view Veblen’s work as an early example of 
a somewhat misdirected/misleading panacea for overcoming 
the administrative evils associated with administrative control. 
Thus, Veblen’s work is useful in dimensionalizing the forms of 
legitimating structures within administrative evil. We argue that 
“pecuniary” and “industrial” activities do not represent opposing 
constructs or dualisms3 but, in fact, exist as a duality in which 
both represent different dimensions of a common construct that 
is grounded in instrumental rationality. Production engineering, 
and the related systems of management and cost accounting, is 
a socially constructed technology predicated and legitimized by 
its logical grounding in instrumental rationality. The underlying 
ideology of the technology also constitutes the underlying rationale 
for capitalism. Such “remedies” will only shift the genesis of the 
forces, depriving innocent human beings of their humanity. 
The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows. 
Section two describes administrative evil and the role of instru-
mental rationality in creating it. The third section presents Veblen’s 
position on financial capitalism and production engineers and 
the presumed primacy of economic efficiency versus “pecuniary 
gain” as the basis for legitimate action. In this section also, we 
consider Veblen’s work as it relates to current notions of instru-
mental rationality and then undertake a critical reassessment of 
his technocracy. We end our investigation of Veblen and admin-
istrative evil with discussion and conclusions. 
3 Dualisms are constructs that cannot be synthesized or reduced to the other.
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ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL, INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY, 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION
Several recent papers in the accounting literature4 explore 
the idea of “administrative evil” and the role that instrumental 
rationality plays in initiating and perpetuating such evil. Adams 
and Balfour [1998] coined the term “administrative evil” to 
describe the use of technology, professions, and bureaucratic 
structures in ways that divorce collective actions from their 
moral context, removing any sense of personal accountabil-
ity. Dillard and Ruchala [2005] conclude that contemporary 
accounting is constituted by “rational” practices of modernity 
from which administrative evil emerges. 
As in the prior work, administrative evil describes actions 
that ordinary people take while carrying out their normal or-
ganizational responsibilities that result in depriving innocent 
people of their humanity. These acts/circumstances include 
depriving an individual of life, dignity, health, justice, security, 
opportunity, or freedom.5 We consider the deprivations to be im-
moral acts. Examples of administrative evil can be direct, such 
as the loss of life experienced by Holocaust victims, or indirect, 
such as organizationally sanctioned actions as knowingly hiding 
health risks of medical pharmaceuticals, the loss of employees’ 
pensions as the result of corporate malfeasance, or the loss of 
property because of sanctioned aggressive lending tactics.6 
Administrative evil is an outgrowth of social roles and insti-
tutional structures motivated by the application of instrumental 
rationality. Instrumental rationality is an integral part of ac-
counting and represents one primary component of its claim to 
significance. As currently practiced, accounting represents an 
ideologically saturated calculative technology; a group of experts 
to implement and sustain the technology and its application; 
and, as such, provides a sustaining medium for the perpetuating 
mechanisms of capitalism. 
Dillard and Ruchala [2005, p. 617] recognize the interplay 
between the individual or collective and ideology and technol-
ogy in separating collective actions from moral content:
The application of the technology in the cause of maxi-
4 Williams [2002], Dillard [2003], Dillard and Ruchala [2005], Dillard, et al. 
[2005]
5 See United Nations [1948].
6 Adams and Balfour [1998] provide extensive examples, including the Chal-
lenger space shuttle and the tobacco industry’s actions in concealing the known 
hazards of cigarette smoking.
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mizing shareholder wealth enhances the dominance 
of the prevailing capitalist ideology. The economically 
grounded and unequally privileging aims are developed, 
clarified, and expanded through instrumentally ration-
nal problem solving and physical and administrative 
technology. Technology can enhance and accelerate the 
capitalists’ demands. Coupling the capitalists’ demands 
with advanced information technology implemented 
through bureaucratic hierarchies facilitates their imme-
diate, disciplined, and efficient implementation.
Instrumental rationality implies a neutral orientation in 
which decision processes and actions are focused on achieving 
the specified end without the need to appraise the legitimacy 
of the end [Jary and Jary, 1991]. For example, an accountant is 
tasked with representing the financial position of a firm  using 
generally accepted accounting principles. Generally, the ac-
countant does not question the legitimacy of creating such state-
ments or their use. 
Adams and Balfour [1998, p. 25] note that: “Technical ra-
tionality, professionalism, and bureaucracy all redefine ethics 
out of the picture in many instances.” They go on to describe 
how “moral inversion” and administrative evil can evolve such 
that choices depriving innocent people of their humanity can 
be legitimized as the “good or right thing to do” by material or 
external authority structures. Building on  Adams and Balfour’s 
work, Dillard and Ruchala [2005] argue that instrumental ra-
tionality fosters and perpetuates administrative evil through the 
roles played by ideology in shaping accounting systems, exper-
tise, and technological processes. 
Following Dillard and Ruchala [2005], instrumental ration-
nality represents the enabling logic of modernity; however, its 
application restricts the conceptualization of legitimate alterna-
tive action sets. The logic of instrumental rationality is imple-
mented through technicians,7 machines, and organizing hierar-
chies. Within and facilitated by these manifestations, one can be 
an accomplished professional/worker and still enable extreme 
acts of violence.8 The technician can faithfully and correctly ap-
ply their skills to the task at hand while abdicating any personal 
7 Following Veblen, we use the term technician in its broadest sense of pos-
sessing expertise.
8 Violence, as used in this paper, refers to the harm resulting from administra-
tive evil. Workplace violence differs from the harm resulting from administrative 
evil in that the individual perpetrating the violence is not acting within his or her 
organizationally sanctioned responsibilities. 
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responsibility for the ultimate results of the actions. Within the 
rational regime of technical expertise, individual conscience is 
subjugated to professional values. A strictly technical perspec-
tive dehumanizes the objects of actions by expressing them 
in technical, value-neutral terms, thereby allowing them to be 
viewed in an amoral fashion. As these actions become increas-
ingly quantitatively represented and manipulated, the human 
subject is further obscured. Administrative evil is perpetuated as 
the ability for ethical evaluation is lost.
Next, we consider the socializing conditions that facilitate 
the abdication of moral responsibility by professionals within 
work organizations. Kleman [1973] postulates three enabling 
conditions – organizational violence is authorized and sustained 
by organizational primacy and discipline; action is routinized 
through role specification and rule-governed practices; and the 
victim is dehumanized through abstraction and quantification.9 
Moral responsibility arises from being held accountable.10 The 
prevailing professional and organizational norms and values 
dictate the decision rationale.11 Legitimating criteria are synony-
mous with instrumentally rational decision making, and moral 
responsibility is narrowly defined as applying instrumentally 
rational logic in arriving at, and carrying out, a course of action. 
Organizational violence is authorized, often indirectly, 
through the single-minded pursuit of the ultimate “legitimate” 
goal(s) of the organization. Within Veblen’s critiques of the fi-
nancial management of corporations, maximizing shareholder 
value, or some derivation thereof, represents the ultimate le-
gitimatizing criterion. However, we would argue that Veblen’s 
reliance on engineering approaches does not ultimately change 
the maxim of efficiency that drives the organizational structure, 
although it may be broadened a bit. Regardless of the techno-
logical base upon which the criteria are situated, the well-being 
9 These conditions are not seen to be mutually exclusive. Bauman [1989] has 
employed these conditions in illustrating how conscientious technicians and ad-
ministrators facilitated the Holocaust through organizational and technical roles 
and responsibilities. For a discussion of the role of accounting and accountants 
see Funnel [1998], Dillard [2003], Lippman and Wilson [2007], Lippman [2009] .
10 See Roberts [1991, 1996, 2001], Schweiler [1993], Shearer [2002].
11 We neither assume in this discussion that fixed, immutable foundations ex-
ist for making moral choices, nor do we assume that all individuals would reach 
similar conclusions in similar circumstances. We do suggest, however, that in-
dividuals within the organization are empowered to use critical evaluation and 
critique such that “actors and organizations can evaluate and be held accountable 
for their actions in terms other than those dictated by instrumental rationality” 
[Dillard and Ruchala, 2005, p. 618].
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of the organization is to be accepted as synonymous with the 
well-being of the individual, and there must be disciplinary 
forces to motivate the actors to act in accordance with these 
goals. The organizational hierarchy controls the distribution 
of resources. Instrumentally rational decision processes are 
privileged as legitimizing criteria and, thus, provide the means 
by which discipline is imposed on individual actors whether 
financial technicians or production technicians are in control. 
An instrumental perspective blurs, and ultimately obscures, the 
moral issues12 associated with the actions undertaken to satisfy 
the organization’s needs. The hierarchy authorizes the actions; 
the professionals insure that technically rational knowledge is 
appropriately applied; and the technology facilitates the efficient 
and effective disposition of one’s duties. All three provide the 
legitimizing basis for actions and evaluation, and all three mask 
the potential for organizational violence.
Kleman’s second condition facilitating the abdication of 
moral responsibility routinizes the action through role specifica-
tion and standardized procedures. Routinization shields the par-
ticipants from having to confront moral consequences of their 
actions. At some point, the discipline of narrowly focusing on 
the technical and administrative details of one’s work can create 
a “taken-for-granted” quality that reduces the capability to ques-
tion the underlying principles or consequences of one’s actions 
[Baumeister, 1997] and substitutes technical responsibility for 
moral responsibility. Technical responsibility requires that the 
best available technology be applied in a cost-effective man-
ner. The means become an end in itself, and the intermediate 
steps connecting the means with the ultimate outcome are not 
recognized. The ethical dilemmas associated with the ultimate 
outcome are not confronted, only the daily ones related to effec-
tive and efficient processing. 
Dehumanization of the victim represents the third dimen-
sion that facilitates the abdication of moral responsibility by 
eliminating any subjective affiliation with the objects of con-
cern. Phenomena are translated through technology filters into 
dehumanizing quantitative representations. Those who work 
within hierarchical control structures are primarily measured 
on, and therefore interested in, the quantitative impact of their 
actions. Thus, dehumanization is commonplace with and within 
12 In fact, the moral issues are presumed to be responsibly addressed by apply-
ing a “rational” decision process in evaluating and selecting alternatives. See, for 
example, Lampe and Finn [1992].
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organizations, which are predicated on instrumentally rational 
manifestations such as bureaucratic control hierarchies. 
Our premise is that Veblen rued the use of economic effi-
ciency defined in terms of financial returns within Kleman’s first 
condition (legitimized violence through organizational primacy 
and discipline); yet, he proposed an alternative organizational 
goal (technical efficiency) which also enables Kleman’s remain-
ing conditions – routinization and dehumanization. The next 
section explores Veblen’s ideas regarding each of these condi-
tions more completely.
VEBLEN’S IDEAS
Raines and Leathers [2001, p. 309] suggest that: “Veblen 
was the first economist to systematically analyze the social and 
economic effects of technology on modern culture within the 
context of large corporate business enterprises.” Analyzing the 
rapid changes in technology and in corporate growth, Veblen’s 
work provides insight into the dialectical relationship between 
administrative and scientific/physical technology. While we refer 
to other writings, the primary compilation of Veblen’s ideas and 
the primary source for our analysis is one of his last works, The 
Engineers and the Price System (EPS), published in 1921. The 
following discussion differentiates between the financial and 
the production technician and their related technologies and 
provides a general outline of the arguments set forth as to the 
why and how of the technological imperative within business 
organizations. 
First, we briefly describe the socio-economic context within 
which Veblen was writing as it relates to our discussion. Veb-
len was writing in a time of growth and change,13 such as the 
growth of productive capacity and industrial capital especially 
as reflected in the large trusts of the day; the changes and up-
heaval associated with World War I and the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion; and the emerging management-labor relationships across 
the industrializing world. 
Much work considers the context and practice of manage-
ment accounting during the period in which Veblen was writing 
in the early 20th century.14 As Fleischman [2000] points out, 
13 See, for example, Chandler [1962, 1977, 1990] for discussions of business 
within this larger context.
14 See Fleischman and Tyson [2007] for a recent review. See also Johnson 
[1975a, b, 1978. 1983], Chandler [1977], Johnson and Kaplan [1987], Miller and 
O’Leary [1987], Hopper and Armstrong [1991], 
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the different perspectives taken by the various authors lead to 
somewhat different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
interpretations. Our discussion presumes that the traditional 
perspective is grounded in economic rationalism reflected 
primarily in neoclassical economics [Fleischman, 2000]. The 
period can generally be characterized by the rise of the verti-
cally integrated mega-corporation and the onset of managerial-
ism exemplified by the work of Fredrick Taylor [e.g., 1912] and 
scientific management. Not unrelated, standard management 
accounting and costing systems were emerging [Fleisch man and 
Tyson, 2007] as a means for managing the integrated work organ- 
izations and implementing change. Several authors consider the 
relationship between Taylor’s ideas and Veblen’s proposals with 
respect to a technocracy.15 Bruce and Nyland [2001, p. 955] state 
that:
Taylor, an engineer from Philadelphia, emphasized 
the application of the scientific method to the selec-
tion, training, and utilization of workers, highlight-
ing the need for planning and management based on 
empirical investigation rather than “rule of thumb” or 
tradition. This emphasis on empiricism and planning 
found a particularly receptive ear among members of 
the institutionalist school [Veblen and his disciples], 
many sharing misgivings about neoclassical economics’ 
deductivist method and its laissez-faire philosophical 
underpinnings.
Two strands of Veblen’s thought are of particular relevance 
here. First, Veblen draws a clear distinction between “pecuni-
ary” and “industrial” activity.16 The former are activities char-
acterized as exploitive, predatory, and/or wasteful functions of 
business, while the latter includes those functions that produce 
socially useful products and services. Speculation, financial 
management, and “salesmanship” are examples of the business 
functions that Veblen cites within the former category. Produc-
tion engineering and material science17 are examples of the 
latter. Using these distinctions, Veblen criticizes the growth of fi-
nancial capitalism and the dangers of capitalist control over the 
means of production with their sole focus on growth and wealth 
15 See Nyland [1996]; Knoedler [1997]; Knoedler and Mayhem [1999]; Bruce 
and Nyland [2001].
16 This distinction is referred to by Veblen as the ceremonial-technological 
dichotomy.
17 Veblen even includes “production economist” in this category.
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accumulation (profit) to the detriment of providing the goods 
and services needed by the members of society. 
Veblen’s second relevant theme considers the relationship 
between large corporations and techno-economic change. Ac-
cording to Tilman [2004, p. 8], Veblen attempts to explain “the 
economic history of the West by linking cultural anthropology 
and social history with changes in the techno-economic base.” 
Veblen is concerned with agency in the form of cultural malle-
ability, structure in the form of institutional rigidity, and the mo-
tivating and moderating influences of technology as they relate 
to economic activity.
Veblen’s criticisms of corporate interests and absentee 
ownership are well recognized. The implications and modifica-
tions associated with large-scale work organizations are more 
nuanced and debatable. For example, Veblen seems to acknowl-
edge both the positive and negative potential of industry on the 
lives of the affected workers pointing out the industrial setting’s 
emancipatory impact as well as its mechanistic effects [Veblen, 
1919, p. 39; Tilman, 2004]. In EPS, Veblen is committed to the 
“physical” technicians as the group that should control the in-
dustrial sector of the economy. He proposes that the conduct of 
“business” be removed from the “captains of industry” (financial 
capital) and given to the “production engineers” (scientific tech-
nicians).
Veblen’s solution is spelled out in Chapter VI of ESP, 
“Memorandum on a Practicable Soviet of Technicians.” The 
central feature is the establishment of a central directorate of 
“industrial statesmen” composed of a loosely tripartite executive 
council with power to act in matters of industrial administra-
tion. The three primary groups are resource engineers, transpor-
tation-system technicians, and distribution-system technicians. 
The council would be relatively small, supported by presumably 
larger staffs. The central council would provide guidance and 
coordination of subcenters and local councils. Veblen envisions 
constant consultation with accreted spokesmen from the main 
subdivisions of productive industry, transportation, and dis-
tribution traffic. The primary actors are production engineers 
who exhibit expertise in material processes; that is, the ways 
and means of producing goods and services and production 
economists who maintain expertise in planning and resource 
allocation.
While Veblen’s unequivocal denunciation of financial 
capital is rarely questioned, an equally unequivocal promo-
tion of  production technicians is not universally supported by 
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some scholars.18 We accept Veblen’s stated position in EPS as 
representing an important historical perspective on scientific 
technology and technicians in large organizations that provides 
the grounds for prevailing attitudes. As such, Veblen’s position 
provides an historical perspective on one dimension of admin-
istrative evil that, in general, has become accepted unquestion-
ably within large-work organizations – technology, including 
its application by technicians, is amoral and this amorality has 
been confused with “value neutrality.” This perspective, we sug-
gest later, obscures the moral implications of an organization’s 
actions and reduces the opportunity to question consequences 
within the context of the situation. We suggest that Veblen’s cri-
tique of capitalism and absentee ownership of the means of pro-
duction led him to propose a technological imperative in which 
a belief in the material laws of nature qualifies their high priests 
and disciples to serve as the guardians of society’s economic 
resources. 
With respect to accounting technologies and control struc-
tures, the role of ideology is central to perpetuating administra-
tive evil through its singular objective of maximizing sharehold-
er wealth. In his last work, Absentee Ownership [1923], Veblen 
elaborates on the evils of financial capital which here include 
militarism, industrial strife, and “business sabotage.” These 
are manifestations of the inherent conflict embodied within 
the prevailing socio-economic system that pits the interests of 
the workers/citizens against those of the financial capitalists. 
Explicitly, according to Veblen, profits are maximized through 
unemployment and privation, restricted output, and price 
inflation. Gesturing toward our conceptualization of implicit 
administrative evil, Veblen views these conflicts as more a result 
of the business system’s internal logic than moral failings, mal-
ice, or greed. “Once money-values are accorded primacy over 
use-values, once net profit is elevated to the primary goal all 
else follows” [Spindler, 2002, p. 84]. Next, we consider the two 
primary groups in Veblen’s analysis, the financial capitalists and 
the production engineers.
Financial Capitalists and Production Engineers: Veblen referred 
to four broad evolutionary eras of economic development – the 
savage, barbarian, handicraft, and machine eras. Technologi-
cal improvements motivated the evolution from the handicraft 
18 For example, some suggest that such a position is out of character with the 
larger body and spirit of Veblen’s work. See Edgell [2001] and [ Tilman [2004].
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to the machine era in that technological advances facilitated 
technological processes and increased scales of production that 
required the development of the industrial plant, the concentra-
tion of ownership of the capital assets, and the separation of 
ownership through the sale of financial capital. The indepen-
dent, skilled owner-craftsman gave way to the entrepreneurial 
owner-operator. However, as industrial processes became more 
complex, Edgell [2001, p. 71] notes: “the entrepreneur withdrew 
from engagement in the technical aspects to concentrate on the 
financial aspects. The captain of industry thus mutated into the 
captain of finance, who has been superseded by the impersonal 
corporation.” 
Veblen viewed the management of the corporation as evolv-
ing into two dimensions, an administrative (social) dimension 
and a technical (physical/scientific) one. The administrative 
dimension referred to the administrative-control  hierarchies 
and the business managers who populated them. The technical 
dimension referred to the technical systems and the engineers 
who developed and applied the scientific technology. 
Veblen [1921, pp. 55-56] saw administrative evil run ram-
pant with the captains of finance colluding and manipulating 
in order to “divert whatever they can to the special gain of one 
vested interest and another, at any cost to the rest.” He also 
itemized the forms of such evil: “the industrial system is delib-
erately handicapped with dissension, misdirection, and unem-
ployment of material resources, equipment, and man power, at 
every turn…and all the civilized peoples are suffering privation 
together because their general staff of industrial experts are in 
this way required to take orders and submit to the sabotage at 
the hands of the statesmen and the vested interests.” 
The Captains of Finance an Instrumental Rationality: Veblen’s 
critique of the bureaucratization of business functions shows 
remarkable similarity to Kleman’s [1973] three conditions dis-
cussed above as antecedents of administrative evil. Kleman’s 
first condition, the abdication of personal responsibility, was 
identified by Veblen [1918, p. 410] in his critique of the “new 
order.” He notes that the corporate structure has severed the 
employer-owner relationship and has removed owners from 
responsibility for the actions of the firm: “...the place of the per-
sonal employer-owner is taken by a composite business concern 
which represents a combination of owners, no one of whom is 
individually responsible for the concern’s transactions.” He con-
tinues on to note that the “chief and abiding power conferred by 
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ownership” is that of being “personally responsible with discre-
tion in all details.” However, he argues that corporate capital 
ownership has taken this power of personal responsibility away 
from the ownership. “Ownership now has virtually lost this es-
sential part of its ordinary function. It has taken the shape of an 
absentee ownership of this corporate capital [where] the greater 
proportion of the owners have no voice.”
Veblen also finds Kleman’s second condition, depersonaliza-
tion, occurring for both owners and workers in the corporation 
of his day. Veblen argues that “The personal equation is no 
longer a material factor in the situation. Ownership has been…
depersonalized to a degree beyond what would have been 
conceivable a hundred years ago.” For workers, “…even that 
contractual arrangement which defines the workman’s relation 
to the establishment in which he is employed, and to the anony-
mous corporate ownership by which he is employed, now takes 
the shape of a statistical reckoning in which virtually no trace 
of the relation of man to man is to be found” [Veblen, 1918, p. 
410]. Veblen saw that these two conditions result in a regimen 
that manifests a tunnel vision perspective focusing on the ends 
(profit) rather than the methods of achieving those ends: “… this 
state of things cannot be charged to anyone’s personal account 
and made a subject of recrimination. In fact, it is not a case for 
personal discretion and responsibility in detail, but rather for 
concerted action looking to some practicable working arrange-
ment.” 
Although Veblen found both the abdication of personal 
responsibility and dehumanization as problems, he presents a 
mixed analysis of the routinization of processes, Kleman’s third 
condition facilitating the abdication of moral responsibility. As 
a strong supporter of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management 
[Knoedler and Mayhew, 1999] and the use of technological 
improvements, Veblen predicted that increased standardization 
and mechicanization of process would lead to greater intellec-
tual development on the part of workers. Veblen held out this 
result as hope for the ability of workers to create social change. 
The root of the problem then, in Veblen’s perspective, was not 
the use of technology itself but the application of technology in 
the control of “corporate captains.”
Engineers and the State of the Industrial Arts: Veblen believes 
that the industrial arts can be separated from the “business 
system’s internal logic.” Technology is seen as ideologically pure. 
The problem is not in the nature of the thing, the technology 
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and/or the expertise, but rather who owns/controls them and, 
more importantly, who receives the returns from their use. In 
contrast to the lack of value (indeed, evil) Veblen sees in admin-
istrative or “ceremonial” management, Veblen [1918, p. 413]
holds the state of the industrial arts and the skilled craftsman in 
high regard. Technological change is a significant driver in mov-
ing the society forward. Thus, Veblen views technology as highly 
productive and as a critical community resource that is limited 
by the diversion of its use for private gain: “This body of techno-
logical knowledge, the state of the industrial arts…constitutes 
the substantial core of that civilization…It is a joint possession 
of the community, so far as concerns its custody, exercise, in-
crease, and transmission.”
Thus, as a community resource, Veblen [1921, p. 148] ar-
gued that the measurement of production should not be based 
on the accounting measures of profitability and gain but on 
community benefit:
Their units and standards of valuation and accountancy 
are units and standards of price, and of private gain in 
terms of price; whereas for any scheme of productive 
industry which runs, not on salesmanship and earnings, 
but on tangible performances and tangible benefit to 
the community at large, the valuations and accountan-
cy of salesmanship and earnings are misleading. 
Veblen [1921, pp. 148-149] states his position in no uncertain 
terms. The accountant and businessman are cut from the same 
cloth and must be excluded under the new order: 
…the experienced and capable business men are at the 
best to be rated as well  intentioned deaf-mute blind 
men. Their wisest judgment and sincerest endeavors 
become meaningless and misguided so soon as the con-
trolling purpose of industry shifts from the footing of 
profits on absentee investment to that of a serviceable 
output of goods. 
This view, with its emphasis on production-related measures, 
is reminiscent of the criticisms of using financial-accounting 
measures as the criteria for managing production operations set 
forth by Johnson and Kaplan [1987]. 
In his reach for a solution to those vested interests and 
absentee owners, Veblen [1921, pp. 53-54] suggests in his most 
controversial work that those who are experts in the physical 
process, the engineers, are uniquely suited to step in and control 
the industrial system: “…The industrial system of today…lends 
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itself to systematic control under the direction of industrial ex-
perts, skilled technologists, who may be called ‘production engi-
neers’ for want of a better term.” Later, in the same text, Veblen 
(p. 137) states: “The technicians are indispensable to productive 
industry of this mechanical sort; the Vested Interests and their 
absentee owners are not.” 
However, some engineers have compromised their birth-
right by becoming commercialized and co-opted by vested 
interests and financiers. These technicians must begin to see 
themselves differently in order to bring about the new order. 
They must change their representations of how they fit within 
the overall system before they can see themselves as able to re-
spond and change. Changes in their representations would then 
change their values and norms. Conflict could then be created 
as they tried to acquire power in order to implement their newly 
found understanding of their role. Although presently in the 
employ of the ownership class, Veblen [1921, p. 79] asserts that 
the growth of class consciousness on the part of the production 
engineers would motivate them to redirect their efforts for the 
benefit of the broader community good: 
They are, by force of circumstance, the keepers of the 
community’s material welfare; although they have hith-
erto been acting, in effect, as keepers and providers of 
free income for the kept classes. They are thrown into 
the position of responsible directors of the industrial 
system, and by the same move they are in a position to 
become arbiters of the community’s material welfare. 
They are becoming class conscious, and they are no 
longer driven by a commercial interest, in any such 
degree as will make them a vested interest in that com-
mercial sense in which the syndicated owners and fed-
erated workmen are vested interests.
In the 1920s,19 Veblen worked with an engineer, Howard 
Scott, and a small number of “progressive” engineers and scien-
tists to form a group called the Technical Alliance. The organiza-
tion was reformed as “Technocracy Incorporated” in the early 
1933 and is currently active.20 The Technical Alliance caught 
the attention of the popular press in early 1930s for research 
19 It might be noted that Veblen wrote EPS before the 1920s. See publishers 
note from third printing, 1933.
20 See its website: www.technocracyinc.org. The website provides access to 
a study guide that contains, almost verbatim, some of Veblen’s analysis and pre-
scriptions. 
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done over the preceding ten years. Dorfman [1966, p. 511] notes 
that Veblen was called “the theoretical founder of Technocracy” 
in magazine articles and his work, The Engineers and the Price 
System, was reissued. Study groups across the country discussed 
Technocracy’s ideas. Dorfman [1966, p. 513] notes that the Janu-
ary 1933 issue of Nation magazine editorialized: “Technocracy 
has performed a genuine service by focusing public interest on 
the two central problems of capitalist society – machines and 
money….It has dramitised the problems involved in the dis-
placement of men by machines and the inadequacy of the pres-
ent system of currency and credit for balancing production and 
distribution.”
Ideology, Technology, and Instrumental Rationality: Veblen’s 
position provides a historical perspective on one dimension 
of administrative evil, central to accounting, that is generally 
unquestionably accepted. That is, technology is amoral, and the 
application of technology to decisions or actions results in an 
efficient and objective determination. Technology becomes its 
own ideology. For Veblen an “...ideology that science had the 
capacity for solving social problems that capitalist institutions 
left unresolved had great appeal as a counter to the accepted 
notions about the sanctity of property and wealth….” [Stabile, 
1984, p. 15]
Veblen recognized the possible dangers of capitalist control 
of the means of production with its sole focus on growth and 
wealth accumulation. As noted above, Veblen proposes that 
the conduct of “business” be removed from financial capital 
and given to the “production engineers.” While such a move 
shifts control from a group whose legitimacy is based on the 
instrumental rationality of capitalist markets to one predicated 
on the instrumental rationality of “material science,” we argue 
that “production engineering” is a socially constructed technol-
ogy also predicated and legitimized by its logical grounding in 
instrumental rationality.
The question arises as to how Veblen’s ideas as developed 
above fit with the applications of instrumental rationality mani-
fest as expertise, technology, and hierarchical control structures 
discussed in our previous work. Is Veblen’s utopian dream just 
another application without soul, without consideration of the 
human being, and, thus, another form of administrative evil and 
its masking? Our understanding of Veblen suggests that all tra-
ditional productive activity is so defined such that the contexts 
of input/output and efficiency constitute the primary criteria of 
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evaluation, and these criteria are formulated and evaluated in 
terms of production capacity and its utilization. The societal ob-
jective of the business sector is to satisfy the needs of the popu-
lation without waste and duplication of work. Veblen’s analysis 
is directed toward the “primary” industries within society and 
assumes that the motivations of the engineers are “physical” in 
that values are grounded in the physical laws of nature or the 
“physical” laws of economics or society. The scientific grounding 
of the subject matter as well as their disposition, training, and 
professional responsibility guide these technocrats. Their ration-
al training and discipline imbue the “production engineer” and 
related technicians with scientific and disinterested orientation 
well suited to steward the productive resources of the society. 
Such a position implies that one cannot take the “laws of na-
ture” and pervert them so that they advantage one group relative 
to another. The technicians’ power arises from their understand-
ing of the productive technology and their ability to apply ef-
fectively and efficiently the nation’s productive capabilities in 
the actual transformation of resources into goods and services. 
The transformations are carried out in a manner consistent with 
society’s needs with regard to both adequate output and gainful 
employment.
Veblen viewed organizational management along two 
dimensions, one administrative and the other technical. The 
administrative dimension referred to the administrative con-
trol hierarchies and the managers who populated them. The 
technical dimension referred to the technical systems and the 
technicians who developed and applied the scientific technol-
ogy. Both, we argue, hold instrumental rationality as a, if not 
the, central legitimating dimension. Veblen is quite critical of 
the managers who control and implement the administrative 
hierarchies. On the other hand, he holds the engineers and 
their technological systems to be proper caretakers of society’s 
means and modes of production. Because of its grounding in 
physical laws and formal (mathematical) logic, Veblen believed 
this segment to exhibit different and less self-serving modes 
of behavior than the politically and socially motivated actions 
associated with administrative systems. However, Veblen’s 
valorized engineering solutions are still firmly grounded on the 
legitimizing criteria of instrumental rationality. In fact, because 
of the link to physical phenomena and laws, instrumental ration- 
ality might be even more dominant in this sector. As such, we 
argue, administrative evil dominates the sector as it is imple-
mented within hier archical control structures. However, as dis-
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cussed above, some [inter alia, Tilman, 1992] have argued that 
Veblen recognizes the limitations associated with this technical 
perspective and that his arguments move beyond the narrow 
implementation of instrumental rationality, implying organiza-
tional arrangements based on the democratic participation of 
engineers and workers. 
Given Veblen’s discussion in EPS, it is not clear how trans-
fers are facilitated. One might argue that Veblen does not hold 
the pricing system at fault so much as its manipulation by 
the captains of finance, although he does seem to be inclined 
towards use values over money values. The pricing system is 
not bad, per se, but it has been co-opted, and controlled. The 
markets are no longer free but controlled and manipulated by 
the vested interests through their uncontested control over the 
economic resources of the nation and the political system that 
has been co-opted and corrupted. This state of affairs is perpetu-
ated by apathy and acquiescence on the part of the technicians. 
Central to Veblen’s analysis is that the total control of the means 
of production by the engineers can be legitimized by the argu-
ment that they are grounded in and held accountable by the 
laws for nature. They are not soiled by desires/emotions of self- 
interested, pecuniary-motivated human beings and possess the 
ability, disposition, discipline, and training to move beyond such 
“irrational” or self-centered motivations.
Efficiency is a key legitimating factor underlying the justi-
fication and structure of Veblen’s technician-centered program 
from two perspectives. One relates to the exercise of control 
over the industry system by vested interests, and the other arises 
out of the inability of non-technicians to deploy society’s eco-
nomic resources efficiently. Withholding efficiency represents 
the primary means whereby vested interests exercise control for 
personal wealth [Veblen 1921, pp. 9-10]. This ability to pervert 
the market system for gain has arisen with the ascendancy of 
the corporate financer. 
On the other hand, inefficiencies also emanate from busi-
nessmen’s lack of technical knowledge. Veblen [1921, p. 121] 
argues that this lack of knowledge creates significant and costly 
inefficiencies throughout the industrial system:
It is true, if the country’s productive industry were 
competently organized as a systematic whole, and were 
then managed by competent technicians with an eye 
single to maximum production of goods and services; 
instead of, as now, being manhandled by ignorant busi-
ness men with an eye single to maximum profits; the 
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resulting output of goods and services would doubtless 
exceed the current output by several hundred per cent.
Moving away from an industrial structure based on absentee 
ownership and financial capitalism toward a more technocrati-
cally managed industrial sector would alleviate the problems of 
efficient production of an adequate level of goods and services; 
provide for economic deployment of the society’s productive re-
sources, with full employment of labor being a primary concern; 
and facilitate the equitable distribution of consumable output. 
No Panacea for Administrative Evil: Technicians and the associ-
ated technology are not panaceas for administrative evil. While 
Veblen’s ideas are not without logic and appeal, we believe his 
proposal substitutes one manifestation of administrative evil for 
another. It replaces the application of instrumental rationality to 
social relationships with the application of instrumental ration-
ality of physical relationships. In fact, such a shift may be even 
more disempowering for two reasons. First, legitimation appeal-
ing to physical laws is more difficult to challenge because of the 
implied grounding in the “objective laws of nature.”21 Second, 
singular appeals to the technical and the technician obscure the 
social relationships that underpin them. Within such a system, 
technical rationality replaces moral responsibility.
A presumption of efficiency underlies Veblen’s technician-
oriented industrial sector. Within an environment character-
ized by limited resources, only the efficient survive. Individual 
actors providing goods and services gain efficiency in their 
undertakings through the application of instrumental rational-
ity manifested as technology, expertise, and hierarchical-control 
mechanisms. The economic system reflects the composite of 
individual actions adhering to and following from the applica-
tion of instrumentally rational techniques and technologies by 
trained technicians. 
Tilman [1992, p. 202] states that Veblen “did not adequately 
differentiate between an ability to understand means-ends 
congruence and master technical skills, on the one hand, and 
the capacity to engage in acts of critical rationality on the other 
hand.” Both an example and a consequence of this lack of differ-
entiation can be seen in Veblen’s [1919, p. 37] view of the effect 
of machine-operated processes on workers: 
21 See Latour [1987, 2004] for a discussion of the power of science in the con-
duct of modern society.
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Under the new order of things the mechanical equip-
ment – the ‘industrial plan’—takes the initiative, sets 
the pace, and turns the workman to account in the car-
rying-on of those standardized processes of production 
that embody this mechanistic state of the industrial 
arts; very much as the individual craftsman in his time 
held the initiative in industry…. 
Veblen [1919, p. 39] suggests that the effect of these changes in 
the institutional structure of work have implications on workers, 
predicting these interactions with machine technology would 
lead to greater rational and intellectual development and con-
sciousness on part of workers, motivating a heightened collectiv-
ist mentality, and the ability of workers to create radical social 
change.
Stabile [1984, pp. 205, 210] disagrees with Veblen’s view of 
the effect of technological processes on workers, suggesting that 
Veblen never considered that the capitalists would find ways to 
use the technology to control workers through deskilling and 
technical control. These are evil in that they deprive human 
beings of their dignity. In addition, Stabile argues that “Veblen 
posited a version of socialism that demanded worker acquies-
cence to the dictates of technical experts…Veblen made it plain 
that the economy be governed by a national council, and indus-
trial town meeting.” Thus, implicit in Veblen’s proposal is the 
presence of bureaucratic structures. The mechanical metaphor 
of the production engineers includes hierarchical-control struc-
tures. Thus, there is a reinforcing interaction within Veblen’s 
proposed “solution” to capitalist control. 
We present these as analogous to the cornucopia of techno-
cratic suggestions for overcoming the shortcomings and inequi-
ties of capitalism and believe that such “remedies” will only shift 
the genesis of the forces depriving innocent human beings of 
their humanity. Veblen appears to give technology a non-ideo-
logical or a neutral character while implicating the ideological 
nature of administrative-control structures and administrative 
expertise associated with the vested interests of financial capital-
ism. We argue that neither of these provides legitimate grounds 
for privileged control because they are both legitimated by in-
strumental rationality. 
A number of Veblen’s contemporaries (e.g., John Commons 
and Wesley Mitchell) as well as a number of later critics, some 
of whom are mentioned above, view Veblen as a technocratic 
elitist for his unbridled faith in the role of technological experts 
to define and lead the vanguard to a “good society.” Some more 
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recent scholars, notably Stabile [1984], Edgell [2001], and Til-
man [2004] consider Veblen better described as a “scientific col-
lectivist” although for slightly different reasons. Tilman [1996] 
reasons that The Engineers and the Price System represents a 
departure from the main body of Veblen’s work and the empha-
sis on a technical elite is not consistent with his prior or later 
emancipatory focus. He also suggests that we might view his 
choice of engineers as an “expository device,” a contrast to the 
critique of other organized business groups.
Edgell [2001, p. 155] emphasizes Veblen’s role as a so-
cial utopian who emphasized cooperation and collectivism. 
Throughout Veblen’s writing, there is an emphasis on workman-
ship as an inherent, even spiritual, trait in human culture. Ed-
gell argues that “Veblen’s utopian vision also privileged work, or 
as he put it, the machine process, not in a narrow technocratic 
way, but in a ‘broader and more humanistic’ manner in which 
people liberate themselves from the restrictions of pecuniary 
control of industry and create a new society.” 
Stabile [1984] compares Veblen’s technological collective to 
that of Lenin. He suggests that Veblen’s engineer-worker alliance 
draws from the latter’s peasant-worker alliance. In part, this al-
liance also comes from Veblen ruling out other interests within 
society. Veblen argued that neither capitalism and its vested 
interests nor organized labor was able to adjudicate the best 
interests of the broader community. Veblen also recognized that 
the industrial worker was captured by the values of the leisure 
class, and he became discouraged about the prospects for social 
change emanating from this group. Stabile notes that Veblen 
would have been influenced by reformist engineers, such as Her-
bert Spencer, who were active at the time and may have looked 
to this group as the only remaining group able to overturn the 
existing social order. 
A Critical Reassessment: Technology is the physical manifesta-
tion of instrumental rationality. By engaging Marcuse’s [1941] 
ideas on technology, we consider the developmental relatedness 
between instrumental rationality and its various manifestations, 
with technology and technicians being of particular interest. In 
doing so, we illustrate how Veblen’s technocracy is also ground-
ed in instrumental rationality and, thus, embodies the potential-
ity of administrative evil. 
While Marcuse [1941, p. 414] does not address administra-
tive evil explicitly, he certainly grasps its essence and origin. 
Marcuse provides an analysis of technically based programs 
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such as the one proposed by Veblen and shows that the concep-
tion of rationality proves useful in anticipating the negative 
potential of the pervasive drive toward efficiency. His descrip-
tion of Germany’s National Socialist regime is a pre-eminent 
example of how technology can be appropriated by vested inter-
ests (e.g., fascist regimes, financial capitalists): 
National Socialism is a striking example of the ways in 
which a highly rationalized and mechanized economy 
with the utmost efficiency in production can operate 
in the interest of totalitarian oppression and continued 
scarcity. The Third Reich is indeed a form of ‘tech-
nocracy’: the technical considerations of imperialistic 
efficiency and rationality supersede the traditional stan-
dards of profitability and general welfare...The reign of 
terror is sustained [in part]…by the ingenious manipu-
lation of the power inherent in technology…follow the 
lines of greatest technological efficiency. 
Marcuse conceives of technology as embodying both techni-
cal and social dimensions, implications, and consequences. He 
describes the process of how the drive for individual rationality 
can evolve from the promotion of critical thought to become “an 
instrument of control and domination”:
Individualistic rationality was born as a critical and op-
positional attitude that derived freedom of action from 
the unrestricted liberty of thought and conscience and 
measured all social standards and relations by the in-
dividual’s rational self-interest. It grew into the ration-
ality of competition in which the rational interest was 
superseded by the interest of the market, and individual 
achievement absorbed by efficiency. It ended with stan-
dardized submission to the all-embracing apparatus 
which it had itself created. …Such was the logical out-
come of a social process which measured individual 
performance in terms of competitive efficiency. 
It is interesting that the process set out by Marcuse also 
has implicit strands of the process set forth earlier in this paper 
as that enabling administrative evil and suggests, contrary to 
Veblen’s belief, that technical efficiency, in particular, can have 
disempowering effects on those who are caught within its influ-
ence. While Veblen thought that the increased use of scientific 
processes and technology might increase the critical faculties of 
workers, Marcuse [1941, p. 422] suggests that such rationality 
controls and limits the ability of workers to critically evaluate 
their situation: 
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Rationality is being transformed from a critical force 
into one of adjustment and compliance. Autonomy of 
reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the 
thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by 
the technical requirements of the apparatus which they 
have themselves created. Reason has found its resting 
place in the system of standardized control, production 
and consumption. There it reigns through the laws and 
mechanisms which insure the efficiency, expediency 
and coherence of this system. 
Following Marcuse, we conclude that a program, and at-
titude, such as advocated by Veblen’s “cult of efficiency” cre-
ated and sustained by technicians and supported by accounting 
technologies, is itself the result, and perpetrator, of a technical 
rationality that provides the legitimating grounds, sustenance, 
and structure for administrative evil.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We set out to explore an historical perspective on the roles 
of ideology and technology in understanding administrative 
evil within large business enterprises. Thorstein Veblen’s work 
is relevant because he represents one of the first to undertake a 
critical analysis of large business organizations as they formu-
late and promote technology in an industrial society. A critic of 
corporate society’s vested interests, he views absentee ownership 
and financial management of corporations as the source of what 
we have termed administrative evil. At the same time, Veblen is 
a strong advocate of technology as the force for positive change 
within the economy and within the larger human society. Veblen 
proposed that the rationality of material science as practiced 
by production engineers is fundamentally different from the 
rationality of market capitalism. While at one level we agree, at 
a more fundamental level we find the validity of this claim to be 
wanting and, thus, are not inclined to modify our previous con-
tentions regarding the propensity of accounting as a facilitating 
technology for administrative evil. 
An analysis of Veblen’s ideas provides an historical perspec-
tive on a generally accepted perspective that accounting and 
accounting information systems are amoral applications of 
instrumentally rational technologies. We argue that Veblen’s 
perspective on technology as set out in The Engineers and the 
Price System is an example of an implementation of instrumen-
tal rationality, and that his ideas are seen as part and parcel of a 
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technocratic view of society in which science and technological 
experts occupy a privileged role that limits the development and 
expression of alternative value structures and work processes.
Veblen’s position is based on the primacy of efficiency in 
production and distribution. The logic of efficiency is instru-
mental rationality and is seen by some contemporary business 
and accounting historians as central in the evolution of busi-
ness and, thus, society. For example, Chandler [1977] concludes 
that the form of the modern business enterprise emerged as the 
result of management-control hierarchies being more efficient 
than market mechanisms in the manufacture and distribution 
of goods and services. Veblen would presumably be supportive 
of at least some of Johnson’s [2000] ideas surrounding manage-
ment by means. While we see definite advantages to Johnson’s 
proposals that claim efficiencies and science as the grounds and 
template for proposed improvements, our analysis of Veblen’s 
ideas leads us to caution that the specter of administrative evil 
cannot be ignored and may, in fact, be more insidious as it is 
masked by the purposed amoral legitimacy of technology and 
those who apply it. 
Our historical analysis of Veblen’s work draws attention to 
the differences between financial technologies (and technicians) 
and production technologies (and technicians). Specifically, the 
distinctions illustrate how physically grounded technology is 
predicated on instrumental rationality and is, therefore, just as 
imbued with destructive potential as the pecuniary perspective 
condemned by Veblen. We propose that Veblen’s “physical” ef-
ficiency morphs from a means to an end. Efficiency becomes 
a fetish replacing profit as the objectified, legitimating criteria 
for action. As Roy [1997] argues, efficiency acts in concert with 
or as a means of power.22 Veblen’s program replaces profit with 
efficiency as the primary legitimating factor. As such, one in-
humane legitimating criterion is substituted for another, with 
the proposed alternative potentially being more insidious than 
the one being replaced because of its perceived objectivity and 
scientific validity, both of which silence debate [Latour, 1987, 
2004]. Veblen perpetuates the devotion to technology and tech-
nicians spurred by the enlightenment predicated on a mythical 
faith in technology and its ability to supersede the vagaries of 
social construction. But ultimately, the potential for administra-
22 A complete evaluation of Veblen’s program requires a more in-depth treat-
ment of the power relationships implied than is possible within the context of the 
current discussion.
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tive evil realized as instrumental rationality, in whatever form, 
replaces moral responsibility. 
While initially optimistic, we find Veblen’s work rather nar-
rowly based on enlightenment thinking taken to an extreme 
conclusion reflecting the program of a disillusioned utopian 
grasping at technical rationality in order to overcome the despi-
cable situation wherein a few with power (the vested interests) 
exploited the many. Unfortunately, his panacea turns out to be 
a placebo, a placebo that may actually advance the disease for 
which it is a purposed cure. The legitimizing ground for both 
market capitalism and technocracy is an instrumentally rational 
conception of efficiency. The presumed socio-political system for 
both is democracy. Efficiency so defined does not conceptualize 
human beings as ends in themselves but as means for producing 
and consuming goods and services. Capitalism is based on a so-
cial science (economics), and technocracy is based on physical 
science (engineering). Within the context of modernity, scien-
tific trumps social. More credibility (truth value) is attributed to 
physical science. From this perspective, Veblen’s recommenda-
tions would be deemed preferable to the prevailing alternatives. 
However, for the reasons presented above, we are not compelled 
to ameliorate your previous understandings of administrative 
evil. 
We do not wish to engage in debating a preference for the 
exclusive domination of either market capitalism or technocra-
cy. Our purpose has been to illustrate the inherent potential for 
administrative evil in both by recognizing its potential within 
technology such as accounting, expertise such as accountancy, 
and the administrative hierarchies supported by both, although 
the manifestations may take significantly different forms. We 
find Veblen’s position and arguments to be, in some ways, a pre-
cursor to cure-alls being offered for improving accounting and 
business practices that are grounded in and legitimated by ap-
peals to their conformity with or emanation from scientific laws 
and logic. For example, activity-based costing and its manage-
ment derivative, activity-based management, are presented as a 
means for providing a more accurate representation of product 
costs by more faithfully structuring measurement regimes 
with respect to the underlying physical activities that consume 
resources. The legitimating grounds are the instrumentally ra-
tional scientific processes whereby the technology is derived as 
well as the decision processes that they support. Human beings, 
if explicitly considered, are means to an instrumental end. The 
accounting procedure does not explicitly consider human be-
34
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/12
27Dillard and Ruchala, Veblen’s Placebo
ings, much less view them as ends in themselves. This, we argue, 
is the root of administrative evil. Processes and artifacts thus 
created can be constructively employed, but vigilance is neces-
sary to overcome the dehumanizing potential. 
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Abstract: This paper analyzes the longitudinal development of ac-
counting thought by characterizing the content of accounting 
research over several decades (1963 to 2003). The paper also inves-
tigates the interaction among accounting scholars and examines the 
relationship of research quality, topical coverage, methodological 
tools, and citation behavior. Thus, this analysis describes how ac-
counting research has evolved, both in its content and in the way it 
has been used and perceived by its adherent scholars. 
INTRODUCTION
The motivation for this study is to improve our understand-
ing of the relationships exhibited in academic research over a 
period of several recent decades. This paper represents a study 
of accounting research as embodied in three scholarly account-
ing journals (Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Ac-
counting Research, and The Accounting Review) as related to the 
objective of improving our understanding of this literature by 
employing a set of taxonomic properties in our analysis about 
the content and context of said literature. Further, this study 
characterizes the content of accounting research, the communi-
cation of this research through the interaction among account-
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ing scholars, and how both this content and this interaction help 
define research quality. By this characterization, the paper seeks 
to provide a conception of how accounting research has evolved 
over time based on the efforts of those who produce, use, and 
evaluate it. The paper also seeks to improve our understanding 
of the topical and methodological content of accounting litera-
ture and in this way contributes to the literature of the history 
and development of accounting thought.
The content of accounting research is described by a taxo-
nomic analysis of its topical and methodological characteristics. 
Taxonomic (Greek “taxis” + “nomia” = arrangement + method) 
analysis is a method of systematically classifying and arranging 
items according to their attributes. Therefore, the content of 
accounting research is defined by classifying the artifacts of the 
research; that is, papers published in scholarly journals accord-
ing to what topics these papers cover and what methods their 
authors used to gather data and arrive at conclusions.
The interaction among accounting researchers is charac-
terized by citation analysis. Citation analysis identifies which 
research papers have been referenced in other research papers, 
and thereby endeavors to trace the development of ideas, to 
chart the interdependencies between groups of researchers, and 
to evaluate the influence of particular research papers, organs, 
or paradigms.
Finally, this paper explores the possibility of a new measure 
of research quality based on the content of research over several 
years and the citation patterns that have developed over time. 
This measure would be comprised of a component measuring 
the diversity of the research content and a component measur-
ing the degree of integration of that research. As discussed later, 
both these characteristics may be correlated with research qual-
ity.
Taxonomic Analysis Defined and Exemplified: The philosopher 
Thomas Kuhn [1962, pp.16-17] proposed the idea that all 
research is characterized by “intertwined theory and method-
ological belief.” Therefore, one way in which research may be 
defined and described is by identifying its topical foci and meth-
odological techniques. Consequently, taxonomic analysis, which 
 classifies artifacts according to their salient characteristics, will 
be used to profile the content of accounting research by identify-
ing its topical and methodological attributes. 
Several accounting history research papers have taken the 
form of taxonomic studies of literature by analyzing papers ac-
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cording to certain topical or methodological attributes. These 
include Haseman [1978] who concentrated on management ac-
counting literature; Vasarhelyi et al. [1988] who studied papers 
published in Contemporary Accounting Research; Parker [1988], 
Carnegie and Potter [2000], and Fleischman and Radcliffe 
[2005] who focused on accounting history studies; Previts and 
Brown [1993] who categorized papers published in the Journal 
of Accountancy; Fleming et al. [1990, 1991, 2000] and Rodgers 
and Williams [1996] who chronicled research in The Accounting 
Review; and Gamble et al. [1995] who studied the accounting 
education literature. 
Citation Analysis Defined: Biochemist Eugene Garfield [1964, 
1975, 1994] pioneered citation analysis, asserting that there 
 exists a “conceptual association of scientific ideas as recognized 
by...research authors” and that “by the references they cite in 
their research papers, authors make explicit linkages between 
their current research and prior work in the archive of scientific 
literature” [Garfield, 1994]. Thus, citation analysis can be used 
to describe a research network by contextualizing its constituent 
parts and finding out how different papers or journals interact 
and inform one another.
However, citation analysis can also be used not merely to 
describe research but to evaluate it. Examples of accounting 
research papers taking the form of citation analyses are McRae 
[1974], Dyckman and Zeff [1984], and Bricker [1988]. Examples 
of non-accounting citation studies include Bush et al. [1974], 
Hamelman and Mazze [1974], Eagly [1975], Ederington [1979], 
Liebowitz and Palmer [1984], Alexander and Mabry [1994], 
Borokovich et al.[1995], and Borokhovich et al. [1999] who used 
citation analysis to determine which journals or papers domi-
nate others. In these papers, the extent of this hegemony is com-
monly measured by a metric derived from the frequency that a 
journal or paper is cited in other research. Articles that are cited 
more frequently are assumed to have a greater impact on the 
literature.
Hence, citation analysis can be used in two ways. First, it 
may be used as an evaluative metric to determine the influence 
a journal or paper has on researchers. Second, citation analysis 
can be used to describe the degree of integration of research 
outlets which, as discussed later, is a desirable characteristic.
Uses of the Gini Metric: Econometrist Corrado Gini pioneered a 
statistical measure of diversity in a series of papers in the early 
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20th century [Stigler, 1994]. This measure, eventually named 
the Gini metric, captures the extent to which a population is 
evenly or unevenly distributed among sub-categories within the 
population. In the past, the Gini metric has been used to see 
how diversely a nation’s exports were dispersed among different 
foreign trading partners, or how evenly wealth was distributed 
within populations. However, in this paper, the Gini metric is 
employed to gauge the diversity of topics and methods in ac-
counting research. 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Overview of Data and Data Sources: Because the ultimate objec-
tive of this paper is to determine the content and context of ac-
counting research through taxonomic and citation analysis and 
to employ a combination of the two to help evaluate the quality 
of the research, the data used will be of two types. The first com-
prises the taxonomic profiles of three accounting research jour-
nals, and the second summarizes the citation patterns among 
these journals. 
The journals studied in this paper are Contemporary Ac-
counting Research (CAR), Journal of Accounting Research (JAR), 
and The Accounting Review (TAR). These particular research 
organs were selected because they purport to be interested 
in accounting research in general, as borne out by their self-
professed research interests and by their empirically determined 
taxonomic profiles [Badua, 2005]. 
One way of quickly determining the topical focus of a jour-
nal is by reading its editorial statements [Brown et al., 1987]. 
A review of the editorial policies of 11 different accounting 
research journals in the Rutgers Accounting Research Database 
(ARD), in which information is compiled regarding schol-
arly journal papers published between 1963 and the present, 
revealed that CAR, JAR, and TAR were self-identified as journals 
that would accept papers from a broad array of accounting 
research topics. In contrast, the eight other journals had a self-
admitted focus on specific topics such as financial accounting 
or information systems. Thus, even though other journals such 
as Journal of Accounting and Economics or Auditing: A Journal 
of Theory and Practice may be considered dominant and influ-
ential journals because of their specific research foci, they are 
excluded from this study.
Hence, JAR, TAR, and CAR comprise a general purpose 
journal group, one that could be characterized as being more 
broadly based in its selection of accounting research with 
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 papers spanning a relatively wider range of topics than the other 
journals. Therefore, it may be stated that the taxonomic and 
citation characteristics of CAR, JAR, and TAR would be repre-
sentative of the accounting mainstream, and that findings as to 
the content and context of research published in these journal 
would be generally applicable.
Methods for Gathering and Analyzing Data for Taxonomic Analy-
sis: The research attributes of interest in this paper are the topi-
cal emphases and methodological techniques that characterize 
accounting research as embodied by the three journals identi-
fied in the previous section. These attributes are determined by 
classification according to the Rutgers ARD. The most recently 
published hardcopy implementation of the ARD appeared in 
third edition in 1994 [Gardner et al., 1994].
The ARD taxonomic schema is comprised of 12 differ-
ent categories which collectively describe various aspects of a 
 paper’s topical foci, methodological tools, and other character-
istics such as its geographic setting, probable applicability, etc. 
However, this paper will focus on five particular taxonomic cat-
egories which collectively describe the topical and methodologi-
cal attributes of accounting research. The three topical taxons 
are accounting area, school of thought, and foundation disci-
pline, and the two methodological taxons are research method 
and mode of reasoning. 
Accounting area defines the functional realm of accounting 
practice to which the paper contributes. Included are financial 
accounting, auditing, managerial accounting, taxation, and 
mixed areas.
The school-of-thought taxon identifies the major area of ac-
counting research to which the paper contributes. This taxon is 
unique in that the categories that comprise it are not common 
to those of other fields. That is, these taxonomic categories are 
mostly specific to accounting research. These areas include hu-
man information processing (HIPS), efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH), time series, mathematical programming, information 
economics, agency theory, institutional studies, expert systems, 
and accounting history.
The foundation-discipline taxon identifies which academic 
area provides the intellectual basis for the paper. This taxon 
includes psychology, sociology, political science, history, phi-
losophy, economics and finance, engineering, communication, 
computer science, mathematics, decision theory, game theory, 
statistics, law, accounting, and management.
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Taxonomic classification according to research method is 
intended to identify which data-gathering procedures underlie 
the research paper. Three broad areas of research method exist 
– analytical, archival, and empirical. Analytical studies may use 
internal logic or simulations. Archival studies use either primary 
records (annual reports, accounting records, and aggregated 
data base sources, e.g., CRSP and Compustat) or secondary 
 records (other research papers or analyses of primary data, such 
as forecasts). Finally, empirical studies may take the form of 
case studies, field studies, laboratory experiments, or surveys.
Taxonomic classification according to mode of reasoning 
determines which type of quantitative or qualitative analysis 
technique was used to formally arrive at the conclusions of the 
paper. These various techniques include descriptive statistics, 
regression, analysis of variance (ANOVA), factor analysis, non-
parametric statistics, correlations, and qualitative analyses. 
In order to capture the topical and methodological char-
acteristics of accounting research, each paper of at least five 
pages in length from the three selected journals were manually 
inspected. Shorter papers, as well as editorial commentary, let-
ters to the editors, discussions of papers, and book reviews were 
excluded. Each of the selected papers was read and then classi-
fied according to the various classifications comprising the five 
chosen taxonomic categories. In this way, the major topical and 
methodological attributes of accounting research as represented 
by the three sample journals were determined.
Once these papers had been classified, the number of  papers 
categorized under each particular taxonomic classification was 
determined, and that number divided by the total number of pa-
pers published in the journal in which the paper had appeared. 
Counts were made and proportions computed over all years 
from 1963 to 2003. Hence, the proportions of papers exhibiting 
a particular topical or methodological characteristic were de-
termined for all three journals in all years the journal had been 
in existence through 2003 (TAR papers since 1963 only were 
included although the journal has been published since 1926). 
Thus, the data run from 1963 to 2003 for JAR and TAR and 1984 
to 2003 for CAR. These annual proportions are in effect a sum-
mary of the content of the entire publishing life of JAR and CAR 
and slightly more than half that of TAR up to 2003. Taken in ag-
gregate, these proportions may be said to summarize the evolu-
tion of the mainstream of accounting research over the last four 
decades of the 20th century.
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Results from Analysis of Individual Taxons: Table 1 summa-
rizes the proportions that different research methods comprise 
articles in each of the three journals. The research methods 
reflected in CAR and JAR are predominantly primary archival 
studies (48.8% and 35.95% respectively) and internal logic 
(34.8%, 31%). TAR authors similarly utilize these two research 
methods except that there is a greater dependence on internal 
logic (38.95%) than primary archival studies (28.15%). CAR’s 
third most frequently deployed research method is secondary 
archival (7.5%), differing from JAR and TAR where laboratory 
studies (14.22%, 12.54%) are the third most common research 
method of choice. 
This finding indicates that the three journals predominantly 
use the same data-gathering methods, except that JAR and TAR 
depend on laboratory studies more than CAR. This difference 
may indicate a behavioral focus in the former two journals that 
is absent in the latter. 
TABLE I
Percentages of Papers Using Various Research Methods
CAR 
(x/518)
JAR 
(x/1207)
TAR 
(x/1771)
research method: internal logic 34.80% 31.00% 38.95%
research method: simulation 1.55% 3.49% 2.61%
research method: archival primary 48.80% 35.95% 28.15%
research method: archival secondary 7.50% 7.83% 9.71%
research method: case studies 1.15% 1.44% 1.24%
research method: field studies 0.65% 2.66% 2.59%
research method: laboratory 2.30% 14.22% 12.54%
research method: survey 2.45% 2.85% 3.88%
research method: mixed 0.95% 0.80% 0.39%
As revealed in Table 2, CAR, JAR, and TAR all depend 
predominantly on regression analysis as a mode of reasoning 
(32.85%, 28.78%, 23.56%). However, while JAR’s second most 
utilized mode of reasoning is analytical modeling (23.22%), CAR 
and TAR authors favor qualitative reasoning (23.5%, 22.61%). 
The third most frequently used modes of reasoning for the three 
journals are descriptive statistics for CAR (13.5%), qualitative 
reasoning for JAR (10.46%), and analytical modeling for TAR 
(20.39%). The salient finding in this distribution is that while 
analytical modeling was among the top three modes of reason-
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ing for JAR and TAR, it was not for CAR. This may indicate that 
JAR and TAR play the role of theory building in the accounting 
research network.
TABLE 2
Percentages of Papers Using Various Modes of Reasoning
CAR 
(x/518)
JAR 
(x/1207)
TAR 
(x/1771)
mode of reasoning: descriptive statistics 13.50% 10.02% 9.17%
mode of reasoning: regression 32.85% 28.78% 23.56%
mode of reasoning: ANOVA 2.90% 10.05% 10.10%
mode of reasoning: factor analysis 3.15% 3.10% 2.71%
mode of reasoning: markov analysis 0.15% 0.32% 0.17%
mode of reasoning: nonparametric statistics 2.20% 5.90% 3.73%
mode of reasoning: correlations 1.95% 2.17% 1.78%
mode of reasoning: analytical modeling 11.80% 23.22% 20.39%
mode of reasoning: mixed 8.40% 6.37% 5.39%
mode of reasoning: qualitative 23.50% 10.46% 22.61%
Table 3 demonstrates that CAR and TAR authors devote 
themselves more heavily to the study of accounting theory 
(26.2%, 22.15%) while JAR’s primary school of thought is the 
TABLE 3
Percentages of Papers Studying Various  
Schools of Thought
CAR 
(x/518)
JAR 
(x/1207)
TAR 
(x/1771)
school of thought: human information 
processing
1.10% 9.93% 8.85%
school of thought: other behavioral 1.05% 7.88% 9.00%
school of thought: efficient markets hypothesis 22.40% 22.59% 17.56%
school of thought: time series 3.35% 5.12% 3.34%
school of thought: information economics 4.25% 10.44% 7.20%
school of thought: mathematical programming 0.60% 2.05% 3.44%
school of thought: other statistical models 10.85% 14.71% 12.54%
school of thought: accounting theory 26.20% 15.07% 22.15%
school of thought: accounting history 0.70% 2.32% 2.54%
school of thought institutional 13.15% 2.59% 5.73%
school of thought: other 16.05% 5.12% 7.10%
school of thought: agency 0.40% 2.39% 0.78%
school of thought: expert systems 0.25% 0.27% 0.12%
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EMH (22.59%). CAR and TAR authors also focus on efficient 
markets as their second most studied school of thought (22.4%, 
17.56%), while for JAR, accounting theory is the second most 
studied topic. Finally, the third most frequently studied school 
of thought for CAR is other topics (16.05%) and for JAR and 
TAR (14.71%, 12.54%), other statistical models. These results re-
veal a migration to the EMH as a research topic, consistent with 
previous research on accounting scholarship [Maher, 1997].
Table 4 reveals consistency in both the first and second most 
referenced foundation disciplines among the three journals. 
These foundation disciplines are accounting (CAR=45.35%, 
JAR=39.39%, and TAR=43.1%) and economics and finance 
(CAR=36%, JAR=26.98%, and TAR=22.12%). However, there is 
less consistency in the third most utilized foundation discipline 
with CAR authors favoring law (5.8%) and their JAR and TAR 
counterparts choosing psychology (12.95%, 10.24%). These find-
ings are again consistent with earlier results regarding research 
method as JAR and TAR authors were frequent users of labora-
tory studies, indicating a behavioral emphasis as confirmed by 
their frequent use of psychology as a theoretical grounding.
TABLE 4
Percentages of Papers Based on  
Various Foundation Disciplines
CAR 
(x/518)
JAR 
(x/1207)
TAR 
(x/1771)
foundation discipline: psychology 1.30% 12.95% 10.24%
foundation discipline: allied humanities 1.30% 3.15% 3.85%
foundation discipline: economics and finance 36.00% 26.98% 22.12%
foundation discipline: computer technology 0.15% 0.85% 1.90%
foundation discipline: allied mathematics 3.05% 10.12% 6.85%
foundation discipline: statistics 2.80% 3.15% 3.98%
foundation discipline: law 5.80% 0.27% 1.56%
foundation discipline: mixed 2.35% 2.10% 1.88%
foundation discipline: accounting 45.35% 39.39% 43.10%
foundation discipline: management 1.95% 1.27% 4.27%
Table 5 shows that all three journals feature financial ac-
counting as their primary area of research (CAR=46.91%, 
JAR=56.5%, and TAR=51.27%). CAR and JAR authors focus on 
auditing (27.8%, 17.9%) and managerial accounting (15.06%, 
16.4%) as their second and third foci respectively. TAR authors 
reverse this ordering, focusing instead on managerial account-
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ing (19.88%) and audit (15.3%) as their secondary and tertiary 
accounting areas of study. 
TABLE 5
Percentages of Papers Contributing  
to Various Accounting Areas
CAR 
(x/518)
JAR 
(x/1207)
TAR 
(x/1771)
accounting area: tax 3.09% 2.65% 4.18%
accounting area: financial 46.91% 56.50% 51.27%
accounting area: managerial 15.06% 16.40% 19.88%
accounting area: audit 27.80% 17.90% 15.30%
accounting area: information systems 0.19% 0.75% 1.36%
accounting area: mixed 6.95% 5.80% 8.02%
Results from Analysis of Taxonomic Combinations: Each re-
search paper’s characteristics may be described as the com-
bination of taxonomic classifications that apply to that paper. 
For example, every paper may be characterized by its topical 
focus (school of thought), its mother discipline (foundation 
discipline), the function of accounting to which it contributes 
(accounting area), and the ways by which data are gathered and 
analyzed (research method and mode of reasoning). Therefore, 
by analyzing not just the frequencies of use of individual taxons 
but also the frequencies of various combinations of them, can 
an analysis of the type of research study most frequently under-
taken by accounting scholars be possible.
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Taxonomic Combinations: To de-
termine what types of research most characterize accounting 
scholarship, composites of the taxonomic characteristics for all 
papers in the population were constructed. Then, the frequen-
cies of those composites were computed. According to this 
analysis, the three types of research paper that have been most 
often attempted over the period of study are:
Papers, that study accounting theory, utilize accounting as 
a foundation discipline, use internal logic and qualitative argu-
mentation, and contribute to financial accounting (198 papers 
out of 3,496 in the population that match the ARD selection 
criteria, or 6% of total papers).
Papers, in which the EMH is studied, are grounded in eco-
nomics and finance concepts, gather data from primary archival 
sources, analyze the data using regression statistics, and con-
tribute to financial accounting (185 papers, or 5%)
48
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/12
41Badua et al., Content, Communication, and Quality in Accounting Research
Papers, in which the EMH is studied, are grounded in 
accounting as a foundation discipline, use primary archival 
sources and regression statistics to gather and analyze data, and 
contribute to financial accounting (130 papers, or 4%)
It could be argued that though there are three groups of 
papers comprising the list above, these papers actually fall into 
two categories as the latter two groups may be combined to-
gether.
The first cluster of papers is characterized by its focus on 
accounting theory which is the basic role and fundamental 
principles of accounting functions and phenomena in relation to 
industry and the socio-economic milieu. These papers are there-
fore based on accounting as a foundation discipline, referencing 
mostly other papers focusing on accounting. In addition to hav-
ing a distinctive topical focus, the first cluster of papers also has 
a characteristic methodological approach as well. Rather than 
gathering empirical data to generate and confirm their findings, 
authors of these papers use internal logic to do so, deducing 
from axioms or prior theory to arrive at conclusions. Further-
more, authors of this category of papers use qualitative, verbal 
argumentation to support their findings which, in addition to 
mathematical modeling, is one of two modes of reasoning avail-
able to works employing internal logic as a research method.
The second category of papers, comprising the second and 
third groups above, has a very specific topical focus, the EMH. 
Hence, these papers concern whether and to what extent equity 
and debt capital markets are affected by accounting informa-
tion and the manner and timing of its disclosure. These papers 
are also distinctive in their methodology, based as they are on 
archival sources, such as the CRSP and Compustat databases 
for information, and regression statistics for data analysis. The 
sole difference between the two groups of papers that constitute 
this cluster lies in their divergent foundation discipline. The sec-
ond group of papers from the list above feature economics and 
finance as a foundation discipline while the third group relies 
upon accounting. Therefore, while the former uses concepts, 
frameworks, and techniques based in economics and finance 
research, the latter uses those prevalent in the accounting litera-
ture.
Longitudinal Analysis of Taxonomic Combinations: While the 
preceding analysis permits a summary characterization of the 
salient features of accounting research, it gives no indication of 
the longitudinal evolution of these features. Thus, to provide a 
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means of determining how various types of research have be-
come predominant or yielded to other types over the years, the 
annual frequencies of papers for each of the taxonomic compos-
ites was computed. Then those taxonomic combinations whose 
frequencies comprised the 99.5th percentile were identified (that 
is, taxonomic combinations whose frequencies were greater 
than 99.5% of the frequencies of all other combinations). While 
it would have been possible to identify the top X most frequently 
encountered combinations, identification of the Xth rank would 
be problematic since the number of taxonomic combinations 
varies for each journal and for each time period. Consequently, 
determination of the top X composites would be meaningless. 
On the other hand, the use of the 99.5th percentile to screen for 
extreme values is a common practice, used in fields as diverse as 
psychometrics and environmental protection [Ohio EPA, 1997]. 
Therefore, focusing on the combinations comprising the 99.5th 
percentile would consistently capture the most dominant combi-
nations, no matter how many there were. 
This procedure was done for four distinct time periods 
(1963 to 1973, 1974 to 1983, 1984 to 1993, and 1994 to 2003) for 
both the total population of papers in all three journals and for 
each one of the journals individually. The tables below list the 
dominant taxonomic combinations as determined above.
TABLE 6
Top Taxonomic Combinations All Journals, 1963 to 1973
all journals 
(1963 to 
1973)
school of 
thought
foundation 
discipline
research 
method
mode of 
reasoning
accounting 
area
178 of 938 
papers
accounting 
theory accounting
internal 
logic qualitative financial
22 of 938 math programming
allied 
mathematics
internal 
logic analytical managerial
17 of 938 accounting theory
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic qualitative financial
16 of 938 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic qualitative mixed
15 of 938 accounting theory
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic analytical financial
15 of 938 accounting theory accounting
archival 
primary regression financial
15 of 938 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic analytical financial
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The first table depicts the dominant taxonomic composites 
for all journals in the time period 1963 to 1973. These 7 combi- 
nations are so frequently encountered in the set of papers that 
their frequencies exceed 99.5 % of the frequencies of all other 
taxonomic composites.
The dominant school of thought is accounting theory and 
the dominant accounting area is financial. While foundation 
discipline and mode of reasoning are diverse, it should be noted 
that the research method in all but one of these composites is 
internal logic. This implies that most research in this period did 
not rely on gathering and analyzing data but on argumentation, 
whether by verbal discourse or by mathematical modeling.
The next two tables display those taxonomic composites 
which made up the 99.5th percentile of papers in all journals 
from 1974 to 1983, and 1984 to 1993 respectively.
TABLE 7
Top Taxonomic Combinations All Journals, 1974 to 1983
all journals 
(’74 to ’83)
school of 
thought
foundation 
discipline
research 
method
mode of 
reasoning
accounting 
area
36 of 686 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
14 of 686 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic analytical financial
14 of 686 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic qualitative financial
12 of 686 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
10 of 686 other behavioral psychology laboratory ANOVA managerial
10 of 686 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary financial
9 of 686 HIPS psychology laboratory ANOVA managerial
9 of 686 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary ANOVA financial
9 of 686 other math internal logic analytical managerial
9 of 686 accounting theory
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic analytical financial
In both tables, two new schools of thought emerge – EMH 
and HIPS. Furthermore, the dominant research methods now 
include primary archival and laboratory studies which are 
often paired with regression analysis and ANOVA as modes of 
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TABLE 8
Top Taxonomic Combinations All Journals, 1985 to 1995
all journals 
(’84 to ’93)
school of 
thought
foundation 
discipline
research 
method
mode of 
reasoning
accounting 
area
72 of 932 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
57 of 932 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
28 of 932 information economics accounting
internal 
logic analytical managerial
21 of 932 HIPS psychology laboratory ANOVA audit
15 of 932 other accounting archival primary regression audit
14 of 932 HIPS accounting laboratory ANOVA audit
14 of 932 information economics
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic analytical managerial
14 of 932 other accounting archival primary regression financial
reasoning. While other types of papers exist during this period, 
two specific types emerge as becoming dominant – (1) papers 
exploring EMH, using primary archival sources and regression 
statistics, and (2) papers studying HIPS, using laboratory meth-
ods and ANOVA.
The next table demonstrates the dominant taxonomic com-
binations in all journals for 1994 to 2003. In this time period, 
TABLE 9
Top Taxonomic Combinations All Journals, 1994 to 2003
all journals 
(’94 to ’03)
school of 
thought
foundation 
discipline
research 
method
mode of 
reasoning
accounting 
area
79 of 940 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
44 of 940 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
30 of 940 EMH accounting archival secondary regression financial
19 of 940 HIPS psychology laboratory ANOVA audit
16 of 940 other accounting archival primary regression financial
15 of 940 information economics
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic analytical managerial
15 of 940 accounting theory accounting
archival 
secondary regression financial
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the two types of papers identified earlier have become com-
pletely dominant.
The next three tables drill-down into the population and 
explore the changes in dominant taxonomic combinations by 
journal. As in the previous tables, the data are divided into the 
same four time periods. 
TABLE 10
Top Taxonomic Combinations, CAR
CAR school of thought
foundation 
discipline
research 
method
mode of 
reasoning
accounting 
area
’84 to ’93
15 of 230 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
13 of 230 information economics
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic analytical managerial
’94 to ’03
19 of 288 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
Because CAR began publication in 1984, there are no taxo-
nomic combinations identified in the 1963 to 1973 and 1974 to 
1983 periods. In the two later periods, consistent with the trend 
in all journals, CAR began to develop research characterized by 
a focus on EMH, using archival data sources and regression sta-
tistics, contributing to financial accounting.
Table 11 shows that JAR exhibits a similar trend towards re-
search that is focused on capital markets and driven by archival 
data and regression analysis. However, it also shows an empha-
sis on HIPS, information economics, and information technol-
ogy during the 1974-1983 and 1984-1993 periods.
Finally, the changes in taxonomic composite types in TAR 
papers are summarized in the table below. Once again, the table 
reveals a migration from research focused on accounting theory 
and using qualitative methods to research in EMH, using regres-
sion analysis of archival information.
While all three journals seem to follow the same trend to 
market research and to empirical and quantitative methods, 
some differences become apparent. For example, CAR does 
not seem to have emphasized HIPS research in any of the time 
 periods under consideration as it was in TAR and JAR.
In summary, the cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses 
of composite taxonomic profiles reveals that historically, the 
topical focus of accounting was on accounting theory, and the 
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TABLE 11
Top Taxonomic Combinations, JAR
JAR school of thought
foundation 
discipline
research 
method
mode of 
reasoning
accounting 
area
1963 to 
1973
21 of 269 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic qualitative financial
9 of 269 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
8 of 269 math programming
allied 
mathematics
internal 
logic analytical managerial
’74 to ’83
22 of 317 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
7 of 317 other behavioral psychology laboratory ANOVA managerial
7 of 317 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary
nonpara-
metric
statistics
financial
6 of 317 HIPS psychology laboratory ANOVA managerial
’84 to ’93
33 of 304 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
28 of 304 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
8 of 304 information technology math
internal 
logic analytical managerial
8 of 304 information economics accounting
internal 
logic analytical managerial
8 of 304 information economics accounting
internal 
logic analytical audit
’94 to ’03
31 of 317 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
14 of 317 EMH accounting archival secondary regression financial
12 of 317 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
methodology was non-empirical and qualitative. However, in lat-
er years, the focus shifted to capital markets, with an emphasis 
on archival sources and regression analysis. Research on human 
behavior has also become prevalent.
Nevertheless, the earlier non-empirical, qualitative research 
on accounting theory still comprised the majority of research 
from 1963 to 2003. However, as empirical, quantitative, market- 
54
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/12
47Badua et al., Content, Communication, and Quality in Accounting Research
TABLE 12
Top Taxonomic Combinations, TAR
TAR school of thought
foundation 
discipline
research 
method
mode of 
reasoning
accounting 
area
1963 to 
1973
157 of 669 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic qualitative financial
15 of 669 accounting theory
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic qualitative financial
14 of 669 math programming
allied 
mathematics
internal 
logic analytical managerial
14 of 669 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic qualitative mixed
’74 to ’83
14 of 369 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
12 of 369 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic qualitative financial
10 of 369 accounting theory accounting
internal 
logic analytical financial
9 of 369 accounting theory
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic analytical financial
’84 to ’93
29 of 398 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
21 of 398 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
9 of 398 HIPS psychology laboratory ANOVA audit
9 of 398 EMH accounting archival primary
descriptive 
statistics financial
7 of 398 HIPS accounting laboratory ANOVA audit
7 of 398 information economics accounting
internal 
logic analytical managerial
’94 to ’03
29 of 335 EMH economics and finance
archival 
primary regression financial
24 of 335 EMH accounting archival primary regression financial
10 of 335 other accounting archival primary regression financial
9 of 335 EMH accounting archival secondary regression financial
8 of 335 HIPS psychology laboratory ANOVA audit
8 of 335 information economics
economics 
and finance
internal 
logic analytical managerial
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oriented research continues to generate more publications, this 
dominance is likely to be erased. 
METHODS FOR GATHERING AND ANALYZING  
DATA FOR CITATION ANALYSIS
Gathering Citation Data: Citation analysis is basically concerned 
with determining which other research a paper has referenced. 
Thus, the bibliographies of each of the papers published in the 
three selected journals in the years 1998 to 2003 were exam-
ined to determine which other papers had been cited. Counts 
were made of the number of times a paper in one of the three 
journals cited a paper appearing in any of the three journals, 
including cases wherein a paper cited another paper in the same 
journal (self-citations).
Citation Metrics: Based on the above counts, citation metrics 
were used to summarize the data. The citation metrics used in 
this research were adapted from Eagly [1975] and Borokhovich 
et al. [1995]. These citation metrics include the send-receive 
ratio and the journal-impact factor, both evaluative citation 
 metrics, and the self-feed ratio, a descriptive citation metric. 
Eagly [1975, p. 880] defines the send-receive ratio as:
the ratio of the number or proportion of messages sent 
(the frequency with which the journal is cited by other 
journals) to the number or proportion of messages re-
ceived (the frequency the journal cites other journals). 
High values (approaching or exceeding 1) of the send-
receive ratio suggest that the journal is a feeder of net-
work information, while lower values (approaching 0) 
suggest that the journal is a storer of network informa-
tion. The high values may perhaps be interpreted as in-
dicative of the journal’s innovative role as a well-spring 
of seminal ideas in the discipline as well as an index of 
the journal’s relative prestige.
The send-receive ratio is calculated by the number of times 
that any individual journal is cited by other journals, divided by 
the number of times that journal cites other journals. The result-
ing quotient is thus a comparison of the journal’s influence on 
other publications, relative to their influence on it. This quotient 
is therefore increasing in the relative influence of the journal 
within a research network. 
Another evaluative citation metric is the journal-impact fac-
tor. Borokhovich et al. [1999] used impact factors as an objective 
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quantitative measure to determine the leading finance journal 
while Borokhovich et al. [1995] deployed impact factors to de-
termine faculty scholarly productivity. 
The journal-impact factor is computed as the number of 
times in a particular year that a journal is cited by other jour-
nals, divided by the number of papers published in that journal 
in the preceding two years. Hence, the resulting quotient is an 
indication of the extent to which the volume of research a jour-
nal has published has generated an impact within the research 
network. The numerator would be proportionately greater than 
the denominator for journals whose influence and prestige are 
more recognized because those journals would be cited very fre-
quently, even if the body of work from which those citations are 
derived is small. The choice of the number of the preceding two 
years’ papers as a denominator makes the ratio a measure of the 
recent standing of the journal among citing scholars. It must be 
noted that the denominator excludes the number of current-year 
publications because it would probably be too soon to expect 
these papers to generate a significant amount of citations.
The self-feed ratio, on the other hand, is a descriptive cita-
tion metric. It is the propensity of a journal to cite itself and is 
used in this research as a measure of research integration. The 
self-feed ratio is calculated as the number of times a journal 
cites itself, divided by the number of times it cites other jour-
nals. Thus, the resulting ratio indicates the proportion at which 
the information cited by a journal originates from the research 
published in the journal itself. As discussed later, while this 
metric is often viewed as a measure of the degree of specializa-
tion of a journal, it also is an important indicator of the ability 
of a journal to assimilate, discuss, and refine its own findings, 
thereby increasing their validity and significance.
Results of Citation Analysis: The annual number of external cita-
tions, published papers, and self-citations of each of the three 
journals was determined. Based on these counts, citation met-
rics were computed for each year and the annual counts aver-
aged for each journal.
JAR was revealed to have the highest values for both evalu-
ative citation metrics (send-receive ratio and journal-impact fac-
tor). TAR had the second highest impact factor, while CAR had 
the second highest send-receive ratio. The descriptive citation 
metric, the self-feed ratio, reveals that CAR authors as a group 
cite themselves the most, followed by TAR and JAR in that order. 
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TABLE 13
Citation Analysis Results
Average: CAR JAR TAR
Send-Receive ratio 1.19 3.02 0.86
Journal-Impact ratio 1.93 5.20 4.75
Self-feed ratio 0.23 0.12 0.13
Methodology for Gini Metric and Taxonomic Diversity Analysis: 
The diversity of the research (in the three journals) is deter-
mined by the Gini metric computed over the fractions of  papers 
classified under each of the various classifications in four 
 selected taxonomic categories, the two topical taxons (school of 
thought and foundation discipline), and the two methodologi-
cal taxons (research method and mode of reasoning). This is 
done by summing the squares of the proportions of papers fall-
ing under each taxonomic category out of the total number of 
papers in a journal [Stigler, 1994]. This results in a metric that 
is closer to zero if it is more diverse and closer to one hundred 
if it is more concentrated, although some researchers will use 
an alternative formula of one minus the sum of the squared 
proportions in order to yield a metric that increases in diversity 
[Badua, 2008].
Results of Taxonomic Diversity Analysis: JAR and TAR proved to 
have almost equally diverse arrays of research methods as borne 
out by their low Gini metric for this taxon (25.45 and 25.93 re-
spectively). CAR proved to be less diverse with a resulting Gini 
metric of 36.62 for research method.
TAR was the journal with the most diverse set of data-
analysis tools with a Gini metric for mode of reasoning of 17.24. 
Once more, JAR authors’ choice of modes of reasoning was only 
slightly less diverse, resulting in a Gini value of 17.57. CAR’s 
Gini score was the highest at 20.42, indicating that this journal 
had the smallest and most narrow selection of modes of reason-
ing among the three journals. 
Once again, TAR and JAR authors seemed to have the more 
diverse topical interests, with CAR articles reflecting less variety 
in topical foci. TAR’s Gini score computed for school of thought 
(12.75) was slightly lower than JAR authors (12.92), but both 
were much lower than CAR’s (17.64). This indicates that TAR 
and JAR focused on a broad array of accounting research topics 
while CAR was more selective.
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Furthermore, TAR and JAR drew from more varied sets of 
foundation disciplines than did CAR. This was proven by their 
lower Gini scores computed for foundation discipline (25.58 for 
TAR, 25.72 for JAR, compared to CAR’s 34.20).
Overall, JAR and TAR had an average Gini score of about 20 
for all four taxons under consideration, meaning that they were 
about as diverse as one another methodologically and topically. 
CAR, with an average Gini score of 27 computed over all four 
taxons, proved to be less diverse.
Table 14
Taxonomic Diversity Results
Gini CAR JAR TAR
Research Method 36.62 25.45 25.93
Mode of Reasoning 20.42 17.57 17.24
School of Thought 17.64 12.92 12.75
Foundation Discipline 34.20 25.72 25.58
Average 27.22 20.41 20.37
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Content of Accounting Research: This paper reports the results 
of a study of mainstream accounting literature over time as an 
exercise in the study of the development of accounting thought. 
As such, it has been an effort to analyze and characterize the 
content and evolution of accounting research. By this character-
ization, the paper seeks to provide a conception of accounting 
research over time based on the efforts of those who produce, 
use, and evaluate it.
The taxonomic analysis reveals that mainstream accounting 
research is characterized by significant differences in topical 
emphases and methodological tools. While it has historically 
been devoted to qualitative studies on accounting theory, this 
research has evolved to focus on economics and finance using 
quantitative analysis of archival data. This is consistent with 
previous research that has documented the strong capital mar-
kets and econometrics orientation of accounting research in 
general. An emphasis on behavioral topics, whether viewed from 
the prism of information economics or psychology, has also de-
veloped. 
The findings also suggest differences in the content and evo-
lution of the journals studied. For example, JAR and TAR seem 
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to have embraced behavioral research to a much greater degree 
than CAR. Differences also exist among the journals not only in 
the predominant methods used and topics studied, but also in 
the diversity of methodologies and topical foci.
Communication and Quality of Accounting Research: In the past, 
citation metrics could provide only proxy measures of research 
quality. This is because whereas the frequency that a piece of 
research is cited, or the number of other research artifacts refer-
encing the cited research indicates the perception of quality that 
the citing scholars have for the work, it does not capture the 
specific characteristics that contribute to that positive percep-
tion. 
Indeed, although they are in the minority, some citations 
may not actually reflect a positive opinion of the cited research 
(as is normally the case when a researcher consults the cited 
work for corroboration or inspiration). This is so when research 
is cited for the purpose of critique or contradiction. In either in-
stance, the reference appears as a cited item in the bibliography.
Future Research and Recent Developments: Some of the analyses 
developed in this paper suggest it would be theoretically pos-
sible to construct an alternative measure of research quality, 
one that takes into account the content of the research rather 
than merely relying on measures of reader perception to proxy 
for quality. This measure of research quality would consist of a 
measure of the diversity of a journal’s methods and topics and 
a measure of the extent to which the journal has integrated its 
findings. Topical and methodological diversity are both im-
portant and desirable characteristics as a research outlet that 
studies a variety of topics and uses multiple methods to prove 
and corroborate its findings contributes (a) information on a 
wide variety of issues which is (b) highly likely to be valid, due 
to triangulation by multiple modes of data gathering and analy-
sis [Robey, 1996; Lewis 1999]. Thus, research is best advanced 
by a journal that is both topically and methodologically diverse.
Paradoxically, diversity may also be a bad symptom. If a 
research paradigm is too diverse, it may be a sign of dissent 
among its scholars and the start of the decay and fragmentation 
of whatever research paradigm to which these scholars sub-
scribe. This phenomenon is known as incommensurability. That 
is, “there are no common measures among diverse paradigms of 
inquiry, so that representatives of different paradigms live in dif-
ferent worlds, hold mutually exclusive beliefs, and use different 
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vocabularies” to the extent that there is no “meaningful commu-
nication” and researchers “risk self-stultification” [Weaver and 
Gioia, 1994, p. 565]. Thus, researchers who study vastly differ-
ent topics and/or use radically different methods to study these 
topics will tend not to communicate, and when there is no active 
dialogue between constituent scholars, their findings will not 
benefit from the refinement and validation that communication 
and collaboration provide.
Therefore, research quality would be expressed as a metric 
comprised of the interaction of two things: (1) some measure 
of diversity and (2) some measure of dialogue within a journal. 
A number of the metrics computed in this paper, such as the 
Gini and self-citation metrics, could possibly be adapted to 
the task. In order to determine the validity of this measure, it 
could be correlated or regressed against other accepted proxies 
of research quality; for example, the evaluative citation metrics 
used in this paper. Because this paper only has six years (1998 
to 2003) of citation data, such an analysis would have limited 
statistical validity even if significant results were found. Thus, 
we leave the final operationalization, implementation, and vali-
dation of the metric for future research. With theoretical refine-
ments and additional data, the metric might indeed prove to be 
a direct means of measuring research quality. 
While such a method permits a quality determination that 
is more direct than traditional citation-based metrics, there are 
limitations and qualifications which apply. Academic organiza-
tions such as the Association for the Advancement of Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB) and the American Accounting 
Association (AAA) have recently asserted the need for demon-
strating research impact on industry as an essential component 
of research quality or value. The implication of these recently 
announced initiatives are manifold [AACSB, 2008]. Is it suffi-
cient to consider and classify research by such measures as cita-
tions, when this metric is decidedly biased in terms of measur-
ing work which is “by academics for academics?” In an applied 
discipline such as accounting, are impact measures not better 
developed by demonstrations of “real world impact,” and, if so, 
what  measures should be used [AAA, 2009]?
Our paper therefore, while limited in this “real world” ele-
ment, opens the way for others to study the development of 
accounting thought over time with a view toward alternative 
measures of quality and impact. Also, we recognize the nascent 
character of quantitative metrics as developed herein and en-
courage continued future research into the development of our 
61
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2011, Vol. 38, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2011
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201154
literature with expanding attention to developing the means to 
improve our understanding of the qualitative and impact factors 
of our discipline’s thought over time without merely relying on 
indirect proxies such as citation metrics. 
Thus, this paper concludes with the idea that research 
quality may be measured in many ways. However, it may be de-
termined by its content and how it has been communicated. As 
in human conversations, the quality of the colloquy among ac-
counting researchers depends on the variety of topics discussed, 
the different ways by which assertions are validated, and the 
degree to which one meditates upon one’s beliefs before sharing 
them with the world.
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THE FIRST EXTERNAL AUDITORS OF 
THE HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY, 1866
Abstract: At the request of shareholders, the Hudson’s Bay Company 
had its financial statements audited for the first time in 1866. Two 
external auditors were hired, one for the shareholders and one for 
management. Three inter-related forces led to this decision: (1) most 
importantly, the company’s shareholders demanded audited financial 
statements, (2) there was emerging in London at the time the capac-
ity and willingness among London accountants to provide external 
audit services, and (3) the British Parliament passed various acts that 
required financial statements of companies in other industries to be 
audited. After a few years, only the management’s external auditor 
was retained. He subsequently influenced the company’s development 
of management accounting. In addition, the company’s early external 
auditors were influential in the development of the Institute of Char-
tered Accountants of England and Wales.
INTRODUCTION
The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) is the world’s longest 
surviving commercial organization that continues in its origi-
nal line of business [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 9]. It was 
a successful, London-based, joint-stock company for 300 years 
before it became a Canadian public company in 1970. In recent 
decades, the HBC became less competitive, and in 2005, it was 
acquired and subsequently converted into a private company.
In its 341 years, the HBC has experienced many account-
ing and auditing changes. The HBC’s management accounting 
changes have been discussed by Spraakman and his co-authors.1 
That research traced the management accounting practices of 
the HBC from 1670 to 2005 and found that the company had 
four different management accounting programs with the fifth 
1 See references for relevant HBC articles by Spraakman and his co-authors 
[Spraakman and Davidson, 1998; Spraakman, 1999, 2002, 2010; Spraakman and 
Margret, 2005a, b; Spraakman and Wilkie, 2005. 
Acknowledgment: The author thanks the editor and two anonymous refer-
ees for their comments and suggestions and Dick Edwards for suggestions on an 
earlier draft. It is colleagues who enable our discipline to advance..
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in the initial phase in 2005. The overall conclusion was that 
management accounting was slow to change, but when it did, 
the justifications and changes were significant. This research 
noted briefly that the HBC’s first external auditor appointments 
had been made in 1866. 
Despite its richness in terms of longevity and comprehen-
siveness, the HBC’s archives have not been used to examine in 
depth the beginnings and development of its external auditing. 
The archive of no other commercial company in the world con-
tains so many years of accounting documents. E.E. Rich [1958, 
p. xi], HBC scholar and Cambridge University professor, ob-
serves that the company “preserved a unique and magnificently 
full series of documents which take the story back even to be-
fore the Charter of 2nd May, 1670, and with great cost and sense 
of purpose it has assembled its archives, sorted and catalogued 
them, and prepared them for the use of the historian.”
Short shrift to auditing is common as Matthews [2006, p. 
2] concludes “that there has been very limited primary research 
into the history of the audit on either side of the Atlantic.” This 
paper will address in part this shortcoming by documenting 
the first external auditors at the HBC. It demonstrates how the 
external auditors and their audits changed the way in which 
accounting was done. In addition, this paper will document the 
affiliation of the HBC’s earliest external auditors to the develop-
ment of professional external auditing in London as well as 
within the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales (ICAEW). 
The context and environment surrounding the introduction 
of external auditing in 1866 will be revealed in the next section, 
followed by section three which describes the conditions accom-
panying the introduction of the HBC’s first external auditors. 
There were two external auditors, one for the shareholders and 
the other for the governor and committee (comparable to the 
contemporary board of directors). Section four documents the 
evolution of the auditor’s external audit activities for several 
decades at the HBC, while the next explores his management 
advisory activities. The last section is a discussion of findings 
and conclusions.
CONTEXTUALIZATION
The decision to hire external auditors can best be appreci-
ated by understanding the context. More specifically, in 1860, 
the HBC’s longest serving governor, George Simpson, died. For 
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the previous 40 years, he had run the company’s fur trade busi-
ness successfully in his inimitable way. The HBC had achieved 
much during those years. Due largely to its success especially 
during the Simpson years, economists have evaluated the HBC 
to be one of the few companies in the world to have earned an 
economic rent from its unique resources. It appears to have 
been singularly successful [Schoemaker, 1990, p. 1,180] as were 
IBM and Proctor & Gamble at later points in time. 
Added to the loss of Simpson’s strong leadership, the HBC 
faced four external but related shocks during the last 40 years of 
the 19th century. First, modernization changed the way in which 
the HBC conducted its fur trade business. Canoes and boats on 
lakes and rivers were no longer the means for communications 
and transportation. The first significant challenge to the value of 
the HBC’s communications and transportation system came in 
1859 from the introduction of steamboats [Innis, 1956, p. 344]. 
Transportation costs were further reduced with the extension 
of the Northern Pacific Railway, which was completed to Win-
nipeg by the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) in 1878. The CPR, 
however, had a much greater impact on lowering costs when the 
trans-Canada line was completed in 1885. The rail was not only 
cheaper than canoes, York boats, and steamboats, but it was 
also quicker and more reliable [Barris, 1977, p. 41]. 
Similarly, modernization enabled barter in North America 
to be gradually replaced by cash transactions.2 Previously, the 
HBC had to create a trade currency, which it did by equating 
all furs and trade goods to a prime beaver pelt, called a “made 
beaver.” This “made beaver” system was a means of influencing 
the lives of the aborigines; trapping and the consumptions of 
European goods became a more significant part of their lives 
[Neu and Therrien, 2003, pp. 27-28]. The “made beaver” system 
worked well from 1670 to the last half of the 19th century when 
modernization gradually demanded that it be replaced with 
cash transactions. The conversion from “made beaver” to cash 
changed how the aborigines dealt with the HBC. Unlike barter, 
they did not have to conduct both transactions – the sale of furs 
and the acquisition of trade goods – with the HBC. 
The isolation of the fur posts and employees decreased in 
relative terms after 1860 with communications and transporta-
tion developments. Correspondence and travelling times were 
also reduced significantly. With the telegraph that accompanied 
2  The paper will refer to “North America” as the location of the HBC’s opera-
tions prior to Canadian Confederation (1867) and “Canada” thereafter.
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modernization, instructions could be detailed and given fre-
quently to the traders along with advice on the latest market 
prices in London. 
Second, the company was required to give up its charter 
that had been received from the King of England in 1670. The 
HBC, in 1870, turned its trade monopoly, charter, and lands 
over to the Canadian government for remuneration (£300,000). 
One important term in the transfer was that the HBC received 
a 1/20th share of prairie-parkland real estate in what became 
Western Canada, thereby entering the land business. 
Third, in 1868, the concerns over the future (e.g., loss of 
charter, modernization, and consequences on business) encour-
aged the governor and committee to hire an external consultant, 
Cyril Graham. He was a vice-president at the Transatlantic Ca-
ble Company and had been in the British Colonial Office. Thus, 
Graham had both business and governmental credentials. The 
governor and committee followed Graham’s recommendations, 
which included pursuing modernization as the most significant. 
With the steam ships on rivers and lakes and later the railway, 
the HBC largely replaced its own communications and trans-
portation system by contracting with suppliers. At the same 
time, the company got out of the business of supplying food and 
clothing to its employees by relying upon an emerging infra-
structure. Hence, the company shrank and with improvements 
in communications and transportation, it became easier to 
manage. Consequently, the HBC was able to change its fur-trade 
organizational structure by eliminating a level of management. 
Prior to the forces of modernization, there were four levels in 
the fur-trade business: posts, districts, departments, and the 
commissioner (the new title for inland governor). Departments 
were eliminated and subsequently district managers reported di-
rectly to the fur-trade commissioner, thus increasing the number 
of managers directly reporting. 
Fourth, the International Financial Society (IFS) acquired 
the HBC shares from its existing shareholders in 1863 and sold 
those shares at a premium to new shareholders who expected 
more from the company. The IFS had an effect on how the HBC 
was managed. The new owners became increasingly demand-
ing [Mitchell, 1953, pp. 220, 241; Ray, 1986, p. 5]. The HBC 
also followed the advice of Graham when it entered the retail 
business with saleshops in 1871. Thus, the company had three 
businesses-fur trade, land, and saleshops. In this context, this 
paper will examine how the company came to hire its first exter-
nal auditors.
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EXTERNAL AUDITORS AND AUDITING
The HBC’s first external takeover was initiated in 1863 by 
the English promoter Edward Watkin, who at the time was a 
member of the British Parliament [Hodgkins, 1999, p. 2]. He 
was familiar with both Canada and the HBC. In 1861, he went 
on a mission to Canada at the request of the British government 
to investigate the possible confederation of five British provinces 
into the dominion of Canada and transferring the HBC lands to 
the new Canadian government [Sutton, 2004]. At this time, there 
was a group of businessmen and British government officials in-
terested in building a telegraph line to the Pacific and a related 
group who wanted to expand the Grand Trunk Railway into an 
inter-colonial railway connecting Nova Scotia through Upper 
Canada (now Ontario) to the Pacific Ocean [Mitchell, 1953, pp. 
222-227]. He also informally represented some of the owners of 
the Grand Trunk Railway. 
An obstacle to the plans for the inter-colonial railway and 
the telegraph was the HBC. The company was not willing to 
cooperate with either plan. Instead the governor and committee 
wanted the company to be purchased for £1.5 million. The IFS 
was an investment group formed by Watkin and some of his in-
vestor friends willing to put up their personal money to acquire 
the company’s shares from the existing owners for £1.5 million, 
about 50% over the market price [Mitchell, 1953, pp. 241-242]. 
None of the members of the IFS had a dominant share position. 
With promotion of the HBC’s untapped potential from future 
settlement, the IFS sold the shares for approximately £2 million. 
None of the buyers had dominant share positions at the time at 
this transaction. Watkin and his fellow investors benefited hand-
somely. After replacing existing shareholders (except for two), 
the IFS disappeared.
The HBC was not removed as an obstacle by the purchase 
of 1863, but the new owners were more cooperative [Mitchell, 
1953, p. 220]. The groups representing the interests of the Grand 
Trunk Railway and the proposed telegraph to the Pacific Ocean 
were not represented by the new owners of the HBC.
The hiring of external auditors was initiated on November 
28, 1865 at the general court by a Mr. R.A. Heath, who made a 
motion which was carried unanimously [HBC, annual report, 
1865]. Heath was a proprietor or shareholder but not a com-
mittee (board) member. The minutes of the general courts 
suggest that shareholders were active in questioning the gov-
ernor and committee about financial prospects [HBC, annual 
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reports, 1866-1900]. Active shareholders at this time were not 
as described by Maltby [1999, p. 38], who found that “investors 
tended to rely on personal acquaintances and experience rather 
than on accounting data.” The HBC’s financial statements were 
audited for the first time and signed by the external auditors in 
1866 [HBC, annual report, 1866]. 
It is important to understand the specific business environ-
ment in London at the time Mr. Heath made the motion for 
appointing external auditors. The Joint Stock Companies Act 
of 1844 made incorporation easy and inexpensive [Boyns et 
al., 2000, p. 97]. It required that a balance sheet be presented 
to the shareholders at the annual general meeting and a copy 
of the balance sheet had to be filed with the Registrar of Joint 
Stock Companies. Auditors could be appointed; directors of the 
company could be selected as the auditors. Then the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1856 cancelled the requirements under the 
1844 Act for the presentation of a balance sheet to the share-
holders at the annual general meeting. The 1856 act included 
a model set of Articles of Association for preparing the balance 
sheet and profit-and-loss statement for an audit [Maltby, 1999, 
p. 33]. 
The Companies Act of 1862 consolidated various acts to be-
come the principal act without changing the voluntary require-
ments. However, it was not until the Companies Act of 1900 that 
compulsory external audits were reintroduced for all limited 
British companies [Edwards and Webb, 1985, p. 179; Chand-
ler and Edwards, 1996, p. 8]. The act defined an appointment 
 method and remuneration for auditors, their rights of investiga-
tion, and their general duties. Only then were directors and offi-
cers of the company ineligible to act as external auditors. In the 
half century prior to the 1900 act, there were no requirements 
for the auditor to hold a professional qualification [Maltby, 
1999, p. 38]. It was frequently stipulated in a company’s articles 
that the external auditor should be a shareholder. 
During the 40 year period prior to 1900, there was a steady 
increase in the external audit of British companies, attributable 
to regulations. The HBC is significant to study as unlike many 
firms that introduced external audit at the same time, it was not 
regulated or required to produce audited financial statements. 
The shareholders demanded audited financial statements. More-
over, the governor and committee were willing to accept the in-
herent risk of a “special” or unique fur-trade accounting system 
that could be misunderstood [HBC, annual report, 1866]. 
Maltby [1999, p. 41] concluded that the requirement for ex-
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ternal audits was likely facilitated by the gradual development of 
the accounting principles. She said:
The late [19th] century saw the elaboration of account-
ing principles by the profession, in the pages of The 
Accountant, in textbooks written by Francis Pixley, 
Lawrence Dicksee and others, and in the lectures and 
papers read to students’ societies. The principles devel-
oped gave a key role to prudence; current assets should 
be valued at the lower of cost and realizable value, fixed 
assets should be depreciated, irrespective of their mar-
ket value, and provision should be made for losses as 
soon as they appeared possible.
The principles became the base against which the auditors 
 assessed a company’s financial statements.
Chandler and Edwards [1996, p. 7] claimed that 1900 was 
the beginning of a “golden age” for external auditors. They ar-
ticulated a definite position among the new professions (e.g., en-
gineering, architecture), and there was for the first time general 
understanding of the “nature and limitations” of external audits. 
Nevertheless, professionally qualified auditors were not required 
by the Companies Act until 1947 [Edwards, 1989, p. 209]. The 
HBC’s decision to engage external auditors came 35 years before 
required by law. The shareholders, who unanimously approved 
the motion to engage external auditors, were aware of the ad-
vantages of external auditors.
For the nearly 200 years prior to the IFS, the HBC’s fi nan-
cial statements did not appear in the minutes to the semi-annual 
general courts. The first financial statements appeared in the 
minutes for 1864 [HBCA,2.3.84]. Prior to 1864, there was no 
evidence in the minutes about the inclusion of copies of the fi-
nancial statements although there was discussion in the general 
courts about the financial condition of the company when the 
governors announced the payment of dividends. Apparently, the 
“grand ledgers” were placed on the “table” for shareholder view-
ing. The HBC broke with this tradition by publishing its audited 
financial statements in 1866. Comparable publication was intro-
duced for railways in 1868, life assurance companies in 1870, 
the gas industry and waterworks in 1871, building societies in 
1874, and the electricity industry in 1882 [Maltby, 1999, p. 33].
The first audit report is recorded below verbatim [HBC, 
 annual report, 1866].
REPORT OF THE AUDITORS
To the Governor and committee of the Hudson’s Bay 
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Company
Under and in accordance with the following resolution 
of the proprietors of the HBC:
That a professional auditor be appointed by the gover-
nor and committee, and that Mr. Watkin be appointed 
shareholder auditor.
That the two auditors report to the shareholders at the 
next general meeting as to the state of the accounts of 
the company.
We have audited the accounts of the company for the 
year ended May 31, 1866, and have made out and 
signed an account which is attached hereto in accor-
dance and conformity with the Deed Poll.
We would, however, draw your attention to the fact 
that the stock of goods and stores has been increased 
by £71,991 14s.11d., which sum includes the usual ad-
dition of 33 percent on the cost price, equal to £17,997 
18s.9d., to cover freight and charges, it being under-
stood that such freight and charges do not, in practice 
amount to so much as 33 percent: therefore, this credit 
contains an amount of assumed and unrealized profit, 
and it is for the governor and committee to consider 
how far such a profit can be now divided amongst pro-
prietors.
Again: the following charges for interest, viz.: North 
West Telegraph, £8,41 2s. 5d., Puget Sound Company, 
£1,246 8s.3d., James Douglas, £145 8s.10d., are credited 
to the interest account, and although it is quite true 
such charges have accrued due and may ultimately be 
recovered, still, their amount has not yet been received, 
so that the above remark is equally applicable to these 
items.
The amount standing to the debit of the account of the 
purchase of Governor Douglas’s interest as a trader be-
ing to a considerable extent irrecoverable, should be 
written off in these or in the next accounts.
As regards the bills held as security for the amounts 
placed in deposit with Overend, Gurney and Company, 
we accept the assurance of the secretary that the gover-
nor and committee are satisfied that these deposits will 
be fully repaid, a conclusion in which, from an inspec-
tion of the bills themselves, we quite concur, although 
some delay may arise in the realization.
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Referring to the capital account we observe that the 
item of £1,073,192 16s. 2d for territory, rights and fixed 
property, can only be taken as a balancing item depen-
dent, first, upon the cost and value of the forts, stations, 
cultivated farms and other property valuable and neces-
sary for the conduct of the trade, and which, paid for 
from time to time mainly out of revenue, have no doubt 
cost a very large sum, not specially debited from time 
to time; and, secondly, upon the future realization of 
wild lands, and of mines, fisheries and other rights and 
royalties over the vast area comprised in the company’s 
possessions: it clearly would be impossible to define the 
latter and it might even under present circumstances 
be highly inexpedient; but it is not impossible to make 
a reliable estimate in detail of the former, and to record 
the result in the books as a separate and special item of 
capital, liable to annual addition or deduction. We rec-
ommend this subject to your consideration.
We have received every assistance from Mr. Roberts, 
your valued accountant, in conducting the audit, and 
although the books of the company exhibit a special 
system, they are very regularly and carefully kept.
Edw. W. Watkin  William Quilter
 Auditors
London, June 19, 1866.
Watkin and Quilter prepared the 1866 financial statements, 
consisting of the balance sheet, profit-and-loss statement, and 
general account (which exhibited the profit-and-loss results for 
the outfit of the previous year), and then audited them. This is 
divulged in the fourth paragraph, i.e., “we have made out and 
signed an account.” In 1866, when Watkin and Quilter signed 
the HBC’s financial statements, external auditors tended to pre-
pare the financial statements and audited them. Further support 
comes from the observations during the time period that com-
panies failed to distinguish between accounting and audit fees 
[Matthews, 2006, pp. 12, 16]. 
If today ‘auditing can be viewed as the checking of 
the work of one set of skilled financial accountants by 
another’ [Sherer and Kent, 1983, p. 17] this has only 
relatively recently become the case....The professional 
audit in Britain then was from the start closely bound 
up with bookkeeping and…this accountancy role often 
preceded that of auditor. From the 1860s, accountants...
had to put the client’s accounts in order, and when they 
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subsequently assumed the role of auditor as a matter of 
course they continued responsibility for the accounts 
…At least down to the 1960s, the majority of British 
‘audits’ were therefore something of a polite fiction and 
not pure audits which the articled clerks were taught 
in their textbooks…Accounting firms…were frequently 
asked to finish the balance sheet and take out the bal-
ance and write up the book.
The financial statements of 1866-1868 appeared to have 
been prepared and audited by the external auditors. The two 
auditors claimed to have “made out and signed an account.” In 
contrast, the financial statements in 1869 and thereafter were 
not prepared by the external auditor. He only audited them. 
More specifically, in his 1869 audit report, he averred that he 
had “examined and found to be in due accordance with the 
Books, Accounts, and Vouchers of the Company” [HBC, annual 
report, 1869]. There was no admission that the auditor prepared 
the financial statements. Also, there was only one external audi-
tor by that time, Quilter, who had been the external auditor for 
management, (i.e., governor and committee). It should be noted 
that in 1869, Quilter did a detailed audit to the voucher level.
There is further evidence that the external auditor exam-
ined the financial statements and books but did not prepare the 
financial statements. This evidence came from the governor at 
a general court. Specifically, in response to a question from a 
shareholder about the external auditor’s fees, Governor Sir Staf-
ford Northcote said of the external auditor:
Mr. Quilter [the external auditor], with the assistance 
of two of his clerks, has been a very considerable time 
in the examination of the company’s books, that all the 
books are laid open before him, and not only so, but it 
has frequently happened, since I have been connected 
with the company, that we have had meetings with 
Mr. Quilter, and discussed with him for perhaps more 
than one day at a time – or rather, for more than one 
sitting – the mode in which certain accounts ought to 
be presented – what should be reckoned as profit, what 
should be reckoned as due to capital, and so forth; and 
I should certainly think the company would behave 
very unwisely if they were to dispense with the services 
of a first-class auditor for such purposes. 
Note, the governor specified that the external auditor exam-
ined the books that were made available to him. These appeared 
to be discussions between the governor and the external auditor 
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on presentation and classification matters. Moreover, there were 
no indications on the financial statements that the external audi-
tor prepared the financial statements in 1869 and in subsequent 
years. 
Matthews [2006, p. 7] and Edwards et al. [2007, p. 82] 
found that Quilter had been frequently requested “to sort out 
railway frauds and other financial problems, and…[was]...
often responsible for putting…accounting systems on a sound 
footing.” It was accountants such as Quilter who improved ac-
counting practices among companies particularly when going 
public [Edwards, 1985, pp. 36-38; Matthews, 2006, p. 9]. He was 
also active in the Institute of Accountants of London (IAL), one 
of the five groups that would form the ICAEW. Walker [2004, 
p. 143] reported that on June 8, 1870, nine of the leading ac-
countants in London gathered at the offices of Quilter’s firm to 
consider establishing the IAL. In addition, Quilter chaired the 
meeting on November 29, 1870 that actually established the IAL. 
The ICAEW received its royal charter in 1880. Its formation was 
the result of the amalgamation of five public accounting groups, 
each of which had been formed in the 1870s [Walker, 2004, p. 
127].
Matthews [2006, p. 7] found that after the aforementioned 
railway act of 1868, the financial statements of railway com-
panies exceeded all other British companies in detail and ac-
curacy. The railway companies had by that date established 
skilled accountants and routine accounting practices that made 
the recruitment of external auditors to prepare the financial 
statements unnecessary. Due to the quality of the financial state-
ments, the external auditors were able to limit themselves to 
auditing the financial statements of railway companies. The fact 
that the HBC’s financial statements were no longer prepared by 
the external auditors in 1869 attests to the ability of the HBC 
accountants and the quality of its financial statements. The 
railway companies and the HBC were more advanced in the ac-
counting for financial statements than most other companies in 
Britain during the last quarter of the 19th century [Matthews, 
2006, p. 8]. 
It was noted that Quilter continued as the external auditor, 
but Watkin, the shareholder external auditor, did not. Matthews 
[2006, p. 10] discussed the use of shareholder auditors in the 
second half of the 19th century:
it…was an established practice in joint stock companies 
(like the old trading concerns such as the East India 
75
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2011, Vol. 38, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2011
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201168
Company or the canals, gas and water works) for the 
shareholders, who took no part in running of the com-
panies, to elect at their annual or bi-annual meetings 
one or two of their number to audit the accounts, and 
so keep an eye on their investments. 
Matthews [2000, p. 11] labelled them “amateurs” and as-
sessed their contribution to be “no more than a cursory inspec-
tion on the day of the general meeting.” Consequently, he con-
cluded that these amateurs quickly had themselves replaced by 
professional external auditors. For example, in 1883, all major 
British companies had amateur external auditors, but in 1900, 
nearly all had professional external auditors. 
In addition, Edwards et al. [2007, p. 82] say that these 
shareholder auditors were motivated to ensure that the com-
pany’s “resources…[were]…properly safeguarded and honestly 
managed.” They concluded that these enthusiastic amateurs 
were unorganized and offered little defence against competition 
from professional external auditors. Consequently, they were 
easily replaced. There was no indication of any such tension 
at the HBC. However, this questions the need for both Watkin 
and Quilter with the audited financial statements in 1866-1868. 
Quilter would have been able to prepare and audit the financial 
statements himself. He was familiar with the accounting rec-
ords as he had been employed by the HBC as an accountant or 
auditor from 1863 [Edwards, 2004], but there was no evidence 
that he prepared the previously mentioned first set of financial 
statements of 1864 as those statements were not signed by him. 
Rather, they were unsigned [HBCA. A.2.3.84]. They could have 
been prepared by or in conjunction with the chief accountant 
at the time, the highly lauded Edward Roberts, who had intro-
duced numerous accounting system changes during his 1803-
1870 career with the HBC [HBCA, A.10.35.129. A.64.38.16d]. 
Watkin did not have the credentials to prepare and/or audit the 
HBC’s financial statements. 
There has always been concern about the independence of 
the external auditor when reporting to management [Staubus, 
2005, p. 5]. This may have tended to encourage shareholders 
to appoint their own external auditor. The question is, can the 
external auditor report honestly to shareholders about the per-
formance of management when being paid by management? 
The existence of an external auditor for the shareholders attests 
to such questioning. At the same time, the managers wanted an 
external auditor reporting to them. Both the shareholders and 
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the managers appeared to believe that the reporting relationship 
would affect the external auditor’s reporting.
Maltby [1999, p. 46] has similarly argued that the audit pro-
fession in Britain has identified itself with management rather 
than shareholder interests. According to Maltby, it occurred be-
cause at the end of the 19th century, small investors were in the 
minority. The dominant form of governance continued to be the 
“insiders,” who were prudent and tended to hold the shares for 
the long term. These investors were able to rely on private links 
with management.
EVOLUTION OF THE COMPANY’S AUDITOR
The 1865 motion specified that Mr. Watkin was the share-
holders’ external auditor. Mr. Quilter was the second external 
auditor and obviously the external auditor for the management 
(the governor and committee). Both auditors, listed in alphabet-
ical order, signed each of the three financial statements for 1866. 
There were two external auditors for each year until the 1869 
financial statements which were signed by only one external 
auditor, Quilter, described by the governor in the report to the 
shareholders as the “Company’s Auditor” [HBC, annual reports, 
1867-1869]. It should be noted that it was the company’s exter-
nal auditor that continued, not that of the shareholders.
Watkin and Quilter were eminent in their respective endeav-
ors which overlapped with their railway activities. There was 
no indication of disharmony between the two external auditors. 
They likely knew each other before becoming the HBC’s external 
auditors. Watkin had formed the IFS to acquire the shares of 
the HBC, and was thus well known to the HBC shareholders. 
He was still a member of the British Parliament. In 1845, he 
became secretary of the Trent Valley Railway, which was sub-
sequently sold to the London and North Western Railway Com-
pany by which he was also employed [Sutton, 2004]. In 1853, he 
became the general manager of the Manchester, Sheffield, and 
Lincolnshire Railway. By 1865, he had become the chairman of 
the Manchester and Liverpool and the Grand Railways [Hodg-
kins, 1999, p. 2]. 
Quilter had also been active with railways as an auditor 
rather than as an investor [Edwards, 2004]. As an accounting 
expert, he was invited in 1849 to present evidence to a House of 
Lords select committee (Monteagle Committee) on the audit of 
railway accounts. The committee was established to investigate 
the “railway mania” of 1845. Quilter testified that (unnamed) 
railway companies were paying dividends out of capital rather 
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than profits thus misrepresenting the financial situation [Bryer, 
1991, pp. 456-457]. One aspect of Quilter’s evidence was his 
stated opposition to any requirement that the auditors of rail-
way companies be shareholders. Accordingly, he also believed 
that auditor ownership of shares compromised independence. 
He advocated the replacement of the shareholder auditors by 
professional auditors as was done by the HBC. Quilter became 
the sole external auditor for the HBC.
From 1869, the same auditor statement “examined and 
found to be in accordance with the Books, Accounts, and 
Vouchers of the Company,” was used until 1892, when it was 
changed to [HBC, annual report, 1892]: “I have examined the 
books, accounts, and vouchers of the company in London, and 
the various authenticated statements and certificates received 
from Canada, and I hereby certify that the balance sheet and 
profit and loss accounts are in accordance therewith. Thomas A. 
Welton, Welton, Jones & co., 5, Moorgate Street, London, E.C.” 
Thomas Welton, from the same firm as Quilter [Matthews 
et al., 1998, p. 26], became the HBC’s external auditor in 1889 in 
succession to Quilter. Welton had also been active with the for-
mation of the IAL [Walker, 2004, p. 143]. Subsequently in 1892, 
as president of the ICAEW, he lauded the “security we have 
taken, in the way of articles and examinations, for the proper 
training of the next generation of accountants” [Anderson et al., 
2005, pp. 22-23].
Governor Donald A. Smith noted at the 1892 general court 
that, “there is also appended to the statement of accounts the ex-
ternal auditor’s certificate, more extended and more precise than 
in former years.” The extended certificate noted that “various 
authenticated statements and certificates received from Canada” 
were included in the audit and the auditor’s explicitly certified 
balance sheet and profit-and-loss accounts. 
A major change came in the 1901 auditor’s report, when 
Thomas Welton, the external auditor, specified [HBC, annual 
report, 1901]:
In accordance with the provisions of the Companies’ 
Act, 1900, I certify that all my requirements as Auditor 
have been complied with. I report to the Shareholders 
that I have audited the above Balance Sheet, and, in my 
opinion, such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so 
as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the 
company’s affairs as shown by the Books of the com-
pany in London, and the audited statements received 
from Canada.
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In 1909, there was a slight change to the auditor’s state-
ment. Welton dropped “the Companies’ Act, 1900” basis for the 
audit. He also referred to the accounting documents as “certi-
fied” rather than audited. The latter was a correction. Although 
external auditors were hired for the London financial statements 
from 1866, these external auditors did not travel to Canada to 
audit the accounting records. Welton, as well as the external 
auditors before him, depended on others to verify the HBC’s 
Canadian accounting records. These records were not verified 
by the external auditors until 1912, as will be discussed later in 
the paper.
Chandler and Edwards [1996, p. 17] report on an 1890 sur-
vey by a senior partner on common certifications contained in 
external audit reports: 
The most common certifications included the succinct, 
if uninformative, ‘Audited and certified,’ ‘Audited and 
found correct,’ and simply ‘Audited’…The clear implica-
tion being that the signature of a reputable accountant 
was sufficient to attest to the reliability of the accounts. 
Indeed, according to Pixley [an auditing textbook au-
thor], the last-named certification was the strongest the 
auditor could give as it implies that without a single 
reservation the accounts are correct in every particu-
lar…[The senior partner] favoured what would today 
be regarded as less primitive formats, including the fol-
lowing which anticipated fairly well the contents of the 
Companies Act 1900.
We have examined the foregoing Balance Sheet with 
the books of the company, and in our opinion it is a full 
and fair Balance Sheet properly drawn up, so as shown 
by the books of the company… 
The death of the external auditor, Mr. Thomas Welton, 
was announced at the July 18, 1918 general court. He was the 
company’s third external auditor. Mr. Welton was replaced by 
Messrs. Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co. They used similar 
wording with their first audit in 1919; the major difference was 
the use of “we” for the auditor rather than “I.”
The London external auditors made their judgments on 
the company’s financial statements which included documents 
prepared in Canada. The vast majority of the HBC’s business 
had always been conducted there. As the external auditors were 
in London, there were requests for the verification or audit of 
an increasing number of recorded Canadian transactions. From 
about 1892 to 1911, the governor and committee, with the coop-
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eration of the London external auditor and the commissioners 
(senior Canadian managers), hired “auditors” in Canada [HBCA. 
A.12.ft203.1.1-14]. The London external auditor provided in-
structions for the audits of the cash accounts and inventories 
primarily that were sent annually to the London accounting of-
fice. For example, in 1897, the London external auditor, Welton, 
wrote the following letter requesting the Winnipeg “auditor” (a 
Bank of Montreal manager) to verify the balance sheets, trading 
accounts, and profit-and-loss accounts [HBCA. A.12.203.1.13-
14].
Dear Sir, 
 Audit at Winnipeg
Referring to our conversation on 8th inst., I beg to say 
that I agree in thinking that efficiency in this case is 
more important than any small economy in the fee 
paid.
The auditor seeks to check the voucher for each ex-
pended and agree the balance of cash monthly. I pre-
sume he also sees the books periodically (at least annu-
ally) and verifies a balance sheet, trading account and 
profit and loss account. The account current with the 
head office is doubtless referred to in this connection 
and any items not yet responded to are considered, as 
to the time having been adequate for a response, and 
as to anything peculiar in themselves. Items out of date 
(which ought to have been responded to) should be re-
ported to Head Office.
The auditor cannot be expected to test valuations, but 
should see that the whole of the inventories are in, have 
been duly certified by proper persons, and are summa-
rized accurately.
As respects issues of goods
  (a) to fur stations
  (b) to shops
there is doubtless a systematic record of such issues 
and a proper officer (other than the auditor) whose 
duty it is to see that these are acknowledged and a note 
made systematically of the fact. The auditor might 
see whether any acknowledgment was wanting which 
ought to have been received.
The only real test on the receipt side of the cash ac-
count is the making out and keeping of books, invoices 
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and statements for debtors by men who do not handle 
cash and the certainty that if each was not duly credited 
to debtors these men would apply for payment until 
proof was afforded by such debtors that payment had 
been made.
As regards sale shops, a custom has been in use here of 
invoicing all goods to sub-stores at fixed nominal pric-
es, so that in sale books both nominal and real prices 
are shown and the stock, taken at nominal prices must 
agree. It is for your commissioner to consider whether 
this plan can be employed but it would have little to do 
with the audit. 
[signed Thomas Welton]
This arrangement was observed by Deputy Governor Skin-
ner and committee member Burbidge when they toured the 
HBC’s Canadian operations in 1910 for the purpose of assessing 
retail opportunities [HBCA. A.12.203.1.43]. Skinner was knowl- 
edgeable on financial matters, while Burbidge understood retail-
ing since he was the managing director of Harrods Limited, the 
London department store. Instead of part-time bank managers 
and the HBC’s accounting staff, they recommended a profes-
sional auditor. Two reasons were given. First, Canada-based 
HBC accountants, as subordinates, were not able to question 
the vouchers of the three commissioners. Second, the pending 
retirement of a Bank of Montreal manager provided an op-
portunity to change the process. Skinner and Burbidge wanted 
professional auditors for the growing Canadian operation rather 
than an ad hoc combination of accounting employees without 
independence and part-time bank managers. Marwick Mitchell, 
an American firm with a Winnipeg office [Boys, 1989], was con-
tacted. Marwick Mitchell presented the HBC with an external 
audit proposal that included purchasing, sales, cash, capital 
and revenue expenditures, accruals and allowances, inventories, 
bad and doubtful accounts, land department, stores, general, 
reporting, and remuneration [HBCA. A.12.203.1.51-59]. The firm 
was hired with the governor and committee reducing the scope: 
“Instead of the exhaustive method proposed, the [governor and 
committee] desire Marwick Mitchell…audit Winnipeg books as 
at present kept for the current year beginning February first” 
[HBCA. A.12.203.1.63]. 
MANAGEMENT ADVISORS
The growth in British joint-stock companies during the last 
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half of the 19th century encouraged shareholders to demand 
that the company exert fiduciary responsibility. In this context, 
the HBC operations in Canada were evolving from entirely bar-
ter trade to cash transactions. The operating or management 
accounting statements for barter had been relatively simple with 
relatively few different accounts.
A memorandum dated April 30, 1889 from the external au-
ditor, Thomas Welton, to the London governor and committee 
lamented the condition of the fur trade or operating statements 
and made recommendations for improvement [HBCA. 67.26.17]:
The mode in which the company’s accounts are kept 
is essentially that of single entry.3 The London books 
no doubt are on a double-entry basis, but as the out-
come of each successive outfit is merely an inventory of 
 assets plus the shipments made to England, there are 
no means of preparing an orderly statement of Profit 
& Loss, or of arriving at a regular comparison of one 
year’s business cost with that of another year. It is not 
shown for example what the payroll of the fur trade 
was in any year, nor what money was drawn by the 
several stations from the chief offices on the other side, 
in addition to the stores and goods forwarded to them 
respectively, nor to what use such money was applied.
In a barter economy, the HBC had a meaningful list or chart 
of accounts; all inventories, trade goods and supplies, could be 
lumped together without clearly differentiating between cost 
of goods sold and inventory. The replacement of barter with 
cash meant there were in the HBC’s Canadian business for the 
first time cash transactions, (i.e., cash outlays to pay for trade 
goods and supplies purchased from vendors in Canada and cash 
inflows from Canadian customers). Welton noted that the ac-
counting for these cash flows with the barter system was to add 
or subtract these flows of cash from the overall cash generated 
from the fur trade. When cash transactions were a small part of 
the business, this was not a problem. However, by 1889, these 
cash transactions were a significant part of the business, thereby 
distorting the fur-trade accounting statements.
Welton believed that the wide variety of items included in 
the specific balance sheet item, “inventory,” led to inaccurate 
information. As an example, Welton stated “(a) large increase 
3  At the time that these changes were being proposed, a part of the work of 
external auditors involved introducing double-entry bookkeeping [Edwards et al., 
2007, p. 83].
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of payments might indicate a new policy of purchasing supplies 
elsewhere than in England, or might mean that a greater por-
tion of the furs shipped had been purchased for cash” [HBCA. 
A.67.26.21-22]. His contention was supported by item 70 of 
the HBC’s 1887 “Rules and Regulations,” which showed the 
components of inventory to include such heterogeneous assets 
as trading goods, supplies, country-made articles, livestock, 
outstanding balances, buildings and land, ships, etc. [HBCA. 
D.24.9.13]. Welton’s recommendations led to the division of 
the inventory account into cash, goods held for barter, furs and 
country produce, livestock, ships and steam boats, and other 
assets. The purpose was to differentiate between the amounts 
of assets and liabilities for current accounts, for barter, and for 
other purposes [HBCA. A.67.26.17-23]. This was the first time in 
more than 200 years that the Canadian operation reported fixed 
assets. 
To ensure proper recording of cash transactions and com-
municating those transactions, Welton further recommended 
the following records be sent to the London accounting office: 
receipts and payments in account with head office; receipts and 
payments in account with officers and servants; receipts and 
payments in account with persons having current accounts; re-
ceipts and payments connected with the fur trade, under several 
headings.
Welton’s recommendations led to the trading account which 
is shown in pre-printed format in Exhibit 1. The trading account 
replaced the balance sheet as an operating statement. With the 
previous barter trade and no-fixed assets, the balance sheet 
could satisfactorily calculate profitability. Welton’s recommenda-
tions led the HBC to manage its fur posts and saleshops with 
financial information.
By 1896, some of the pre-printed forms had been custom-
ized for the saleshops which had been established in 1871 
[HBCA. D.24.11.1-9]. An important change to performance 
measures was the reporting of the return on capital employed 
(ROCE) by fur posts and districts, and saleshops. ROCE was 
the profit or loss from sales divided by the capital employed. 
With the HBC operating almost entirely in a cash economy, the 
financial records became more detailed and were used more 
frequently because of improvements in communications and 
transportation. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Trading Account Format
Trading Account ________________District Outfit 1910, Form 20
To inventory of goods
To goods from depot and mills
To goods and country produce purchased
To goods from other posts, etc.
To freight on goods
To insurance on goods __________
By supplies on expense accounts
By supplies on servant accounts
By supplies to other posts, etc.
By inventory of goods __________
 Net cost of goods sold
By cash sales
By credit sales
By bartered for furs, country produce
 Gross profit              (Per cent. Of C.L.)
 
Add - Gain on: live stock, bad debts recovered, fur
  purchased, [Aboriginal] debts recovered   
  __________
Less - Expenses as per Form No. 14
  Repairs and improvements (annual depreciation)
  Loss on articles at fixed prices (goods depreciation)
Loss on: bad, doubtful, [Aboriginal] debt __________
Apparent gain
  __________
Furs purchased
 Cash
 Freight, insurance, packing, etc.
 Bartered for goods
 Credit [Aborigines]
Credit Customer __________
 Cost
 Tariff valuation
Gain exclusive of profit on goods bartered
  __________
   
  __________
Source: HBCA. D.31.14. 
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These actions of the external auditors were expected of the 
“professional” external auditor. In 1883, The Accountant was 
quoted in Maltby [1999, p. 43] as saying:
A true audit…goes far beyond the checking of vouchers, 
items and balances. It means behind the scenes, search-
ing out the causes by which the effects have been cre-
ated, the discovery of managerial errors, and the sug-
gesting of remedies. A true auditor is in the confidence 
of his client. The latter almost invariably consults him 
on matters for removal from the simple question of the 
balance-sheet and profit and loss. 
Welton was obviously a “true auditor.”
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The regulatory requirement for external audits in many 
industries in the last 40 years of the 19th century was a major 
event in the development of the public accounting profession. 
Similarly, the 1866 introduction of external auditors was a sig-
nificant accounting event not just for the HBC but for other pub-
lic companies as the driving force was not regulation. It was the 
shareholders who saw the benefits and who requested that the 
financial statements be audited to make them more useful. In 
that way, it was an early example of shareholders and managers 
with external auditors working together in pursuit of standard-
ized and informative audited financial statements. The purpose 
was to provide the shareholders with a better understanding of 
the company’s ability to pay dividends and to expand in North 
America. 
The introduction of the external auditor at the HBC was 
a result of three forces that reinforced one another. First, the 
HBC’s shareholders that came after the IFC were more demand-
ing then prior owners. Second, there was a capacity among Lon-
don accountants to provide external audit services. These exter-
nal auditors were keen on pursuing new businesses and turning 
themselves into a new knowledge profession. Third, the British 
Parliament was passing various acts for regulated companies 
that required audited financial statements. Even when regula-
tion was missing, this signalled that audited financial statements 
provided more useful information than unaudited ones. In this 
context, the HBC appointed external auditors decades before 
legally required to do so.
The external auditors also had a significant impact on how 
internal or management accounting was conducted. With the 
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HBC, external auditor Welton assisted with the transition of 
the management accounting from a barter economy to one in 
which cash predominated. The external auditor’s recommenda-
tions were completely accepted. In this way, the external auditor 
served as an advisor to the HBC’s management for improving 
the precision and thereby the effectiveness in using financial 
information to manage the hundreds of fur posts and saleshops. 
The HBC had a long history with its external auditors. 
When the HBC’s head office was moved from London to Canada 
(Winnipeg) in 1962, the board (the name for the governor and 
committee after 1930) decided it only needed one external 
auditor. The London external auditor from 1918 to 1962 was 
Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Company. The Canadian external 
auditor from 1911 to 1962 was Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Since more than 90% of the HBC’s operations were located in 
Canada, the board recommended that the Canadian external 
auditor be appointed for the entire company. Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell & Co. was appointed the sole external auditor for the 
HBC, and remained so until 2005, but with the name of KPMG 
LLP.
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IN INVESTING IN 1870s AMERICA
Abstract: The objectives of this study are to understand better the 
development of investment practices and the information that was 
available for those practices during the turbulent decade of the 1870s. 
This was a time of panic, depression, and manipulations by insiders. 
Nevertheless, outsiders chose to speculate and invest in corporate se-
curities in Wall Street. Consequently, authors began to provide more 
specific investment advice, some of which required the use of earn-
ings and other financial-accounting information. This study describes 
the availability of  that information in the books and periodicals in an 
age dominated by railroad kings.
INTRODUCTION
Financial accounting became important to the securities 
markets in America in the late 1840s. At that time, the markets 
were called upon to provide significant amounts of capital to 
railroads, the first modern businesses. Since the markets were 
little more than rigged casinos, it was hoped that financial ac-
counting and other information would help investors make 
rational decisions. Information was viewed as a means to defeat 
stock swindlers and manipulators who took advantage of the 
uninformed [Thompson, 2008].
However, authors prior to 1870 provided little guidance on 
how information should be used to select corporate securities. 
They focused on educating investors and providing informa-
tion to assist in the purchase of securities that had “intrinsic 
value” [Armstrong, 1848] or were “well-authenticated” [Hamon, 
1865]. This paper examines what advice authors gave to inves-
tors to make decisions and what information was available to 
them for making those decisions. As such, it contributes to our 
understanding of the development of investing and financial ac-
counting. It helps explain how financial-statement analysis went 
 Acknowledgments: The author is grateful to two anonymous reviewers for 
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from virtually non-existent in the 1840s to methods in the 20th 
century.
This article is based primarily upon books on investing pub-
lished in the 1870s. As in a previous article [Thompson, 2008], 
these books were identified using WorldCat [2007], employing 
a fairly comprehensive set of search terms related to investing 
and railroad manuals. Stipulations included that the books were 
published in America, focused on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), were general works on investing in corporate securities, 
and were available through interlibrary loan. The information 
derived from these books was supplemented by periodical litera-
ture of the day.
This article is organized as follows. The stock market of the 
1870s and its operations are discussed in the first two sections. 
Contemporary investment advice, including the first model for 
making investment decisions expounded by an American author, 
is described in the subsequent section. Available investment 
information is surveyed in the next section and a synthesis and 
conclusion complete the study. 
THE STOCK MARKET IN THE 1870S
The NYSE had grown dramatically over the years. The con-
duct of business had grown more than 200-fold by 1870 com-
pared to 1838, and it had become a $3 billion market [Medbery, 
1870]. About this time, 100,000 shares typically traded in a day.1 
In 1875, the daily volume of business transacted on the NYSE 
approached $50 million compared with $20 million, including 
gold trades, in 1865 [Tumbridge, 1875; Stedman and Easton, 
1905; Gordon, 1999].2
Table 1 shows the domination of railroad securities on U.S. 
exchanges.3 These securities helped finance the doubling of 
railroad track mileage from 39,250 miles at the end of 1867 to 
81,841 miles at the end of 1878 [Poor, 1879]. Other industries 
that grew in the aftermath of the Civil War did not usually rely 
upon the securities markets for financing.4
1 By comparison, in 2000, the market capitalization of stocks listed on the 
NYSE was over $12 trillion, with an average daily trading volume of over one bil-
lion shares [Wright, 2001].
2  The technology of the NYSE was also changing with telephones first used in 
November 1878. Stock quotations had been reported by tickers starting in 1867 
[Eames, 1894].
3 There were also a large amount of bank and insurance stocks that were con-
sidered “local” and, as will be seen later, were not actively traded.
4 For example, retailers and wholesalers relied upon commercial banks and 
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TABLE 1
Numbers of Securities on U.S. Exchanges in 1870 
(Principal Cities)
Industry Stocks Bonds 
Railroad   192  736
Canal   15  30
Coal   12 —
Gas   12 —
Telegraph   2 —
Express   4 —
Steamship   2 —
Trust   5 —
Mining   4 —
Street Passenger Railroad (New York & Brooklyn Cities)  21  29
Miscellaneous —  8
Source: Dana & Co. [1870]
During the early 1870s, the NYSE was affected by corners 
in Reading, Rock Island, and Chicago and Northwestern, ma-
jor fires in Chicago and Boston, and the Oakes Ames scandal 
involving the Union Pacific Railroad and the Crédit Mobilier of 
America (CM) [Fowler, 1873; Lapsley and Bazley, 1874].5 How-
ever, the Panic of 1873 was the most notable stock-market event 
of the 1870s.
 The failure of Jay Cooke & Co. on September 18, 1873 
precipitated the panic. As underwriters of Northern Pacific Rail-
road bonds, Jay Cooke & Co. was to pay 85 cents on the dollar 
for the bonds. However, it was obligated to pay the Northern 
Pacific interest on any unsold bonds. Jay Cooke sold less than 
$20 million out of a total of at least $60 million. Consequently, 
it could not keep up with the interest payments, resulting in the 
firm’s failure [New York Times (NYT), 1873d]. Jay Cooke came to 
national prominence by selling U.S. government bonds during 
the Civil War, often with little or no compensation [NYT, 1873b].
The panic produced runs on financial institutions as de-
positors lacked confidence in the safety of their deposits [NYT, 
cash flow to finance their operations [Chandler, 1977]. Two notable companies 
that began in the 1870s also did not need the security markets. Carnegie’s Edgar 
Thomson Steel Company was a limited partnership [Livesay, 1975], and the stock 
of the Standard Oil Company was held by six people [Chernow, 1998].
5 The CM was the construction company for the Union Pacific. Oakes Ames, 
one of CM’s stockholders and a congressman from Massachusetts, sold CM stock 
among his colleagues with the intention of receiving a favorable view by Congress 
toward the financing of the Union Pacific [Seitz, 1926; Gordon, 2005].
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1873c]. An estimated 20,000 people were financially ruined 
within two days, and losses amounted to at least $20 million 
[Smith, 1873]. The NYSE closed for ten days from September 
20-30 [Fowler, 1873]. By the end of 1873, 57 NYSE-listed firms 
had failed [Eames, 1894]. In addition, over 300 banks failed 
[Geisst, 2004] and, by the end of the decade, 287 brokerage 
firms were bankrupt [Gordon, 1999]. 
Railway stocks suffered the most, including those owned by 
Vanderbilt [NYT, 1873e]. Stocks hit their lowest prices on No-
vember 7, 1873 [Fowler, 1873]. As of that day, for the 15 stocks 
for which the NYT reported closing quotations on September 
12, 1873 (before the trouble began), the average loss was 39.5%. 
The losses ranged from 21.5% for the Chicago and Rock Island 
to 54.0% for the Hannibal and St. Joseph [NYT, 1873a, 1873h].6 
Even worse, railroad stock prices lost an average of about 50% 
by 1878 [Gordon, 1999].
One of the consequences of the panic was the onset of a 
business depression [NYT, 1873g] that lasted most of the de-
cade. In 1876, 134 railroads were in default on $500 million in 
bonds out of $2 billion outstanding [Sullivan, 1876]. Railroad 
earnings did not recover until after 1878 [Poor, 1879].7 By the 
end of the decade, 65 railroads were bankrupt [Garraty, 1995, p. 
501]. 
However, speculation returned to Wall Street in fall 1879. 
A record number of 681,810 shares were traded on November 
20, 1879 [Stedman and Easton, 1905]. This return to specula-
tion was accompanied by reorganizations of railroads and their 
bonds, benefiting “speculators who had bought up their old 
stocks and bonds at little or nothing, thus ‘reconstructing’ im-
mense fortunes for themselves while saddling the reorganization 
with a weight of indebtedness as great or greater than before” 
[American Railroad Journal (ARJ), 1879a, pp. 1,149-1,150].
 
6 The NYT reported the actual transactions (number of shares traded and 
price) in stocks at the NYSE. In a separate table, it reported the opening and clos-
ing prices for 15 stocks.
7 Some contributing factors were railroad strikes in 1876 [Stedman and 
Easton, 1905] and Granger laws that had a negative impact on the prices of rail-
road shares [Eames, 1894]. More importantly, the five major trunk lines that con-
nected the west with the shipping ports on the east coast were grappling with 
competition among themselves [Adams, 1888].
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THE NATURE OF SECURITY MARKET OPERATIONS
Some commentators attributed the Panic of 1873 to an 
overbuilding of railroads and a shortage of money as surplus 
crops were coming to market [Fowler, 1873; Clews, 1887]. 
However, other authors thought a more fundamental cause was 
excessive speculation [Smith 1873; Stedman and Easton, 1905]. 
Sullivan [1876, p. 101] noted that there were two aspects of Wall 
Street, “the substantial or investment [and] the speculative or 
visionary.” The former helped the country’s industry while the 
latter caused wealth to be made or lost. Banker’s Magazine and 
Statistical Register (BM) [1879, p. 19] lamented the existence 
of speculation since “it diverts to the occupation of gambling, 
which is essentially unprofitable in a public point of view, an 
incalculable amount of time, energy, and talent.” Walker [1878, 
p. 40] added that “the rashness of those who hover around the 
vortex of stock speculation is not rashness merely, but probable 
perdition.”
Fowler [1870, pp. 132, 534] explained the motivation for a 
speculator: “the hope of gain is a stronger principle in human 
nature, than the fear of loss.” (italics in the original) He added: 
“They lose everywhere, buying stocks, selling stocks; by failures 
of their brokers, by frauds of their contractors, by panics, by 
corners, by tricks and stratagems of the market.” Smith [1870, 
pp. 157, 544-545] also explained the urge to speculate: “The 
haste to be rich, by a lucky stroke of fortune, by hazarding a few 
thousands in Wall Street, is the same spirit that leads thousands 
to the gambling table.” Some lost because of their own actions, 
others were fooled. Unfortunately, “Ninety-eight out of every 
hundred, who have to do with the Street, are cleaned out and 
ruined.” 
Various methods were used to take advantage of unwary 
investors and speculators. One was through “points, a bit of se-
cret information concerning a stock…which will seriously affect 
prices” [Medbery, 1870, p. 83]. Today, the securities acts prohibit 
trading on such secret or inside information. Moreover, Regula-
tion FD mandates disclosure by a corporation to the public of 
material information that could affect its stock’s price [Sharpe, 
1981; Malkiel, 2007]. Yet, in the 1870s, these points were useful 
as long as “you have not been misled” [Medbery, 1870, pp. 83, 
86]. Medbery added that “half the failures of the street are due 
to points which brokers believe in, not only to their customers’ 
but their own ruin.” Fraudulent newspaper articles were also 
extremely influential “if a favorable notice can be secured for a 
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handsome check, it is regarded as well laid out” [Smith, 1870, 
p. 520]. In fact, Jay Gould, the aforementioned stock operator 
par excellent, owned the New York World and used it to aid his 
schemes [Josephson, 1934].
“Corners” were also a popular device of manipulative pools 
[Medbery, 1870]. Essentially, these involved controlling, through 
ownership or buying contracts, most of the shares available for 
a corporation.8 This trapped (cornered) the “shorts” (the sellers), 
forcing them to pay an exorbitant amount for the stock in order 
to fulfill their contracts. 
Corporate directors deceived stock owners by issuing more 
than the authorized number of shares and by paying dividends 
out of capital [Medbery, 1870; Smith, 1870]. This was long be-
fore Ponzi schemes were so-named in the 1920s, which Bernie 
Madoff popularized in the contemporary world [McCoy, 2009]. 
In addition, corporate directors often had a conflict of interest. 
For instance, Gould, as a director of the Union Pacific, threat-
ened to develop a competing railroad. He strung together a 
number of railroads and planned an extension that would have 
bypassed the Union Pacific by connecting the Central Pacific in 
Utah with the Lake Shore Railroad in Ohio. To avert the compe-
tition, the Union Pacific acquired the proposed line, benefiting 
Gould and other directors of the Union Pacific who held stock in 
the acquired railroads [Stedman and Easton, 1905].9
Abuses like these were often easy to perpetrate since rail-
road ownership was concentrated in the hands of a relatively 
few (e.g., Vanderbilt, Gould, Scott, Garrett, Huntington, Mitch-
ell, Jewett, Garrison, Field, and coal railroad owners). Through 
their stock ownership and the related control of their compa-
nies’ bonds and leases, these “railroad kings” controlled approxi-
mately $3.3 billion of the $4.5 billion railroad capital in the U.S. 
These amounts dwarfed the nation’s $720 million in banking 
capital and $369 million in states’ debt. Moreover, railroad capi-
8 These contracts, essentially futures, were buyer or seller options for 3, 10, 
30, 60, and 90 days [Medbery, 1870]. A buying contract allowed the issuer to buy 
stock from a seller, while a selling contract allowed the issuer to sell stock to a 
buyer. In a buying (selling) contract, the buyer (seller) could give one day’s no-
tice to complete the sale during the term of the contract or otherwise must have 
bought (sold) when the contract came due.
9 However, Gould claimed that he resigned as director of the Union Pacific 
shortly before the acquisition [Clews, 1887]. During this same period near the end 
of the 1870s and into the early 1880s, Gould orchestrated other schemes includ-
ing obtaining control of Western Union and the elevated trains in New York City 
[Stedman and Easton, 1905].
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tal was almost twice as large as the $2.3 billion debt of the U.S. 
[ARJ, 1879b].10 
Despite this domination by a handful of individuals, many 
Americans owned railroad securities, including those living 
along railroad lines. Even clergymen and women speculated at 
times. These “outsiders” sent from 850 to 2,300 daily telegraph 
orders to the NYSE [Medbery, 1870]. In 1879, as many as 30,000 
outsiders participated in the stock market [Fowler, 1880].11 It 
was for these outsiders that the authors of the 1870s began to 
offer advice. This advice was more specific than that offered by 
prior authors.
SELECTING SECURITIES
Rules for Outsiders: Fowler [1870, p. 117] advised: “Buy only on 
the amplest margins. Be an occasional not a constant operator. 
Cut short your losses, and let your profits run. Never sell what 
you have not got.”12 Walker’s [1878, p. 40] two rules were: “Never 
borrow money to speculate with. Never speculate so deeply but 
that, if you lose all, you will not feel it.” Medbery [1870, p. 230] 
discouraged outsiders from buying on margin: “If they pur-
chased ‘out and out,’ the whole aspect of things would change. 
The cliques would not control as at present, and speculation 
would become an affair of relative judgment.” Barnes Garrison 
& Co. [late 1870s, pp. 5, 7] suggested: “Always go with the tide…
Never buy stocks immediately after a strong ‘bull’ campaign, 
nor sell them just after a sharp ‘bear’ movement.” They added, 
in what was essentially a technical-analysis approach, “Where 
a stock has once been in price, you may look for it to sell there 
again at some time.” 
Some of this advice is still around. Malkiel [2007, p. 372], 
for example, believes in “the Wall Street maxim ‘Ride the win-
ners and sell the losers.’” He also believes in trading as little as 
possible. Similarly, Cramer [2005] advises not borrowing a lot 
of money to invest, selling losers, and staying with winners. 
Investors should also [Cramer, 2006, p. 155] “Follow the Street’s 
10 William H. Vanderbilt would soon sell $30 million of New York Central com-
mon stock. While Vanderbilt maintained that he did this to placate the public on 
its charges of monopoly, others thought that this was simply a good time to sell as 
the value of the New York Central was not likely to increase [ARJ, 1879c].
11 Foreign investors in American securities tended to buy debt securities, many 
preferring government bonds. In total, British investors owned $1.1 billion of 
American securities in 1876 [Baskin and Miranti, 1997].
12 Margins of 10% were typical, although for more speculative securities, the 
required margin could be more [Medbery, 1870].
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lead.” Moreover, Buffet does not believe in using much debt for 
investing [Schroeder, 2009]. 
Others pursued more of a fundamental-analysis method. 
Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial Review (HMM) 
[1870a, p. 106] demanded greater publicity of financial informa-
tion, noting that “the current value of railroad stocks is regu-
lated by the current earnings of the road.” When investing in 
stocks or bonds, Sullivan [1876, p. 101] suggested that “the prin-
cipal and interest should be secure beyond question.” Toward 
this end, Sullivan advised to “ascertain the amount of stock or 
bonded indebtedness, or both; the scheme or object represented; 
if a railroad, the cost per mile, the demands and productiveness 
of the country through which it passes.” Other considerations 
included whether an acquired security could be used for collat-
eral or sold in the event cash was subsequently needed. 
When speculating, as opposed to investing, Sullivan [1876, 
p. 102] advised to stay away from “‘fancy,’ or stocks of no 
intrinsic value, non-dividend paying, and subject to the wild-
est fluctuations.” Recent examples of such stocks include the 
internet bubble at the turn of the 21st century when compa-
nies were evaluated by the number of website visits, how long 
visitors stayed, or how many miles of fiber-optic cables had been 
laid [Malkiel, 2007]. Sullivan [1876, p. 102] believed that only 
insiders or those with a controlling interest could make money 
with fancy stocks. As with investment, Sullivan’s cardinal rule 
was safety of principal and interest. In addition, he required 
that both controlling stockholders and its officers were honest, 
with the interests of the company being their utmost goal. Such 
stocks “must not be looked for, however, with the flattering hope 
of getting rich in a day, for their fluctuations are small, yet they 
are sure.” 
Medbery [1870, p. 203] believed that outsiders should buy 
low and sell high and that “the advice is not more sound than 
feasible.” Those who succeeded “watch the market, study the 
earnings of companies, look into the character and bent of mind 
of directors, and when certain stocks fall to a reasonable figure 
they buy, generally upon wide margins.” His advice is similar to 
that of Warren Buffet [2001].
Moreover, sounding quite modern, Medbery [1870, pp. 204, 
210, 217] believed that stock price changes were primarily due 
to “excess or want of confidence.” He observed that stock prices 
often moved together and that “in its panics, Wall Street is espe-
cially unreasonable. Indeed, there is not a safer method of profit 
in existence than to watch the periodical depressions of securi-
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ties; and to buy, buy, buy as soon as the downward pressure is 
fully under way.” He added that such stock price changes were 
common and occurred every year. Unfortunately, “To buy at the 
crest wave of extreme advance and to sell at the lowest ebb of 
the tide, are what brokers assure us to be the judicious customs 
of ninety out of a hundred of the people who bewail their inex-
plicable misadventures in stocks!” As an alternative, Medbery 
suggested a more comprehensive approach by formulating an 
investment model, the first known American author to do so. 
Medbery’s Investment Method: Unlike the other authors, Medbery 
[1870. p. 207] developed a valuation model for stock prices, 
noting that “the method is not difficult in its arithmetic, and 
has doubtless a certain use, as illustrating the difference be-
tween the selling rate of stocks and their theoretical value.” He 
explained his method for a stock which pays a dividend of 7% 
on a par value of $100: “Thus, where money brings easily seven 
per cent a year, it is clear that a stock ought to have par value, 
provided the company which it represents is managed with such 
care as to insure the property from future injury in its earning 
power.” He further added that: 
if the same stock should permanently pay eight per 
cent, its true value in the market would be the equiva-
lent of that sum, which at seven per cent would give 
eight dollars in interest. Were a capitalist to buy the 
stock at 114 2/7, his annual dividend would be precisely 
what the same money would be worth at .07 per year. 
In other words, the price of the stock is that amount needed to 
generate a fixed dividend each period at a constant money rate 
(price x .07 = $8, or price = $8/.07 = $114 2/7). In modern terms, 
this is equivalent to modeling the price of a share of stock as the 
present value of a constant dividend per period in perpetuity 
discounted by a constant interest rate [Sharpe, 1981]. For Med-
bery’s example, $114 2/7 is the present value of the $8 dividends 
received in perpetuity discounted at 7% per year. 
Using his model, Medbery provided actual examples of 
mispriced securities. He considered examples of bank and rail-
road stocks, showing the difference between the market price 
and the theoretical value using a 7% money rate. He concluded 
that, “With the exception of a few of the banks, it has been seen 
that the table affords a near average of the intrinsic worth of the 
stock cited above.” Medbery [1870, pp. 221-222] cautioned that, 
“The reader ought to thoroughly understand, however, that there 
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is no royal road to speculation.” Moreover, “Integrity and ability 
in directors, the earning capacity of the property of a corpora-
tion, the chances of the future as well as the past, are essential 
points to the final judgment, and the rates of the Exchange are 
averagely the measure of increasing or decreasing faith in the 
dividend worth of a security.” 
Medbery [1870, pp. 209, 229-230] noted that his model had 
been around for some time: “Seventy years ago a chart classify-
ing the great British funds, according to ratios similar to tables 
just presented, was published in London.” He added that the 
model should have aided users to become wealthy. However, it 
had not always been applied successfully because of “suspicion, 
over-confidence, timidity, vacillation – each and every element 
which has made the prices of all financial centres through early 
and latter days fluctuating, unstable, hazardous.” He observed 
that “This weakness of humanity is the life of speculation.” 
Moreover, regarding the use of his model, Medbery lamented 
that:
Brokers tell us that about one in a hundred buy in this 
manner. The ninety-nine mean to do so. They make 
their calculations, add up, subtract, wander hither and 
thither for points, try this system and that theory, are 
wise to the extent of their wisdom, and come forth from 
their ventures shorn of all their golden fleece. With a 
chart of prices before one, this fatality seems inexpli-
cable.
AVAILABLE INFORMATION
Medbery, Sullivan, and others [HMM, 1870a; NYT, 1873f] 
suggested obtaining information on earnings, costs, capital 
structure, dividends, integrity of management, and prospects 
for the future in selecting investments. Focusing on railroads, 
this section describes the investment information contained in 
various volumes, periodicals, and manuals during the 1870s. 
Railroads’ annual reports were not reviewed. Setting aside the 
difficulty of currently obtaining them, a more compelling fac-
tor is that annual reports were not always as complete as the 
information available elsewhere, especially in railroad manuals 
[Chandler, 1956]. In addition, as late as 1926, investors did not 
usually examine annual reports or other primary documents, 
such as corporate charters. Instead, they relied on manuals and 
periodicals [Lyon, 1926].
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Miscellaneous Volumes: Miscellaneous volumes commonly pro-
vided tables on high and low prices for railroad securities. Fail-
ing [1870], for example, included a table, covering three years, 
containing annual high and low prices for about 40 bonds, 
common stocks, and preferred stocks. Sullivan [1876] presented 
a similar table, covering the years 1860 through 1875. Other au-
thors [Dana & Co., 1870; Horton & Co., 1878] provided monthly 
high and low prices. Monthly tables were often given by broker-
age houses as an enticement for speculators to buy stocks or 
privileges (options).13 
Another type of table commonly available contained basic 
descriptors of stocks and bonds. Failing [1870] had a table of 68 
railroad stocks showing par, capital paid-in, shares outstanding, 
dividend rate, and dividend-payment dates. Dana & Co.’s [1870] 
table showed the same information along with date of last divi-
dend payment and bid and ask prices. Sullivan’s [1876] table for 
27 railroads listed capital stock, par value, dividend-payment 
months, bonds outstanding, latest net earnings, and funded debt 
of road property. Note that he provided slightly more informa-
tion by including net earnings and debt information. Dana & 
Co.’s [1870] railroad bond table briefly described the issue (e.g., 
first mortgage, convertible) and provided amount outstanding, 
interest rate, when and where interest was to be paid, maturity 
date, and bid and ask prices. 
Dana & Co. [1870] included other tables on railroad mileage 
and earnings. It also summarized economic conditions of 1869, 
and gave an overview of major economic issues: government 
debt, foreign trade, crop production, real estate values, Wall 
Street speculation, and railroad construction. Reflecting a future 
orientation for the upcoming year, Dana & Co. [1870, p. 73] did 
“not anticipate a general and material increase in railroad earn-
ings over the year 1869.” However, it noted that “the old and 
well known favorites on the Stock Exchange will do well, and 
in fact, be very prosperous, if they can show during the coming 
months of the new year a report of earnings which will compare 
favorably with the same months of 1869.” Long ago, investment 
practices included a future outlook, a perspective that continues 
to this day [Cramer, 2005].
Periodicals: One of the popular periodicals of the mid-19th cen-
13 Privileges, what are now called options, included calls, puts, spreads, and 
straddles (double privileges). They allowed the holder to buy or sell stock at a fixed 
price, typically during a 30-day period.
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tury was HMM. In 1870, this monthly magazine contained busi-
ness articles, banking and economic data, government reports, 
and notices of issues of new securities. Its section entitled “Com-
mercial Chronicle & Review” discussed business, money-market, 
bond-market, and stock-market conditions. Another section on 
“Railroad Items” provided mostly short notices on conditions 
and progress of individual railroads. Thus, general business 
news was available to HMM readers. 
Quantitative data were also included. Similar to the mis-
cellaneous volumes discussed previously, there was a focus 
on pricing information. In February 1870 [HMM, 1870b], one 
table showed monthly high and low prices for railroad stocks 
for 1869. Another gave the opening, highest, lowest, and clos-
ing prices for selected securities during each of the prior two 
months. Also provided was industry sales volume for the month 
for shares traded on the NYSE. Remarkably, in January 1870, of 
the 896,596 shares traded, 781,340 were railroad shares (87%).
Financial-accounting information played a significant role 
in HMM. Comparative year-over-year monthly earnings and 
earnings year-to-date were reported for selected railroads. Even 
detailed income and balance-sheet information was some-
times included, such as for the Reading and the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroads [HMM, 1870c]. Tables were periodically 
published covering railroads in a handful of states, such as Ohio 
and Massachusetts [HMM, 1870d]. The table for Ohio included 
for each railroad, length, cost, capital stock, funded and float-
ing debt, earnings (passenger, freight, and total), operating 
 expenses, net earnings, interest paid, and dividends. The tables 
for other states were similar.
Reflective of the changing times, the monthly HMM was 
merged, beginning in 1871, with the newly born (July 1865) 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle weekly. An editorial ex-
plained [HMM, 1870f, pp. 401-402]: 
the increased rapidity of communication between cities 
and nations by means of railroads and telegraphs has 
changed into quicker movement all thought and action  
by individuals and communities...Thus it became evi-
dent, some time since, to the publishers of the Magazine 
that the infrequency of its issue (only once a month) 
prevented its keeping pace with the growing wants and 
necessities of the community. Its information was too 
late to be of present use.
The new Commercial and Financial Chronicle and Hunt’s 
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Merchants’ Magazine (Chronicle) was to be supplemented by an 
annual volume that “shall contain all the yearly statistics, &c., 
necessary for Bankers’ and Merchants’ use, in form easy of ref-
erence, with reports of the different branches of trade, &c.” 
By the end of the decade, the Chronicle, the leading finan-
cial periodical of the time [Geisst, 2004], offered a compendium 
of information.14 The breadth was amazing. The three key parts 
of the Chronicle were the weekly issues, the monthly “General 
Quotations of Stocks and Bonds,” and the monthly Investor’s 
Supplement. In Its July 1879 issues, the Chronicle [1879 b, c, d, 
e] provided general business news like its predecessor HMM. 
There were articles, banking and economic data, a weekly col-
umn on commodities and railroad traffic, and a weekly column 
on the money market and securities. Also reported were the 
dollar values of transactions in bonds (U.S., state, and railroad) 
as well as the number of shares traded on the NYSE. Compara-
tive prices over three years were given for New York City bank 
stocks, money, gold, exchange, U.S. bonds, railroad stocks (12 
issues), and merchandise.
Price and volume information for stocks and bonds were 
important. One table reported the opening, high, low, and clos-
ing stock prices for the most recent two months for railroads 
(68 security issues), telegraph (4), express (4), coal & mining 
(12), and various (7). Another table showed the daily high and 
low prices during the most recent week for 39 stocks. For these 
issues, a table provided the number of shares sold during the 
most recent week and the lowest and highest prices year-to-date 
and for the previous year. For seven issues, a table displayed the 
daily trading volume during the past week, the weekly total, and 
the total shares outstanding. In addition, fairly long tables pro-
vided recent bid and ask quotations for stocks and bonds. For 
railroads with “Active Previously Quoted” securities, 29 stocks 
and 219 bonds were included. Tables on New York local securi-
ties covered banks, gas, city railroads, and insurance companies. 
Moreover, the initial January issue [Chronicle, 1879a] reported 
the monthly high and low security prices for the prior year.
As a current comparison, opening, high, low, and closing 
daily prices, volume data, charts, and additional information 
are readily available on websites such as Barchart.com. The Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ) [2010] provides stock data that were not 
14 The Chronicle maintained its preeminent status well into the 1920s. Lyon 
[1926, p. 52] referred to it as “the great thesaurus of current investment informa-
tion.”
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contemplated in the 1870s, such as performance of stock indi-
ces, largest percentage gainers and losers, most active stocks, 
and volume movers. For bonds, the WSJ focuses on indices and 
the issues with the largest spread and price changes.
Financial-accounting information also played a prominent 
role in the Chronicle. One table had comparative monthly and 
year-to-date gross earnings. Another showed gross earnings, ex-
penses, and net earnings for a different set of companies. Recent 
dividend announcements were included separately (percent, 
when payable, date that books closed). Additionally, included in 
the Chronicle were a few annual reports (some in detail). In all, a 
typical Chronicle issue was about 25 pages in length.
The last Chronicle for each month contained extensive 
tables entitled “General Quotations of Stocks and Bonds,” cover-
ing stock and bonds traded throughout the U.S. These compre-
hensive tables contained far more securities than reported in the 
weekly issues. Table 2 lists by industry the number of securities 
with bid and ask quotations for July [Chronicle, 1879e]. Not 
included in Table 2 are bank and fire-insurance stocks in major 
cities other than New York, U.S. bonds, foreign-government se-
curities, and state and city securities. In sheer numbers, railroad 
securities dominated except for bank and fire-insurance compa-
nies. These groups were not actively traded. Only about 1,200 
bank shares were traded in May and June 1879 respectively 
compared with 5.5 million and 3.2 million railroad and miscel-
laneous shares [Chronicle, 1879b].
TABLE 2
Number of Securities Quoted by the Chronicle in 1879
Industry-Security Type Number
Railroad Bonds  793
Railroad Stocks  240
Canal Bonds  33
Canal Stocks  10
Miscellaneous Bonds  23
Miscellaneous Stocks  25
Express Stocks  4
Gas Stocks  45
Manufacturing Stocks (mostly in New England)  55
Coal and Miscellaneous Mining Stocks  30
Boston Mining Stocks  23
California-Nevada Mining Stocks  85
New York City Bank Stocks  62
New York City Fire Insurance Stocks  75
Source: Chronicle [1879e]
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The Chronicle also published an Investor’s Supplement on 
the last Saturday of each month. After a discussion of invest-
ments for the month, extensive stock and bond tables were 
presented. These gave basic security descriptors. For railroad 
stocks and bonds, the tables provided description, miles of road, 
date of bonds, size of bond issue or par value of stock, dollar 
amount outstanding, and interest or dividend information (e.g., 
interest rate, last dividend date for stocks, etc.). Brief notes on 
the company or issue were appended. Again, railroad securities 
dominated with tables covering 16 pages compared with three 
for state securities, seven for city securities, one for canal stocks 
and bonds, and one for miscellaneous stocks and bonds [Chroni-
cle, 1879f]. In all, the Investor’s Supplement was typically around 
30 pages in length. These comprehensive pricing and security 
descriptor tables supplemented data available on a weekly basis 
for selected security issues. 
Unlike the Chronicle, the weekly ARJ focused more exclu-
sively on railroads, although some information was usually 
given on state and U.S. government securities.15 Almost half of 
the ARJ was devoted to two main tables on railroad securi-
ties, “American Railroad Bond List” and “Railroad Share List.” 
These tables followed the same formats in the 1870s that had 
been adopted in the 1860s [ARJ, 1869, 1879d]. The bond list had 
basic descriptors for each listed bond issue – dollar value, inter-
est rate, when and where payable, due date, and price. Table 
3 shows the contents of the share list. Note the inclusion of 
financial-accounting information. For the December 26, 1879 is-
sue [1879d], there were 1,283 issues listed in the bond table and 
318 issues in the stock table.
Two other ARJ tables dealt primarily with railroads. One 
showed for 229 railroads stock outstanding in dollars, dividend-
payment dates, and last dividend date; the other displayed 
monthly earnings for three to six years for 21 railroads. Daily 
stock and bond prices for the most recent week were reported 
for selected companies on the New York, Philadelphia, Boston, 
Baltimore, and London stock exchanges. Weekly price ranges 
were given in lists for additional selected stocks and bonds 
traded in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore. 
Also included in the ARJ were short articles, excerpts from an-
15 A third periodical of the time, BM emphasized banks and banking although 
it routinely reported selected stock prices for 25 companies, mostly railroads. It 
also included commentary on the stock market.
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TABLE 3
ARJ Railroad Share List Information
Identifiers – name, states of operation, year ending
Railroad mileage – main line, branches, second track and sidings, in progress, 
operated
Rolling stock – engines, passenger cars, B. M. & E. cars, freight cars
Abstract of general balance sheet: property and assets – railroad, rolling stock, 
and other assets; accounts and cash; liabilities – stocks, bonds, accounts, 
and surplus income
Operations – miles trains moved, number of passengers, tons of freight
Earnings – gross and net
Dividend percent
Values of shares – par and market
Source: ARJ [1879d]
nual reports of railroads, brief announcements on earnings and 
directors, and a classified ad-type format for mostly dividend an-
nouncements. It contained a column titled, “Financial and Com-
mercial Review,” that discussed stock-market conditions, such 
as the activities of prominent bulls and bears, likely trends, and 
other economic matters. However, general business news played 
a less prominent role in the ARJ compared with the Chronicle. 
For the December 26, 1879 issue [1879d], 17 of the 28 pages of 
the ARJ were devoted to tables. Thus, on a weekly basis, the ARJ 
provided basic security descriptors, updated annual balance-
sheet and earnings information, and price data. In contrast to 
the Chronicle, the ARJ published more financial-accounting in-
formation. However, even more financial-accounting data were 
provided in railroad manuals.
Railroad Manuals: The most detailed company information 
continued to be published in railroad manuals. A new work dur-
ing the 1870s was the American Railroad Manual for the United 
States and the Dominion by Edward Vernon. This was the first 
edition of what was intended to be an annual edition. Vernon, 
who was formerly editor of Travelers’ Official Railway Guide, 
expanded on his purpose in an introductory “Editorial.” Vernon 
[1873, p. xlix] wanted to be impartial in presenting “the merits 
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of each line, and to give an accurate exhibit of its financial con-
dition, connections, and doings in transportation.” On occasion, 
he planned to evaluate the railroads critically.16 Like the compil-
ers of other railroad manuals before him, Vernon noted that the 
information he wanted was not always available. In some cases, 
the officers of the railroad would not cooperate in providing the 
information at their disposal. 
Vernon [1873, p. 1] was rightfully proud of the inclusion of 
railroad maps, believing he was the first to do so: “The illustra-
tion of a statistical work on railroads with such an elaborate 
series of maps originates with ourselves.” However, Poor [1860] 
also did so in his first volume covering the railroads and canals 
of the U.S. Poor, however, was unable to complete his planned 
three-volume set because of the onset of the Civil War.
Most interestingly, Vernon [1873, pp. li, liii] wanted to cre-
ate a table for each state, “systematizing all statistical informa-
tion.” However, due to difficulties, he did so only for Massachu-
setts and Ohio. The difficulties included different fiscal years, 
use of estimates in the place of actual results, and the lack of 
uniform accounting. With respect to the latter, Vernon penned 
an early plea for standardized financial reporting: 
 There is also such an entire want of uniformity in 
keeping railroad accounts,  and their subdivision, that 
an accurate estimate of the actual cost of railroad  
property is almost unattainable, especially as many 
railroad companies yearly  expend large sums out of 
net earnings in permanent improvements, and charge 
to operating what should be legitimately debited to con-
struction.
He added: “Our work in compiling these statistics would be 
materially facilitated if some definite rule were laid down by 
railroad managers as to what should constitute operating ex-
penses.”
Overall, Vernon’s manual was 662 pages, and its general 
index contained about 1,000 railroads, including branch and 
leased lines. A majority of the write-ups were a half page or less. 
Thirty-nine of Vernon’s write-ups were two or more pages.17 
16 Contrast this aspiration with Poor’s views [1860, preface]: “For each compa-
ny no explanations of its acts or policy, or speculation as to the cause of its success 
or want of success have been offered.” Poor added that, “All such would be worse 
than useless, as they would encourage a tendency, so strong in all, to substitute 
results that are desired for such as actually take place.”
17 Of over 750 entries in Poor’s [1868] index (including U.S. and state debt, 
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Since it was his original plan of display, Table 4 shows the infor-
mation for each railroad in Massachusetts. The table for Ohio 
was essentially the same except that it covered more debt instru-
ments. These tables were comparable to those presented in pe-
riodicals of the time, such as the ARJ [1869]. Vernon, however, 
included some ratios and break-downs of earnings, expenses, 
and debt. On the other hand, unlike ARJ, asset costs were miss-
ing from these tables.
TABLE 4
Contents of Vernon’s Table for Massachusetts
Characteristics of road – gauge and mileage for main, branch, sidings, total, and 
mileage in state
Capital stock and bonded debt – capital stock authorized, paid-in, preferred 
stock, first mortgage bonds, second mortgage bonds, unfunded debt, con-
vertible bonds, total, and dollar amount for state 
Rolling stock – number of locomotives, passenger cars, B & M cars, freight cars
Earnings and receipts – from passengers, freight, other (mail, express, rents, and 
miscellaneous), and total
Expenses – maintenance of way, locomotive repairs, car repairs, conducting and 
transportation, general, and total
Net earnings
Mileage statistics (ratios) – expenses to earnings, earnings per mile of road, ex-
penses per mile of road, net earnings per mile of road
Percentage of dividends on stock
Source: Vernon [1873]
As for other states, railroad information was included in 
the write-ups for each railroad. These typically traced the his-
tory of the railroad from its original charter through subsequent 
amendments or consolidations. The terminus and length of 
track were noted. With respect to Table 4, the shorter write-ups 
tended to include the information on characteristics, capital 
structure, rolling stock, and earnings. In addition, Vernon 
mentioned the cost of road and equipment. Also given was the 
distribution of net earnings to interest, rent, dividends, and 
street railroads, and railroads known by more than one name), about 30 involved 
extensive write-ups (two or more pages) for steam railroads. Hence, taking into 
account the additional items in his manual, Poor had a somewhat higher propor-
tion of longer write-ups than Vernon. On the other hand, exact comparisons were 
hard to make since Poor’s page size was smaller.
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surplus. However, not all the information was always presented, 
presumably because it was not available. In addition, some of 
the write-ups were written for railroads under construction and 
those leased to other railroads. In these cases, Vernon briefly 
discussed progress to date or the lease terms. Often included 
were connections with other railroads, the express company 
used (e.g., American Express), a list of directors, and the loca-
tion of the general office.
An example of a longer write-up is that for the New York 
Central and Hudson River Railroad. It was five pages with 
about half of its length devoted to the railroad’s long history and 
consolidations. For the year ended September 30, 1872, Vernon 
[1873, p. 136] noted a considerable discrepancy between total 
liabilities (including stock) and the cost of the road and equip-
ment. He stated that: 
 It would be better if the items on which the increase in 
capital stock was originally based were charged to their 
appropriate heads, and the value of the property on the 
books made to correspond with the existing liabilities; 
then a correct balance-sheet could be published from 
year to year, and there would not be such a glaring 
discrepancy between assets and liabilities, which must 
naturally puzzle those who  are not conversant with the 
legitimate process by which the capital stock was in-
creased nearly 100 per cent. and the value of the prop-
erty correctly appraised. 
Though stock watering was common, Vernon believed that the 
liabilities, not the assets, represented the actual value of the 
track and rolling stock. Notably, Vernon also provided ratios 
in which the actual cost-per-mile of road and per-mile of track 
were calculated.
In tables, Vernon reported physical operations for three 
years (e.g., miles run, passengers in total and carried one mile, 
tons of freight in total and carried one mile, etc.), “doings” 
(happenings) in transportation for three years (gross earnings, 
expenses, and net earnings), and expenses by categories for two 
years (e.g., office and station expenses, cost of running, etc.). 
He also reported the ratio of total expenses to gross earnings. In 
sentence form, he gave the distribution of net earnings to grad-
ing and bridging, interest on bonds, dividends, and rent, with 
the remainder carried forward to the income account for the 
next year. Vernon discussed other matters, such as the financing 
of two additional tracks from New York to Buffalo, the leasing 
of the New York and Harlem Railroad, the replacing of existing 
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rails with steel rails, and the competency of management (i.e., 
Vanderbilt).
In summary, Vernon [1873] emphasized a railroad’s legal or-
ganization, including its original charter, amendments, and con-
solidations. Compared with Poor’s [1868] entry on the New York 
Central, Vernon spent more time on the history of the company 
and less on providing tables.18 Operating and financial informa-
tion was generally limited to the current, or at least the most 
recent years. In contrast, Poor [1868] provided more operating 
and financial information covering six years. Vernon’s approach 
may have been sufficient for an annual work. However, based on 
a search of WorldCat [2008], Vernon only published one more 
edition of his work in 1874. His manual may have been a victim 
of the Panic of 1873.
The most popular railroad manual of the era, Poor’s Manual 
of the Railroads of the United States was in its 12th edition in 
1879.19 The general index contained over 1,350 entries. Most 
of these referenced American and Canadian railroads, but also 
included state debts, city and suburban tramways, the Panama 
Railroad, Pullman’s Palace Car Co., and the United States Roll-
ing Stock Co.20 In addition, an appendix listed the names of for-
mer railways and the name of the current railway of which they 
were now a part. A classified index and an alphabetical list of 
advertisers were also provided.21 
The introduction reiterated the purpose of providing infor-
mation on railroads: “What the public requires is an accurate 
presentation of their financial condition” [Poor, 1879, p. 1]. 
Poor commented that he was better able to fulfill this mission 
since the railroads and state oversight boards disclosed more 
information.22 Yet, with respect to some railroads, “there are
18 Poor [1860] covered the history of railroads and canals.
19 Another long-running railroad manual, The Manual of Statistics [Financial 
News Association, 1879], started in 1879. It, like Poor’s Manual, was published 
into the 1920s. Unfortunately, no copies of the inaugural edition could be located, 
either through interlibrary loan or otherwise (no library could be indentified us-
ing WorldCat [2008] that actually had the 1879 edition).
20 As noted, there were approximately 750 entries in the general index to Poor 
[1868]. As a sign of the times, Poor deleted about a dozen entries for canals that 
had been in his 1868-1869 Manual. In the newer edition, Poor only included ca-
nals associated with a railroad.
21 One notable user of Poor’s Manuals was Jay Gould. Fowler [1873, p. 563] 
noted that before the Panic of 1873, Gould “was poring over ‘Poor’s Railroad Man-
ual’ in search of some other good railroad to link on to those that he then held.”
22 Poor was more successful than stockholders in obtaining information for 
the New York Central which did not provide annual reports to stockholders in the 
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still a considerable number which either refuse it altogether, or 
supply it sparingly and grudgingly.” He added that, “The refusal 
of information should, as a rule, be taken as evidence, that, if 
communicated, it would tell strongly against the company, or 
persons refusing it.”
Poor was optimistic. In 1878, 2,700 miles of track were 
added, resulting in over 81,000 total miles in the U.S. Poor ex-
pected mileage to double as the system reached undeveloped 
lands and expanded to accommodate growth in population and 
commerce. Financially, Poor commented that railroad earn-
ings for 1878 were nearly equal to the peak year of 1873, and, 
despite the ensuing depression, freight tonnage had increased 
50%. This boded well for the railroads in the future as they 
“will start upon a new career, with an ample tonnage traffic, the 
rates on which are only slightly increased to add enormously to 
their net earnings.” He noted that a large number of railroads 
had been reorganized “upon a plan, or scheme, to reduce their 
interest-bearing securities to a sum the interest on which could 
in all probability by met by the accruing incomes, leaving divi-
dends on common or preferred stock to be paid as earned.” Poor 
[1870, pp. ii, iii] observed optimistically: “With the general re-
covery witnessed on every hand, and with an enormous balance 
of trade with foreign countries in our favor, there is every reason 
to believe that the country, and particularly its Railroads, are 
entering upon a career of unwonted prosperity.”
Next, Poor provided a table for all railroads showing in 
total, for each of the years 1871 through 1878, miles operated, 
capital and funded debt, gross earnings broken down by freight 
and passenger, net earnings, and dividends paid. In the next 
table, he presented these data regionally, comparing 1877 and 
1878 results. Poor also provided mileage, rolling stock, capital, 
cost, earnings, interest, and dividends, both in total and per 100 
miles of railroad for each state.. 
The main part of the manual, comprising 997 pages, was 
organized by states and territories within regions. For each state 
or territory, Poor included the area in square miles, population, 
and miles of railroad. A table showed for each railroad total 
mileage, total in the state or territory, cost of railroad per mile, 
length of railroad worked, gross earnings per mile, expenses 
as a percent of gross earnings, profits per mile, and percent of 
dividends paid. The entries for individual railroads in that state 
1870s and 1880s [Previts and Merino, 1998].
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followed, ranging in length from about a quarter of a page to 
several pages. Of the approximately 1,160 entries for railroads, 
95 of them were two or more pages.23
Illustrative of the longer entries that Poor included is that 
for the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad. The entry 
was about five pages long. Poor began the entry by giving the 
main-line mileage owned; branches; second, third, and fourth 
tracks; and others, such as sidings, turnouts, and auxiliary. He 
also listed the mileage of the lines leased from others and the 
total length of all tracks operated. The gauge of the track was in-
cluded as well as the types of rails (e.g., steel and weight). Table 
5 shows the extensive information provided in the remainder of 
the entry. Both physical and financial information was included. 
Especially noteworthy are the breakdowns of classes of freight, 
gross earnings, expenditures, capital structure, and operat-
ing assets. This remarkable amount of information was more 
detailed than that of Vernon [1873]. Much of it was presented 
on a comparative basis covering six years. Several ratios on a 
per-mile basis were reported as well as the percent of expenses 
to gross earnings (revenues). Overall, 166 of the approximately 
1,160 railroad entries (14%) in the manual had some sort of a 
comparative earnings table. Comparative financial statements 
(balance sheets) were less common.
The five-page entry for the New York Central in the 1879 
Manual is comparable, with a few notable changes, to that of 
the four-page entry in the 1868-1869 Manual. The historical 
write-up was more extended in 1879, giving the charter and 
opening dates of the various lines. In the 1879 edition, Poor 
combined tables in the earlier manual on “doings in transporta-
tion,” earnings, and the income account into his “Comparative 
Statement of Operations, Traffic, and Revenue.” In the process, 
he eliminated calculations per 100 miles each for freight and 
passengers, replacing them with per-mile calculations for gross 
earnings, expenses, and net earnings. He added percent of ex-
penses to gross earnings and the average rates (dollars) per pas-
senger per mile and per ton per mile. Similarly, he combined the 
information on track mileage (deleting details on second tracks, 
sidings, etc.), rolling stock, and financial condition into a single 
“General Account” table. Poor in the 1879 edition only provided 
details of funded debt for the current year rather than in a table 
covering six years. He deleted the monthly stock-price table. In 
23 As noted, this compared with only 30 entries of at least two pages in Poor 
[1868], which was less than half (about 400 pages) of the length of Poor [1879].
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the newer edition, he presented more details of expenses and 
TABLE 5
Poor’s Entry for the New York Central
Rolling Stock – numbers of locomotives and cars by type (e.g., passenger and 
freight)
Constituent Companies – dates of charter and opening of predecessor com-
panies and leased lines
Operations – miles run by passenger and freight trains, number of passen-
gers and tons of freight in total, per mile, and rates per mile, classes of freight 
by ton (e.g., forest products, animal and animal products, manufactures, etc.), 
earnings by source (passengers, freight, mail, etc.,), expenditures (maintenance 
of way, rolling stock, fuel, etc.), net earnings, other receipts (e.g., rents and inter-
est), other payments (e.g., interest on bonds, dividends, rent), and surplus for year
Comparative Statement of Operations, Traffic, and Revenue for 1872-1878 
– miles of railroad and all tracks, passenger and freight miles, passengers car-
ried and passenger miles, freight tons moved and ton miles, gross traffic earnings 
(passenger, freight, and miscellaneous), transportation expenses, net traffic earn-
ings, other receipts, payments (rentals, interest, dividends), balance to surplus, 
per mile basis for gross earnings, gross expenses, and net earnings, percentage of 
gross expenses to gross earnings, average rate per passenger per mile, and average 
rate per ton per mile
Financial Statement at September 30, 1878 – capital stock account, funded 
debt, bonds and mortgages on real estate, and total; per contra, grading and ma-
sonry, bridges, superstructure, stations and buildings, land and land damages, lo-
comotive engines and snow plows, passenger and baggage cars, freight and other 
cars, engineering and agencies, investments in other lines, and balance of other 
assets
Funded debt – issues, interest rates, maturity dates
Comparative General Account at September 30 for 1872-1878 – miles of rail-
road and tracks, numbers of locomotives and cars, dollar amounts for capital 
stock account, funded debt, real estate bonds, floating debt, total capital, railroad, 
equipment, engineering and agencies, investments in other railroads, and balance 
of other assets
Other – directors, officers, and principal office and address
Source: Poor [1879]
railroad assets for the current year, but with fewer details of 
other liabilities and other assets. 
The shorter entries were typically about a half page or less. 
Table 6 shows a reproduction of the information for the Parker 
and Karns City Railroad. The format for a shorter entry was 
similar to that for the New York Central. The major difference 
was that only one year’s data, with fewer details, were included. 
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For example, the financial-operations section might only supply 
gross earnings, operating expenses, and net earnings. The finan-
cial-statement section might only include capital stock, funded 
debt, floating debt, and the assets reported might be limited 
to the cost of road. Poor usually included details of the funded 
debt, such as due dates and interest rates. A fair number of the 
entries were brief when the lines were leased to others. Some-
times, Poor just reported basic description when the railroad 
refused to provide the information. Some of the shorter entries 
in the 1879 Manual were longer than those in the 1868-1869 edi-
tion. The newer entries contained an historical write-up, more 
gross earnings breakdowns, more balance-sheet amounts, more 
calculations of rates, and details of the funded debt. 
TABLE 6
Poor’s Entry for Parker and Karns City Railroad
Line of Road.-Parker Junction, Pa., to Karns City, Pa……………10.50 miles.
Sidings and other tracks, 1.31 miles. Gauge, 3 feet. Rail, 30 lbs.
Construction commenced October 1, 1873. Road opened April 10, 1874.
Rolling Stock.-Locomotive engines, 4. Cars-passenger, 5; baggage, etc., 2; 
Freight (box, 10; and platform, 36), 46-total, 53.
Operations for year ending December 31, 1878.-Gross earnings-passenger 
$101,459.40; freight, $63,011.64; and miscellaneous, $5,627.83-total ($16,199.89 
per mile), $170,098.87. Operating expenses (51.19 p. c.), $87,099.06. Net earnings, 
$82,999.81. Disposition of net earnings not reported.
Financial Statement, December 31,1878.-Cost of road ($21,547.39 p. m.), 
$226,247.50, and of equipment ($7,426.72 p. m.), $77,980.54; total, road and 
equipment ($28,974.12 p. m.), $304,228.11. Capital stock, $150,000. Funded debt, 
1st mortgage 7 per cent. gold bonds, $100,000.
 S. D. Karns, President………………………………Parker City, Pa.
PRINCIPAL OFFICE AND ADDRESS…………………Parker City, Pa.
Source: Poor [1879, p. 344]
Compared with Vernon’s 1873 Manual, Poor’s 1879 Manual 
also included a history of the company, but Poor refrained from 
editorializing on how the company was doing or on the com-
petency of the management. Again, Poor provided more data 
covering more years, and he included more ratios. Both authors, 
however, reported the ratio of operating expenses to gross earn-
ings. Poor had more entries as well as more entries with longer 
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write-ups, although this could have been a function of the later 
publication date. Yet, both authors were frustrated by the lack of 
information forthcoming from some of the railroads.
On the other hand, these railroad manuals contained con-
siderably more information than mining manuals from the era.24 
One mining manual [Mining Review Publishing Company, 1879] 
provided an overview of mining stock exchanges, mining laws, 
mines, biographies, and articles related to mining. Most of the 
descriptions of the approximately 475 individual mines were 
less than one-quarter of a page and were often just a few lines. 
They included basic organizational information (e.g., directors), 
capital, physical descriptions of the property, and progress to 
date. In some cases, the descriptions included assessments, 
dividends, value of ore, costs of mining and milling per ton, 
expected profits, and law suits and other disputes with adjoining 
mines. No financial statements were reported. 
In summary, while investors sometimes had a wealth of 
information for some railroads, for others it was sparse and 
hard to come by. Moreover, the comparability of the expense/
asset amounts troubled Vernon. In contrast, Poor was not overly 
concerned about the reliability of the data. He believed that this 
potential problem was mitigated by presenting comparative 
information over several years. He thought that this approach 
made it more difficult for the railroads to hide something [Chan-
dler, 1956].
A SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
Did outside investors from the 1870s need financial ac-
counting information? Clearly, Medbery [1870] and Sullivan 
[1876] thought that the answer was yes. They thought that 
financial-accounting information, especially earnings infor-
mation, was necessary to make informed decisions. The NYT 
agreed. In the wake of the Panic of 1873, it was proposed that 
NYSE railroads provide monthly financial statements. The fi-
nancial statement would have included earnings (revenues) and 
expenses and should have resulted in “more confidence felt by 
investors in their purchases, which are now mostly made blind-
folded, as it were” [NYT, 1873f, p. 1]. 
Due to inside information, railroad directors had an unfair 
24 Mining securities were not traded on the NYSE. Most of them were traded 
on the New York Mining Stock Exchange, the San Francisco Stock and Exchange 
Board, the Pacific Stock Exchange, or the California Stock and Exchange Board 
[Mining Review Publishing Company, 1879].
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advantage over outside stockholders. The suggested solution 
was the disclosure by railroads of weekly earnings (revenues) 
and monthly statements of earnings and expenses [HMM, 
1870a]. Additionally, there was support for inspection, on 
 demand, of a railroad’s books by stockholders [HMM, 1870e].
Was financial accounting information available? Painstak-
ing effort was made to provide this information, especially by 
periodicals and railroad manuals. Available information to aid 
investment decisions expanded and became more timely as 
exemplified by the merger of the popular monthly HMM with 
the weekly Commercial and Financial Chronicle. By the end of 
the 1870s, the merged Chronicle, the most prominent financial 
periodical of its time, provided a host of data. Earnings informa-
tion was reported along with basic security descriptors, price, 
volume, economic, and money-market data. The ARJ presented 
even more operational, balance-sheet, and earnings data for 
railroads. 
Yet, the most detailed operational and financial information 
was provided in railroad manuals, especially Poor’s. Poor [1879] 
reported more information about more railroads. In a growing 
number of cases, he included six years of comparative physical 
asset, operational, earnings, and balance-sheet numbers. In ad-
dition, sophistication of the analysis of the information grew as 
Poor presented more ratios involving per-mile calculations. Both 
he and Vernon [1873] calculated a railroad’s ratio of operating 
expenses to gross earnings. These ratios should have helped 
investors better understand railroads. They are key metrics that 
Cramer [2005] insists are critical to understanding an industry. 
Unfortunately, some railroads still refused or disclosed rela-
tively little information. Further, Poor [1879] reported compara-
tive earnings information for only about one in seven railroads. 
Balance-sheet information was reported for even fewer. State 
regulatory agencies that promoted financial disclosure, such as 
the Massachusetts Board of Railroad Commissioners, were in 
their infancy in the 1870s [McCraw, 1984]. At the federal level, 
it would not be until 1887 that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission required standardized formats for financial statements, 
and it would not be until 1906 that the Hepburn Act required 
standardized accounting methods [Baskin and Miranti, 1997]. 
Moreover, having all publicly held companies routinely provid-
ing financial accounting information was still more than half 
a century away. Outsiders would have to wait for a systematic 
reporting process while they contended with railroad kings and 
sweeping economic events like the Panic of 1873.
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ACCOUNTING HISTORY REVIEW CONFERENCE
at Cardiff University, 12th-13th September 2011
ANNOUNCEMENT AND CALL FOR PAPERS
The 23rd accounting history conference organised at Cardiff Business School will be 
the launch event for Accounting History Review. In accordance with the focus of the 
journal a key theme of the conference will be ‘Accounting in History’ - exploring the 
scope for greater interdisciplinary engagement between accounting and mainstream 
historians. The guest speakers are historians whose work has important implications 
for accounting history research. Plenary addresses will be given by Mary Poovey, New 
York University, author of Genres o f the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eigh­
teenth and Nineteenth-Century Britain and A History o f the Modem Fact; and Evan 
Jones, Bristol University, author of prize winning work on accounting for smuggling 
in the mid-sixteenth century.
Also with a view to stimulating the development of new research agendas there will 
be a panel discussion on future research directions in accounting history involving 
leading commentators on the state of the field over the past two decades. Panellists in­
clude Salvador Carmona, Warwick Funnell, Christopher Napier and Stephen Walker.
The conference will also feature parallel sessions. Theoretical, empirical and review 
papers are welcomed in all areas of accounting history.
Delegates are provided with the opportunity of receiving constructive feedback, in 
an informal setting, on papers ranging from early working drafts to fully developed 
manuscripts. The programme allows approximately 35 minutes for presentation and 
discussion.
The conference, organised by Malcolm Anderson and Stephen Walker, will be held 
in the prestigious Glamorgan Building of Cardiff University. Sessions will commence 
on the morning of 12th September 2011 and conclude in the late afternoon of 13th 
September.
The event will feature a wine reception sponsored by Taylor & Francis on 11th Sep­
tember, conference lunches, teas and a dinner in the Great Hall of Caerphilly Castle, 
one of the most impressive medieval fortresses in western Europe. A link to local ho­
tel and university accommodation booking can be found on the conference website 
www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/conferences/ahr2011/index.html.
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the conference 
should send a one page abstract (including name, affiliation and contact details) for­
matted in Word as an email attachment by 1st June 2011 to Carbs-Corrference@cf.ac. 
uk. Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5731. Applicants will be advised of the conference organisers’ 
decision by 10th June 2011.
Part of the costs of this conference are being paid by the ICAEW’s charitable trusts. 
These trusts support educational projects relating to accountancy and economics.
CHARITABLE Cardiff  Ysgol 
t r u s t s  Business  Fusnes
School  Caerdydd
Cardiff University   Prifysgol Caerdydd
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“I Ask the Profession to Stand Still”: 
The Evolution of American Public 
Accountancy, 1927-1962
Abstract: This paper traces the emergence of the AICPA as an effective 
national representative of the American profession. Central to this 
evolution was a broadening of the Institute’s outlook to encompass all 
practicing CPAs and to embrace the benefits of public relations and 
lobbying. The paper begins with the Wall Street elite that dominated 
the Institute’s predecessor, the AIA, and describes the pressures for re-
form that culminated in the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and set 
this evolution in motion. The final section makes use of former AICPA 
president Marquis Eaton’s papers to show how pressure from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, from competing professions, 
and from a geometric increase in the profession’s numbers brought 
a more pragmatic and aggresive leadership to the Institute, one that 
more closely resembles the modern AICPA. 
INTRODUCTION
Studies of the U.S. accounting profession’s development 
often end with the 1930s, viewing the New Deal, the unification 
of the profession in 1936, and the McKesson & Robbins (M&R) 
scandal of 1939 as the seminal events in the profession’s history 
[Miranti, 1990; Sriram and Vollmers, 1997]. Few emphasize the 
importance of the next two decades and the realignment of the 
profession’s leadership and goals took place. This paper focuses 
on the crucial years of 1927-1962, when accountants evolved 
from an insular, divided group with an uncertain mandate from 
American society for its services to a profession eager to pro-
mote itself and to expand its reach and responsibilities. From 
Acknowledgments: I wish to thank Stephen Zeff, Paul Miranti, Gary Pre-
vits, Bob Parker, Editor Richard Fleischman, and participants at the 2009 ABFH 
Conference in Cardiff for their comments. This paper is based on my dissertation 
at Texas A&M University. I thank Harold Livesay (chair), Gary Giroux, Charles 
Brooks, and Albert Broussard for their advice and support.
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the beginning of the push to reform U.S. capital markets with 
William Z. Ripley’s 1927 polemic Main Street and Wall Street 
to the M&R audit scandal, the leadership of the profession 
remained aloof from the opinions of those outside the profes-
sion. But in the wake of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 
and M&R, a new generation of leaders began to take a more 
expansive view of the profession’s proper role. Faced with pres-
sure from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), from 
competing professions, and from a geometric increase in the 
profession’s numbers, a more pragmatic group took the reins 
of accounting’s national leadership, embodied in the AIA, and 
began to embrace the benefits of public relations and lobbying. 
They were motivated not only by their own vision of a greater 
public profile as an essential part of a true profession but by 
the inroads competing professions were making into CPAs’ 
hard-won jurisdictions in financial-statement audits, taxes, and 
the burgeoning field of management-advisory services. This led 
them to a more aggressive and self-interested stance for the 
profession, eagerly seeking out new venues and new revenue for 
CPAs’ skills. Beginning with the union corruption scandals of 
the 1950s and the promotion of the CPA’s abilities as “business 
advisors” in 1962 testimony before Congress by incoming AICPA 
president Robert Witschey, the AICPA’s increasingly aggressive 
lobbying efforts on behalf of its members showed how far the 
profession’s evolution had taken it.
This paper retraces the profession’s path through the seis-
mic shocks of the Great Depression, the New Deal, and M&R 
and evaluates the role these events played in shifting the profes-
sion’s leadership away from the aristocratic traditions of the 
Wall Street-centered elite and towards a more pragmatic gen-
eration more in sync with the unique public-private regulatory 
model the New Dealers envisioned for the profession. Particular 
attention is paid to the efforts of John Carey, a non-accountant 
who, as executive director of the AIA and the AICPA, became the 
profession’s cheerleader everywhere from his editorial column 
in the Journal of Accountancy to the halls of Congress and state 
legislatures; to Marquis Eaton, who laid the groundwork for 
the profession’s new public-relations efforts and presided over 
the name change that finally, after 20 years of resistance from 
the profession’s old guard, made the AICPA the official repre-
sentative of CPAs; and to Carman Blough who, as the first chief 
accountant of the SEC and later as director of research for the 
AICPA, probably did more to improve the quality of financial 
reporting in the U.S. than any other individual in accounting’s 
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history.
The best known and most colorful of the older generation, 
George O. May of Price Waterhouse & Co., also figures promi-
nently in this paper. May’s career is in many ways the best 
vehicle from which to describe the evolution of the American 
profession. He personified the old-world model of the gentle-
man professional, confident that his professional expertise made 
his integrity clear to outsiders and largely obviated the need for 
formal regulation. This model proved incompatible with Pro-
gressive notions of legal standards of conduct for market actors, 
and May’s influence steadily waned after the 1930s. Accounting’s 
next generation of leaders better understood the demands that a 
nation with an historic aversion to government oversight placed 
on professions. This generation (slowly) implemented more uni-
form accounting and auditing principles and procedures and ac-
cepted responsibility for the quality of work of all CPAs. But in 
navigating the course laid out for them, the AICPA found itself 
defending more and more professional territory, expanding into 
new fields, and fighting off challenges from competing profes-
sions that threatened its members’ practices. Soon this dialectic 
had made the CPA a businessman more than a disinterested pro-
fessional, and May was one of the few voices lamenting that the 
ideal his generation had strived for had been left behind. The 
portrayal of May is meant to help illustrate the tension at the 
heart of this story, that while much of the paper would certainly 
qualify as a Whig interpretation of history, this evolution is what 
ultimately led to the profession becoming more self-interested. 
The professionalization of accounting, in short, is what caused 
the damage to the profession’s credibility. 
This paper is in the style of traditional narrative history, 
employing archival sources to offer a portrait of the U.S. pro-
fession in the mid-20th century. The first half of the paper 
describes the profession under the leadership of the national 
accounting firms, referred to throughout as the Wall Street elite 
because of its clientele’s listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). The papers of James M. Landis and George O. May, 
combined with practitioner journals, mainstream media sourc-
es, and an abundant secondary literature on the New Deal (per-
haps the only era of the U.S. profession to have received thor-
ough, critical evaluation by multiple historians) are the bases for 
these sections. The heart of the paper are the years beginning in 
1939, years that previous historians have largely framed around 
the development of accounting principles [see Zeff, 1971, 2003; 
Chatov, 1975; Previts and Merino, 1998]. But this was only one 
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aspect, and as will be argued, not the most important in the 
profession’s evolution over the two decades following the M&R 
scandal. The papers of former AICPA president Eaton have been 
available at the University of Florida since the 1970s, but as far 
as the author can determine have never been used. These mem-
os and letters provide a wealth of information on how and why 
the AICPA became just another “trade organization” that aided 
accounting firms in “serving their own business interests” at the 
expense of the investing public [Turner, 2006, p. 392].
The story in this paper fits neatly into the existing para-
digms of the professionalization literature. Accounting histo-
rians have made use of Abbott’s jurisdiction model (see below) 
and Macdonald and Ritzer’s dilemma of exclusiveness vs. 
market control1 to describe the growth of public accountancy in 
several nations [e.g., Carnegie et al. 2003; Walker, 2004; Edwards 
et al. 2005]. The U.S. offers its own iteration. In the 1920s, the 
profession was divided into two national factions along lines 
of practice (national firms auditing big business with local 
practices providing basic accounting services) and background 
(northeasterners strongly influenced by British practice vs. 
southerners and midwesterners often of non-Anglo-Saxon de-
scent). This schism left the profession without an authoritative 
voice and the two groups merged in 1936 expressly to lay claim 
to representing the entire profession. In the postwar era, an 
expanding economy created opportunities for other professions 
to challenge CPAs’ jurisdictions in audit, tax, and management 
consulting. But by this time, a united profession, led by an ag-
gressive leadership, could successfully defend the CPAs’ territory. 
THE AIA ELITE AND THE SECURITIES ACTS
Writing of the American legal profession in the early 20th 
century, Galambos [1983, p. 488] describes “a profession virtu-
ally controlled by a WASP elite, which used its power and status 
to ward off threats from liberal reformers and the country’s 
new immigrants.” A similar picture emerges in the accounting 
profession of the 1920s. Accounting’s dominant voices were 
national firms such as Price, Waterhouse & Co., headquartered 
in New York and conducting financial-statement audits for the 
largest American corporations. Until the M&R scandal, this Wall 
1 Macdonald and Ritzer [1988, pp. 257-258] write “…to control the market, 
the occupational body must include anyone with a reasonable claim to expertise, 
but such inclusion brings in marginal practitioners who lower the standing of 
higher-status practitioners.”
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Street elite served as the profession’s national voice. 
These men formed the leadership of the AIA, which like the 
AICPA was a voluntary organization (In the U.S., licensing of 
CPAs is reserved to the individual states.). Until 1921, the AIA 
served as the only national organization of public accountants. 
Many of its leaders were British chartered accountants sent to 
the U.S. to develop an American presence for their firms. In 
1926, one-fifth of the AIA’s membership consisted of accountants 
born outside the U.S. [see Nissley, 1928, p. 37]. They tended to 
favor an apprenticeship system similar to their own training, 
rather than the more egalitarian college education prevalent in 
the U.S. In many cases, they were also reluctant to associate 
with men of southern and eastern European heritages [Miranti, 
1990, p. 123]. Most importantly, they did not respect the CPA 
certificate, which they dismissed as a state-regulated license 
that conferred legitimacy on an inferior class of accountants. 
In 1919, the AIA had attempted to secure legislation in Con-
gress that would recognize its membership as superior to a 
CPA license. As late as 1926, the AIA refused to limit its future 
membership to CPAs [Springer, 1936a, p. 749]. This finally led 
to the creation of a rival national organization, the American 
Society of Certified Public Accountants (ASCPA), in 1921. This 
is the most conspicuous example of the AIA’s failure to exercise 
leadership for the profession. At a time when it could have taken 
all CPAs under its wing and embraced responsibility for raising 
the professional standards of all public accountants in the U.S., 
the AIA instead chose to distance itself from the rest of the pro-
fession. 
Many small town CPAs in the 1920s may also have found 
it difficult to relate to the AIA’s official periodical, the Journal 
of Accountancy, particularly to the style of its editor, A.P. Rich-
ardson. Durand Springer, founder of the ASCPA, reportedly 
“could not stomach the leisurely ways of the elite who in those 
days dominated the Institute’s activities…Heading that elite 
group was A.P. Richardson, a nonaccountant and an import who 
has often been referred to as the epitome of a perfect English 
gentleman”2 [Kohler, 1975, p. 27]. After stepping down as editor 
in 1936 (to be replaced by John Carey), Richardson [1040. p. 
217] returned to the Journal in 1939 with a regular column titled 
“This Blessed Language” of which the following passage is rep-
2 “Perfect English gentleman” was apparently a style Richardson affected. 
Alphyon Perry Richardson was born and raised in New Jersey, never attended 
college, and worked as a reporter for the Wall Street Journal [O’Neill, 1980, p. 1].
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resentative: 
Take...the quotation: ‘Only the brave deserves the 
fair’;…as the sentence stands it means of course that 
the brave man and no one else deserves the fair. If we 
say ‘The only brave deserves the fair,’ we may mean that 
an Indian warrior is deserving or that there is no more 
than one brave man.‘The brave only deserves the fair’ 
probably means that our hero deserves the fair but is 
not to have her. Now, moving our wandering adverb an-
other step forward, we say ‘The brave deserves only the 
fair’ and we imply that the brave man deserves nothing 
except the fair. Again ‘The brave deserves the only fair.’ 
Here we find that the choice is limited. If there be other 
ladies present they do not qualify. And, finally, if we say 
‘The brave deserves the fair only,’ I don’t know exactly 
what it means.
The AIA’s inadequacy as a leadership organization became 
particularly apparent in the crisis years that followed the stock 
market crash of 1929. Pressure had been building on the profes-
sion since the publication of economics professor William Z. 
Ripley’s Main Street and Wall Street in 1927, which brought the 
issue of financial reporting to the attention of a broader public. 
His portrayal of auditors as too-closely tied to their corporate 
clients and lacking authoritative standards for financial report-
ing brought unwanted attention to the profession [Richardson, 
1927a, p. 254; Kohler, 1933b, p. 142]. But the AIA leadership 
was reluctant to take action. It was George O. May, senior part-
ner at Price, Waterhouse & Co., who saw the handwriting on 
the wall for reform and led the first effort to improve the quality 
of financial reporting. As early as 1926, May [1936, pp. 44, 46] 
warned: “There is not in the profession as it now exists a body 
of men capable of dealing adequately with the problem…at the 
present time auditors hold office usually at the pleasure of the 
officers of the company.” Ripley’s writings spurred May to take 
the initiative in reforming financial accounting practices [May 
Papers, 57-6; AICPA, 1960]. May would write: “It is becoming 
recognized that if the interests of all affected by corporate de-
velopment – and that includes a large proportion of our people – 
are to be protected, it is vitally important that some basic princi-
ples of accounting should be established and given substantially 
the force of law” [May Papers 53-6, September 11, 1930]. May’s 
efforts led to the NYSE requiring annual financial statement au-
dits for all listed firms in 1932 and to the publication of Audits of 
Corporate Accounts (1934), at the time the most comprehensive 
effort to establish accounting principles.
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By this time, in no small part due to the revelations of the 
Pecora hearings in Congress, May had lost the initiative and fed-
eral legislation became inevitable [Seligman, 1982, p. 2; Flesher 
and Flesher, 1986, p. 421]. Inexplicably, though, the profession 
was caught by surprise by the 1933 Securities Act, passed during 
President Roosevelt’s “Hundred Days” with the goal of restoring 
confidence in U.S.capital markets. “Despite William Z. Ripley, 
despite Berle and Means, despite the Pecora investigation, de-
spite public demand for reform of the securities markets, the 
Institute had made no effective preparation to deal with legisla-
tion directed to that end” [Carey, 1969, p. 182]. The obloquy 
even came from the accounting academe. Eric Kohler [1933a, p. 
164], editor of The Accounting Review, railed against “the inher-
ent snobbishness in many of the Institute’s published reports – a 
snobbishness and lack of good taste that have their origin in a 
real ignorance of the things at stake in the accounting profes-
sion. There is no indication of any understanding of the prob-
lems that lie ahead; no appreciation of the newer opportunities 
for the profession in the bloodless social revolution in which we 
have been immersed during the past year.” After the passage of 
the 1933 act, the profession quickly realized its importance, and 
both the AIA and ASCPA sent representatives to Washington to 
help write the detailed regulations to implement the law [Landis 
papers, Folder 2-3; Chatov, 1975, p. 56; Zeff, 2008, p. 177]. 
 Without a unified voice, accountants had been unable to ex-
ercise any real influence on the 1933 act. Colonel Arthur Carter 
of the New York State Society (NYSSCPA), apparently on his 
own initiative, did testify at the congressional hearings leading 
up the 1933 act, though it is interesting to note that he report-
edly did so as a gesture of U.S. accountants’ independence from 
the British-dominated AIA [Carey, 1979, p. 34]. The impact of 
Carter’s testimony is unclear; contemporary newspaper coverage 
suggests it was quickly forgotten [New York Times (NYT), April 
2, 1933, p. 1; Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1933, p. 8; see also Wi-
esen, 1978]. One reason may have been Carter’s imperious tone: 
Sen. Barkley: You audit the controllers?
Col. Carter: Yes, the public accountant audits the con-
troller’s account.
Sen. Barkley: Who audits you?
Col. Carter: Our conscience.
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The pompous spirit of much of the AIA alienated not only 
the vast majority of U.S. CPAs (most of whom did not belong 
to either the AIA or the ASCPA) but also the New Dealers who 
wrote the Securities Acts. James Landis, the chief author of the 
Securities Acts and later chairman of the SEC, summed up the 
profession this way in 1936: “The impact of almost daily tilts 
with accountants, some of them called leaders in their profes-
sion, often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to management 
are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor” 
[Carey, 1979, p. 36]. Landis particularly had in mind May, who 
had worked closely with Landis in the months after the 1933 
act and who had garnered a reputation as the profession’s “phi-
losopher” [Carey, 1970, p. 3]. Born in England in 1873, May was 
extremely well educated despite never having attended college, 
instead rising up through an apprecticeship to join Price, Wa-
terhouse & Co. in London [Grady, 1962, pp. 9-13; Parker, 2010, 
p. 5]. In 1896, he was sent by the British firm to conduct audits 
in the U.S. and was one of the founders of the U.S. profession. 
Landis [1959, p. 35, fn. 12] felt such antipathy towards May 
that a quarter century after the Securities Acts, he found space 
in a 20-page law journal article to single him out for criticism: 
“Despite the fact now generally recognized that the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act have introduced into the ac-
counting profession ethical and professional standards compa-
rable to those of other recognized professions, the then dean of 
the accounting profession, George O. May of Price, Waterhouse 
& Co. was strangely opposed to our proposed requirements for 
independent accountants.” And Landis was not the only one. 
William Paton [1981, pp. 91-94], professor of accounting at 
the University of Michigan and one of the leading accounting 
theorists of his generation, remembers May as “a very conceited 
Englishman, and hypersensitive to criticism, even when some-
what justified…his brusque way of disposing of questions he 
didn’t like, and his rather domineering attitude toward all those 
daring to ask questions, annoyed both faculty and students…I 
understand that I was one of only three people who dared to 
call him ‘George.’” More significantly, Landis’ opinion of May 
seems to have extended to the entire profession. He wrote to 
Felix Frankfurter: “I was up the night before and talked to some 
accountants…a very strange class of people whom I suppose by 
the very nature of their profession are without any humor” [Par-
rish, 1970, p. 200]. The feeling was apparently mutual. Carey 
[1979, p. 35] would remember: “Mr. Landis was not so easy to 
deal with. Cordial and conciliatory at first, he became increas-
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ingly critical of the accounting profession. He was a thin, tense, 
somewhat impatient man, almost humorless, and clearly feeling 
the pressure of his new responsibilities.” 
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act, passed by Congress 
and signed by Roosevelt on June 6, 1934, created the SEC and 
granted it power to regulate Wall Street, including the account-
ants who audited publicly traded companies. It might have 
been expected that without the trappings of a true profession 
(one organization representing all practicing accountants, clear 
independence from their corporate clients, an established lob-
bying presence in Washington), the SEC would not have trusted 
the profession to handle such an essential cog in U.S. capital 
markets as big business’ financial communications to the public. 
But such was not the case. Despite the SEC’s lack of confidence 
in accountants, the profession was largely left to govern itself, 
putting in place a regulatory regime that has since been the ob-
ject of almost constant criticism from Congress, the media, and 
historians [U.S. Congress, 1976; Previts and Merino 1998, pp. 
271, 318; Zeff, 2003, pp. 195-196]. As an historian of the Securi-
ties Acts concluded: “Nothing jarred the SEC’s confidence in the 
accounting profession’s ability to evolve more uniform terminol-
ogy and techniques. Commissioners and staff members merely 
became impatient” [Parrish, 1970, p. 206]. By 1939, Landis had 
concluded: “As long as you have the May leadership in the ac-
counting situation, I have very little hope of seeing them accom-
plish much” [quoted in Parrish, 1970, p. 206]. 
 
THE SECURITIES ACTS’ IMPACT ON THE PROFESSION
The passage of the Securities Acts was the single most 
important event in the professionalization of accounting; they 
legitimized the profession by granting it an exclusive franchise 
to conduct financial-statement audits, providing auditors with 
the leverage to resist the demands of their corporate clients.
They imposed clear accountability with liability standards for 
negligence. As dicussed below, they spurred the unification of 
the profession in 1936. And there was near universal agreement 
among contemporaries that they improved the quality of finan-
cial reporting by encouraging the development of more uniform 
accounting principles [Certified Public Accountant, 1933, p. 597; 
Smith, 1937, p. 152; Cooper and Ijiri, 1979, p. 36]. Finally, the 
acts enshrined a regulatory framework that, regardless of its ef-
fectiveness, has presided over the most successful capital market 
in the history of the world.
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The experience of the Securities Acts did spur the consolida-
tion of the AIA and ASCPA in 1936. Hostility between the two 
groups, based not only on differences in clientele and scale but 
on class and ethnicity, had at times reached puerile levels. From 
1927 to 1932, the respective journals of the two organizations, 
the Journal of Accountancy and The Certified Public Accountant, 
rarely even mentioned the name of its rival. Robert Montgomery 
[1939a, p. 38], of the national firm Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Mont-
gomery, noted: “The profession had been greatly handicapped 
in its contacts with governmental agencies in Washington, due 
to the inability of the representatives of the two societies to 
represent the interests of the profession as a whole.” But even 
with this in mind, acrimony nearly destroyed the union. As 
Montgomery [1939b, p. 72] remembered it: “The retiring [AIA] 
president was bitterly opposed to the merger. For some obscure 
and wholly unfounded reason, he argued that the AIA would 
be diluted in quality and reduced in prestige by the proposed 
merger.” Members of the ASCPA pointedly noted that it was 
not a “merger” at all. Even at this late date, the AIA refused the 
ASCPA’s proposal that the two organizations combine into a new 
organization to be called “The American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants.” Instead, the ASCPA was “absorbed” into 
the AIA despite the fact that less than 3% of the AIA’s members 
by 1936 were non-CPAs [Springer, 1936b]. It would take two 
more decades of fighting before the AIA explicitly became the 
national organization of CPAs, and then only in response to the 
encroachments of unlicensed public accountants. 
Carman Blough’s role in the profession’s leadership began 
in these years. Having worked his way up through the ranks 
of state government in Wisconsin, Blough probably had more 
in common with the ASCPA than the AIA elite [Miranti, 1990, 
p. 153]. While working at the Wisconsin State Board of Public 
Affairs, he met George Mathews, a future SEC commissioner, 
and, in 1934, he joined the SEC as a financial analyst. By 1935, 
the SEC decided a need existed for a “final arbitrator in all ac-
counting problems facing the Commission,” and Blough was 
appointed the first chief accountant of the SEC [Cooper, 1982, 
pp. xviii, 8]. Carey remembered that “there could not have been 
a more fortunate appointment…tempermentally he was ideally 
suited for the new job…He was open minded, willing to listen” 
[Cooper, 1982, p. xiv].
But while a more affable presence than James Landis, 
Blough was a stern advocate for more formalized accounting 
principles. He told the NYSSCPA in 1937: 
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Almost daily, principles that for years I had thought 
were definitely accepted among the members of the 
profession are violated in a registration statement 
prepared by some accountant in whom I have high 
confidence. Indeed, an examination of hundreds of 
statements filed with our Commission almost leads one 
to the conclusion that aside from the simple rules of 
double entry bookkeeping, there are very few principles 
of accounting upon which the accountants of this coun-
try are in agreement [Carey, 1970, p. 10]. 
Carey [1970. p. 11] remembered: “The cumulative effect of 
this speech was devastating.” Blough would later add: “Unless 
the profession took steps to reduce the areas of difference in 
accounting practices the Commission would” [quoted in Zeff, 
1972, p. 132]. It was Blough’s hope that the profession would ac-
cept the challenge: “I have emphasized at numerous times that 
the policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission was to 
encourage the accountants to develop uniformity of procedure 
themselves, in which case we would follow” [AIA, 1937, p.190]. 
He certainly had his work cut out for him in persuading the 
Wall Street elite to embrace formalized rules at the expense of 
professional discretion. As a Lybrand, Ross Bros. partner pro-
tested, “There is the idea that standardized accounting is a sim-
ple matter, that the only reason it has not advanced further is to 
be found in the ignorance or dishonesty of accountants and the 
management of large industries” [Warren, 1934, p. 10]. The SEC 
received some support for its efforts from accounting academics 
when their organization, the American Accounting Association, 
issued “A Tentative Statement of Accounting Principles Affect-
ing Corporate Reports” in 1936 [Carey, 1970, pp. 11-12]. Blough 
and others at the SEC sedulously pursued improved accounting 
principles until the M&R scandal undermined the old guard’s 
claim to leadership of the profession.
HOW M&R AND WORLD WAR II CHANGED THE 
PROFESSION
 The reforms of the New Deal, although initially intended 
to bring fundamental change to accounting, had little impact 
on the profession over the course of the 1930s. The Wall Street 
elite remained firmly entrenched in the profession’s leadership, 
much to the consternation of accounting’s new overseers at the 
SEC. And however superannuated this elite may have become, 
it clung defiantly to the professional model that had seen it 
through the decade’s crises. In his valedictory address to the AIA 
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in 1937, outgoing President Montgomery encouraged his audi-
ence to continue whistling past the graveyard: “We have been 
told so often that we cannot remain still, we must go forward or 
backward, that we are inclined to believe it. Nevertheless, I ask 
the profession to stand still. I do not want it to change” [AIA, 
1937, pp. 89-90].
The forces driving public accountancy to become the pro-
fession the New Dealers envisioned would work slowly over the 
next two decades. The unification of the profession into one 
national organization in 1936 was the first step towards broad-
ening the leadership’s outlook to embrace CPAs throughout the 
U.S. But it was the M&R scandal and the demands that World 
War II placed on accounting that undermined the old-guard 
leadership of the AIA and paved the way for U.S. public account- 
ancy’s next generation of leaders.
The M&R scandal was uncovered in December 1938. From 
1923 to 1937, auditors from Price, Waterhouse & Co. had been 
accepting fraudulent inventory and accounts receivable records 
prepared by a convicted felon operating under an assumed 
name [NYT, December 24, 1938, p. 4, January 13, 1939, p. 38]. 
The revelation that systematic fraud had been perpetrated un-
der the nose of the profession’s premier firm made headlines 
in newspapers all over the country and led to major changes in 
audit procedures. It also proved a major blow to the elite gen-
eration’s control of the profession, both to its prestige and to its 
numbers, as the practice of relying on temporary workers came 
under greater scrutiny and the ranks of full-time CPAs swelled. 
It occurred just as the AIA was beginning to take steps towards 
the establishment of accounting principles, short-circuiting the 
elite’s efforts to placate the SEC [Previts and Robinson, 1996, 
p. 69]. In September 1938, the AIA’s Committee on Accounting 
Procedure (CAP) had recommended that it be given additional 
responsibilities and personnel, “recognizing the existence of 
a widespread demand for greater uniformity” [Carey, 1970, p. 
12]. The CAP’s work continued after the scandal as it issued 51 
Accounting Research Bulletins by 1959, to be succeeded by the 
Accounting Principles Board. 
The lurid events of the fraud brought the profession unprec-
edented public scrutiny. Within a month of the revelation of the 
scandal, the attorney general of New York summoned leaders of 
the AIA to his office to discuss what reforms were needed, and 
his office issued a statement that “the Coster-Musica [M&R] 
case [has] revealed certain fundamental weaknesses in the 
preparation of financial statements of large corporations” (NYT, 
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December 24, 1938, p. 4]. The new chairman of the SEC, Jerome 
Frank, hoped the fallout from M&R would mark “a turning 
point in accounting standards” and called on accountants to 
take the lessons of the scandal to heart and begin to accept the 
responsibilities the New Dealers had laid out for them six years 
before: “Without in any way indicating what the applicable law 
and morals may have been in the past, I suggest that the McKes-
son & Robbins case…raises, for the future, certain questions 
with respect to corporations whose securities are listed or regis-
tered. While the controller serves not only the management but 
also the stockholders, should not the accountant serve the man-
agement and the stockholders and the bondholders and other 
creditors? And should not the accountant serve not merely the 
existing stockholders and bondholders, but all future investors” 
[NYT, January 9, 1939, p. 45]?
The profession showed a new sensitivity to public relations 
by responding quickly to the crisis. By May 1939, six months 
after the scandal broke, new procedures were put in place that 
required physical checking of inventory and confirmation of re-
ceivables. A new tone could be detected in response to the SEC’s 
investigation into the scandal: 
Such an investigation might not be proper in the case 
of any other profession, but certified public account- 
ants recognize a dual responsibility which is unique – a 
responsibility to the client and a responsibility to the 
public which may rely upon the accountant’s report. 
It was no doubt in the belief that the investing public, 
as represented by the S.E.C., had a right to know all it 
wanted to know about generally accepted auditing pro-
cedure that the accounting profession cooperated fully 
in providing the desired information [Carey, 1941, p. 1].
The new audit procedures, as well as the SEC’s issuance 
of Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 4, requiring for the 
first time “substantial authoritative support” for an account-
ing principle, helped to end the rules vs. judgment debate that 
had marked the profession’s generational fault lines: “The 
significance of McKesson, in combination with ASR 4…was to 
complete the transformation of an accounting professional’s dis-
cretionary roles from individual-laissez-faire driven judgments 
regarding principles and procedures, to a judgmental process 
directed by peer professional standards, guided by a committee 
structure of the AIA” [Previts and Robinson, 1996, p. 76].
Besides making many in the profession more aware of the 
power of public opinion, M&R offered an opening to the smaller 
131
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2011, Vol. 38, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2011
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2011124
firms that desired a greater say in the profession. At a meeting 
with members of New York Governor Lehman’s staff, as the NYT 
[January 9, 1939, p. 11] reported:
A number of [speakers] charged that about 90 per cent 
of all the brokerage and investment firms, as well as the 
greatest industrial firms listed on the Stock and Curb 
Exchanges, were audited by six or seven great firms 
of which Price, Waterhouse, and Co., auditors of the 
McKesson & Robbins Company, was one. With this was 
coupled a charge that the officials of these firms domi-
nated the New York State Society of Certified Public 
Accountants and the American Institute of Accountants 
which resulted in a too lenient interpretation by the 
Association of principles which should be applied to 
all accountancy activity. Speakers declared that where 
small accounting firms, auditing smaller business 
houses, made it an almost invariable practice to check 
on statements of inventories and of accounts receiv-
able before listing them in audit, the larger accounting 
firms, dealing with the books and records of the larger 
houses, in general accepted the statements of officers 
of the companies audited and put them into balance 
sheets without further checks.
The scandal offered those outside the profession’s leader-
ship the opportunity to voice long-simmering resentments of the 
big-firm elite. Clem Collins, who had served as president of the 
AIA from 1937-1939, observed: “Ever since the matter [M&R] 
came up, which is about three years ago, there have been nu-
merous criticisms. When I was president, I received a great 
many letters insinuating that there was not full consideration 
being given, and that because this firm [Price, Waterhouse] was 
a large firm, perhaps they were not subjected to as severe ex-
amination and censure as might be accorded to a smaller firm” 
[Carey, 1970, p. 40].
Coming so quickly on the heels of M&R, U.S. entry into 
World War II saw a perhaps chastened profession respond with 
alacrity to the demands of a wartime economy. As the NYT [No-
vember 10, 1942, p. 41] told its readers: “Recognizing that ac-
counting has become an indispensable element in war produc-
tion and in control of the government’s vast expenditures, the 
executive committee of the American Institute of Accountants 
yesterday announced adoption of a war activities program to 
remain in effect for the duration.” As quickly as January 1942, 
practitioner journals were advising their readers of the new is-
sues their clients would be facing, from contingencies in the 
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face of uncertain payment from government funds to questions 
as to whether “accounting reports may be of value to enemy 
forces,” and whether subsidiaries of clients now in enemy hands 
could still be listed as assets on their balance sheets [Towns, 
1942a, p. 270]. 
The war’s effects on U.S. public accountancy would not be 
felt until the post-war era, but their importance should not be 
overlooked. The domestic labor shortages brought large num-
bers of new entrants into the profession. Most prominently, this 
included women, although in the 1950s, many firms returned 
to their pre-war hiring practices, and women lost many of the 
gains they had achieved in accounting [Wootton and Kemmerer, 
2000, p. 175]. In addition, the war greatly expanded the need 
for tax services. Taxes before the war had affected a maximum 
of 6% of the population [Zelizer, 1998, p. 84]. Increased rates of 
personal income taxation as well as wartime excess profits taxes 
added to the complexity and scope of the tax code and gave 
birth to a swelling of the ranks of tax accountants that would 
continue in the post-war era as tax rates remained high [Towns, 
1942a, p. 374; Perry, 1944, p. 139].
The war also saw tremendous advances in the field of 
management-advisory services. The unprecedented scale of 
war contracts led to innovations in business management and 
recordkeeping. “There is no doubt but that WPB and OPA have 
forced many businesses to develop more adequate records” 
[“War Has Changed Old Bookkeeping,” 1944, p. 273]. To imple-
ment machine recordkeeping such as punch-card systems, the 
large accounting firms were often brought in as consultants 
[Higgens, 1965, p. 188]. As Perry [1944. p. 139] summarized it: 
Prior to the war, the average accounting practice was 
largely composed of audit work and preparation of 
tax returns, sweetened on occasion by nonrecurring 
system engagements or cases dealing with new finan- 
cing.The scope of services rendered by accountants has 
been considerably extended in wartime, and it seems 
probable that the success of the profession in handling 
these varied assignments may result in a wider field of 
practice in the future.The problems of business man-
agement have been tremendously complicated by the 
network of wartime controls in the face of expanding 
volume, and shortage of managerial manpower has led 
many clients to turn to professional accountants for as-
sistance.
The dilemma created for the profession by consulting ser-
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vices will be subsequently discussed.
THE POST-WAR PROFESSION
The end of the war found the profession stronger than ever, 
with a younger, more modern generation at the helm. Account-
ing’s impressive contributions to the war effort had enhanced 
the profession’s image: “Many of [our] members occupied high 
places in the armed forces; others served with distinction in an 
advisory capacity. Washington came to know the accounting 
profession better than ever before, and today recognizes the val-
ue of services which professional accountants render to the gov-
ernment” [Carey, 1946, p. 1]. The lessons of M&R provided mo-
mentum to the two campaigns that marked the sharpest break 
from the 1920s generation. The drive for improved accounting 
principles, interrupted by the war, resumed in earnest [Zeff, 
2001], and a new respect for the necessity of public relations 
became central to the profession’s agenda. The combination of 
new leadership that embraced the demands post-war America 
placed on them, an expansion of the profession’s numbers that 
reoriented the national leadership away from the big national 
firms, and the challenges accounting faced from competing 
professions led to a new AIA (soon to become the AICPA) that 
played a pivotal role in molding the profession that exists today.
The AIA’s determination to take all CPAs under its wing, a 
process begun with the consolidation in 1936, meant new priori-
ties to meet the needs of its membership: “The influx of veterans 
and post-World War II CPAs into the profession…[brought] 
a new and much larger generation, more diverse in practice” 
[Previts, 1985, p. 84]. Firms like Price, Waterhouse & Co. had 
traditionally limited their partnership ranks to a select few, but 
the increase in the scale and scope of accounting work in the 
1950s forced it to welcome partners from southern and eastern 
European backgrounds as well as many younger CPAs more 
amenable to the changing times [Allen and McDermott, 1993, 
pp. 93, 115].
Perhaps the most important change resulting from the AIA’s 
expanded membership was a reorientation to the priorities of 
small firms. The AIA’s focus in the post-war era turned away 
from the increasingly independent national firms and towards 
the needs of small practitioners. While the national firms 
expanded to smaller markets and to the international stage, 
smaller firms were growing at an even faster rate: “From 1946 
to 1966 the number of CPA’s associated with the ten largest firms 
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had jumped from 2,950 to 11,850 – a 401% increase. However, 
the total number of CPA’s had jumped from 20,778 to 94,284 
during the same period – a 453% increase” [Carey, 1970, p. 356]. 
Small accounting firms increasingly faced challenges requiring 
an authoritative and representative voice as an ever-expanding 
set of accounting rules, as well as increased automation and 
cost-tracking techniques, placed more demands on CPAs. 
Carman Blough remained on the front lines of this battle, 
becoming director of research for the AIA in 1944. He would 
continue to prod accountants to adopt more uniform proce-
dures for audits and financial-statement preparation as he had 
done in the 1930s as chief accountant of the SEC [Carey, 1970, 
p. 156]. He did this with speeches and a regular column in the 
Journal of Accountancy, “Current Accounting and Auditing 
Problems,” in which he clarified technical accounting issues and 
encouraged the use of best practices, geared particularly to the 
needs of small practitioners. 
Carey had taken over as editor of the Journal of Accountan-
cy in 1937, and he was named executive director of the AIA in 
1948. The contrast with the old Wall Street elite, particularly his 
predecessor as editor of the Journal, A.P. Richardson, could not 
have been more pronounced. Richardson’s flowery, verbose edi-
torials, so incongruous in the pages of a technical practitioner’s 
journal, gave way to a modest, business-like style. Carey [1954, 
p. 33] encouraged a sense of pride and challenged members to 
embrace the “social responsibilities of CPAs” and constantly 
congratulated them on their progress: 
Such rapid growth might have resulted in disorganiza-
tion…on the contrary, professional organization has 
improved…A vast amount of work remains to be done 
before the CPA will be universally accepted as the equal 
of his colleagues in the older professions, [but] for the 
first time, it seems to us, it may be said that the rough 
framework at least [now exists]…to complete the struc-
ture of the accounting profession. 
Carey regularly crisscrossed the U.S., testifying before state 
legislatures and speaking before state and local CPA societies. 
He wrote Professional Ethics of Public Accounting, hailed as a 
“masterpiece,” to placate the SEC’s demands that accountants 
formalize their rules on auditor independence [“Tis Not the 
Whole of Auditing,” 1947, p. 3], and more than anyone else, 
Carey [1949, pp. 3, 5] pressed the need for a greater public pro-
file for the profession: 
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When certified public accountants were a small, com-
paratively obscure group, regarded as technical experts 
who could help management and credit grantors in 
their work, nobody else bothered very much about the 
accounting profession. But now, when auditing, mea-
surement of profit, cost determination, and tax prob-
lems are recognized as matters of vital importance, not 
only to management and credit grantors, but investors, 
labor unions, consumers, economists, analysts, statisti-
cians, lawyers, government policy makers, and others, 
the accounting profession suddenly finds itself in a 
goldfish bowl…we can’t escape the basic truth that pub-
lic opinion will largely determine the accounting pro-
fession’s opportunity for future progress…[in response] 
the Institute has developed a comprehensive public 
relations program. 
For the most part, CPAs supported Carey’s efforts. State 
societies supplemented his work with their own public-relations 
campaigns [“President’s Report – 1947-8,” The Texas Accountant, 
1948, Vol. 21, No. 7, p. 9; “Public Relations Program for 1951-2,” 
The Texas Accountant, 1951, Vol. 24, No. 10, p. 6]. Future AIA 
president Marquis Eaton recognized Carey’s service to the pro-
fession in effusive terms: 
In my opinion it would be impossible for the Institute 
to do too much in acknowledgement of [Carey’s] con-
tribution to the profession…[He] is eligible for retire-
ment in twelve years.That date is not so far off that we 
can postpose any longer our preparation for it…I have 
often heard the question, who are we going to get to 
take John Carey’s place? We should get that question 
out of our thinking. We are not going to get anybody to 
take his place” [Eaton letter , May 5, 1950, group 9, box 
3, F.14; Eaton speech, October 27, 1956, G12, B2, F28, 
University of Florida Papers].
The AIA’s new focus did not win universal acclaim in 
the accounting community. May, now in his third decade of 
retirement, maintained a vigorous and often cantankerous 
correspondence with Institute officials. “I deeply regret the ap-
pointment of an expert in publicity as editor of the Journal of 
Accountancy,” May [May Papers, 58-10, 1956] wrote to Blough. 
“It seems to me to be an acceptance of the view that the function 
of that Journal is to promote the interests of accountants rather 
than to give accountants professional guidance.” To John Inglis 
of Price, Waterhouse & Co., he continued: “I think it is high time 
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somebody protested against Carey’s monopolistic rule in the 
Institute” [May papers, 58-10, 1956]. Nor was May reluctant to 
share his views face-to-face, as the normally unflappable Carey 
[Group 9, B.10, F.73, June 29, 1956, University of Florida Pa-
pers] related to Eaton: “I enclose excerpts from some notes Mr. 
May gave me when he took me to lunch to criticize my article 
in the May, 1956 Journal. I am omitting some of the notes of a 
personal nature.” 
THE AICPA TURNS TO LOBBYING
A desire to burnish the CPA’s image in the public mind was 
not based solely on an idealistic vision of what a true profession 
should be. Blough, Carey, Eaton, and others were cornered into 
action by the encroachments of competing professions. As law-
yers, management consultants, and unlicensed public account- 
ants aggressively pursued new venues for their services, the AIA 
felt compelled to push back, reluctantly forced to expand the 
CPA’s field of competence and to promote itself in the power cor-
ridors of Washington.
Andrew Abbott [1988, p. 2] described jurisdictions (inter-
professional competition) as “a fundamental fact of professional 
life.” It is through competition with other professions that a pro-
fession carves out its professional space. “Control of knowledge 
and its application means dominating outsiders who attack that 
control…the professions make up an interdependent system. 
In this system, each profession has its activities under various 
kinds of jurisdiction…boundaries are perpetually in dispute.” 
U.S. public accountancy embraced the trappings of a modern 
profession – ppublic relations, lobbying, responsibility for all 
members of the profession – in response to the efforts of its 
competitors.
The most pressing jurisdictional challenge from the 1920s 
through the 1950s came from unlicensed public accountants 
(PA). In the post-war era, CPAs were generally college graduates 
who had passed a now nationally standardized and notoriously 
rigorous examination process [Merino, 2006, p. 369]. PAs com-
peted only in local markets and so posed little threat to the Big 
Eight firms. But for small practitioner CPAs, unlicensed PAs 
were interlopers who threatened their status and thwarted goals 
of professional unity. The AIA’s official policy was to encourage 
PAs to obtain the educational and statutory requirements of 
CPAs, something the PAs, not surprisingly, resisted as pointless, 
bureaucratic hoop-jumping [Tinsley, 1983, p. 29]. Although PAs 
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had their own state and nationwide organizations, anyone could 
call himself a public accountant. CPAs major concern was that 
unethical or untrained individuals holding themselves out as 
PAs would damage the reputation of the accounting profession. 
In the 1920s, state CPA societies pursued regulatory or “two-
class” legislation which would license non-certified PAs then 
practicing and prohibit future registration, thus making PAs a 
“dying class.” In another example of the AIA’s aloofness from 
the needs of small practitioners in this era, the AIA officially 
opposed such legislation, hindering the state societies’ efforts 
[Tinsley, 1962, pp. 34-35]. 
The national firms did have substantive reasons for their 
opposition. In several states, regulatory legislation allowed only 
accountants registered in the state to certify financial state-
ments. This proved a serious inconvenience to the national firms 
attempting to serve clients with offices scattered around the 
country. Second, several state-court decisions had questioned 
the constiutionality of regulatory legislation, suggesting that 
it “deprived [PAs] of the fruits of [their] training” [G9, b4, f23, 
April 18, 1946, University of Florida Archives]. Finally, as has 
been noted, the AIA in the 1920s still had a significant number 
of British chartered accountants who were not CPAs, and so 
would be classified with the inferior class of PAs under regulato-
ry legislation {Richardson, 1933c, p. 248]. Most likely, this issue 
explains why the Securities Acts allowed for audits of publicly 
traded companies to be conducted by CPAs or PAs.
In the post-war era, with the AIA’s new focus on the con-
cerns of small practitioners, the PA movement became one of 
its most pressing issues. In 1945, spurred partly by the influx 
of returning veterans and because the demand for account-
ing services far outpaced the number of CPAs, the National 
Society of Public Accountants {NSPA) was formed and com-
menced lobbying state legislatures and the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue (later the Internal Revenue Service) to recognize 
non-certified PAs as equal in status and qualifications to CPAs 
[Texas Society of CPAs, 1946, p. 5]. Some PAs even pressed to 
abolish the CPA designation altogether [Tinsley, 1962, p. 68]. 
The NSPA apparently made considerable headway in gain-
ing credibility for its members in Congress. In 1957, the AIA 
learned, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 
inquired of the NSPA “soliciting suggestions for improve-
ments in individual tax forms 1040 and 1040A. The AIA was 
not asked to assist in this study. “[The Joint Committee] 
apparently felt that our members would not be as well in-
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formed about individual tax returns as the public account- 
ants. Efforts have already been made to disabuse them of this 
idea” [G9, B5,F32, memo, “Activities of the NSPA,” October 9, 
1957, University of Florida Archives]. 
It was specifically in response to the challenge from the 
NSPA that the AIA finally chose to rid itself of the last vestige 
of the old Wall Street elite and change its name to the AICPA 
[AICPA, 1957, p. 1]. This had been a contentious issue in 1936, 
even threatening to scuttle the consolidation. As Carey remem-
bered: “In 1936, the question of what the name of the surviving 
organization should be was naturally charged with emotion 
and loyalties…the membership defeated the proposal [to adopt 
the name AICPA]. There was some bitterness among those who 
favored it” [G9, b5, f26, January 20, 1955, University of Florida 
Archives]. The change was opposed because some members felt 
that the name AIA had aquired a prestige in business and po-
litical circles. But there was another more dubious justification 
that suggests the arrogance and inflexibility of the old AIA: “The 
American Institute of Accountants is a more euphonious term 
than is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants…
the proposed name is longer, will not make as neat looking a let-
terhead and in general it will be cumbersome” [Springer, 1936, 
p. 632]. Over the course of the next 20 years, remnants of the old 
guard as well as inertia kept the AIA from changing its name, 
even though “on numerous occassions, members have sug-
gested that the change of the AIA’s name would be very helpful 
to them in associating the title Certified Public Accountants with 
the Institute’s many excellent publications and public relations 
activities. Some members have shown difficulty in understand-
ing why the Institute should persist in its present title” [G9, b5, 
f26, January 20, 1955, University of Florida Archives]. But it was 
only in March 1954 that the Journal of Accountancy’s subhead-
ing became: “Published monthly by the American Institute of 
Accountants, the national professional society of certified public 
accountants.” Finally, in 1957, the AIA became the AICPA. Eaton 
considered this one of his crowning achievements as president 
of the Institute [G9, B15, Dcember 26, 1956, University of Flori-
da Archives].
While initially a small-practitioner concern, the PA move-
ment eventually redounded to the national firms as well. In the 
early days of the income tax in the 1910s, the legal profession 
spurned tax work and left the field to accountants [Carey, 1949, 
p. 3; Chatov, 1975, p. 42]. As the complexity and ubiquity of 
taxes grew, however, the ranks of tax lawyers expanded, leading 
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to a long-running battle with the accounting profession. The 
growth of the PA movement seemed to damage the prestige of 
CPAs, as the NSPA began lobbying Congress to allow PAs to 
represent their clients before the Treasury Department [G9, B5, 
F32, May 8, 1957, University of Florida Archives]. The AIA was 
deeply alarmed by this development, fearing that lawyers and 
legislators tended to lump all accountants together [G9, B5, 
F26, “Comment on Dean Griswold’s Speech,” 1957, University 
of Florida Archives; G9, B4, F23, December 12, 1955, Univer-
sity of Florida Archives]. These fears came to a head with the 
Agran case in 1954, which briefly threatened to restrict the right 
of CPAs to represent clients before the Treasury Department 
[Carey, 1970, p. 240].
It was the AIA’s fears of the inroads made by PAs and law-
yers that persuaded it to take a more active role in lobbying. 
It began keeping close tabs on the Washington activities of the 
PAs: “The National Society of Public Accountants [NSPA] has 
recently acquired some powerful friends in its drive to extract 
greater recognition from the Treasury” [G9, b5, F32, October 9, 
1958, University of Florida Archives]. In 1955, the AIA began es-
tablishing stronger contacts with key congressmen and cabinet 
departments with the help of a public relations and lobbying 
firm to supplement the efforts of Covington & Burling, the law 
firm that had represented the AIA in Washington since the 1920s 
[G9, b4, F23, December 5. 1955, University of Florida Archives]. 
The AIA also established a Washington office for the first 
time since the 1930s. The ASCPA, although not the AIA, had 
maintained an office in Washington for years, and initially the 
office was to be maintained as part of the new organization. 
But although many thought it important to have a presence in 
Washington, the office was closed in 1937. The AIA determined 
that “adequate information and advice regarding legislation and 
departmental regulations, and introductions, when necessary, 
to Governmental officials, have always been readily obtained 
through counsel to the Institute, who are situated in Washing-
ton…the volume of activity does not appear to justify the cost of 
maintaining the office” [“Closing of Washington Office,” 1937, p. 
27; see also Montgomery, 1936, p. 329]. 
The office was reopened by the AICPA in 1959, but only 
with great reluctance. Carey cautioned: “The Institute can-
not overlook how its actions may affect its public relations. If 
it behaves like a trade union, quarreling over a monopolistic 
privelege, it will attract little support and perhaps contempt and 
ridicule. This is particularly important in view of present rela-
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tions with the legal profession. If on the other hand it acts like a 
leader, shows no desire to punish its opponents or to oppress a 
weaker group of people, it may get the credit for a statesmanlike 
approach to a problem which is of real interest to the public” 
[G9, b4, f23, December 1, 1955, University of Florida Archives]. 
Carey [1970, p. 436] would also note in his official history that 
the new office “gave the Institute a visibility in the nation’s 
capital which had not existed before,” although he insists “the 
charge to the Washington staff was not to lobby.” 
The AIA’s response to the union corruption scandals show-
cased its new determination to make its presence felt in the na-
tion’s capital. In 1955, a special Senate subcommittee, known as 
the McClellan Committee after its chair, John McClellan, began 
hearings investigating corruption in trade unions. These hear-
ings, best remembered today for the exchanges between Senate 
counsel Robert Kennedy and frequent witness Jimmy Hoffa, 
exposed intimidation, violence, and corruption in the handling 
of union funds. The hearings showed that a lack of proper finan-
cial controls played a role in the corruption – bookkeeping was 
erratic or nonexistent, union funds were embezzled by bosses, 
and fraudulent financial statements were presented to the rank-
and-file [Doron, 2009, p. 221]. Among the proposals to clean up 
the unions was a requirement for annual financial-statement 
audits. The NSPA sent its president, Raymond Jennison, to tes-
tify before Congress on the skills that public accountants could 
offer, and the AICPA felt obliged to send its own representative 
to advocate an expansion of the audit franchise for the first 
time since the New Deal. Blough, as director of research for the 
AICPA, testified before Congress in 1957 and again in 1959, ar-
ticulating the profession’s reticence: 
The Institute is not a frequent witness before Con-
gress…It has been the policy of our institute up until 
last year not to make this type of representation before 
Congress on the basis that, if we appeared on bills of 
this kind, it would be taken that we were self-serving in 
our appearance, that the purpose we had in mind was 
to get more work for CPAs. For that reason, we were 
very reluctant, for years, to make any presentations of 
this type. But about a year ago our executive commit-
tee reached the conclusion that this was not a sound 
policy, that where fiscal matters were involved on which 
we should have specialized knowledge, we should make 
ourselves available for questioning and should make 
representations, as I have here today, on matters in 
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which we feel we have particular abilities [U.S. Con-
gress, 1959, pp. 979, 985]. 
While the old Wall Street elite would surely have shunned 
the idea of involving themselves with trade unions, by 1957, 
the AICPA felt it could not afford to concede any ground to the 
NSPA. As a result, it offered the services of CPAs to unions that 
often had poor financial controls, thereby risking huge new li-
abilities if any fraud were to occur on its watch. Perhaps at no 
other time in the profession’s history has it made such a gener-
ous offer in the name of public service, although its motives 
were considerably more complex. 
By 1962, the AICPA’s attitude towards active lobbying had 
undergone a virtual transformation. At a hearing on the needs 
of small business, Robert Witschey, nominee for president of the 
AICPA, eagerly promoted the CPA as business advisor: “The tra-
ditional functions of the certified public accountant have been 
the independent auditing of financial statements leading to the 
expression of an opinion as to their fairness, and consultation 
on tax problems. After World War II, however, it became ap-
parent that one of the most important needs of small-business 
management was assistance in areas where the training and 
experience of CPA’s gave them special skills.” Witschey further 
relates a study that found CPAs were the most sought-after 
outside consultants among small business manufacturers [U.S. 
Congress, 1962, pp. 113-114]. Gone are Blough’s qualifiers about 
the AICPA not wanting to appear self-serving.
THE PROFESSION AND MANAGEMENT-ADVISORY 
SERVICES
The growth in the complexity of business, particularly the 
increasing reliance on electronic data-processing technology, 
helped to fuel the market for consulting services after the war. 
For the most part, the profession welcomed the opportunity to 
expand its scope of service, hoping “to improve the prestige of 
the CPA as an advisor to management, and to increase the reli-
ance of the business community upon the CPA” [Frisbee, 1957, 
p. 29]. In no small part, the AIA’s embrace of this field stemmed 
from its new focus on the needs of small practitioners. National 
firms were developing MAS departments independently of the 
AIA, and the concerns about maintaining independence when 
performing both audit and non-audit services to a client did not 
apply to small practitioners whose clients generally were not 
publicly traded corporations. 
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Nonetheless, concerns about the impact of MAS on firms 
large and small were raised even in these early years. Many 
feared that the CPA was extending himself into areas beyond 
his competence, and some echoed the cautionary from May that 
the “noble obligation” of the independent auditor could be jeop-
ardized “as a result of this expanding service to management” 
[“A Talk With George O. May,” 1956, p. 42; on competence, see 
“Management Services by CPAs,” 1957, p. 42]. Some also noted 
more inter-firm competition in the rush to obtain MAS clients 
[Alvin Jennings memo, G9,b10, f77, December 27, 1956, Univer-
sity of Florida Archives].
But what drove the expansion into the MAS field were the 
demands of the post-war era. Eaton observed that “many clients 
ask for consulting help, [and] are disappointed when the CPA 
cannot or will not provide it” [G9, b7, f40, University of Florida 
Archives]. This fueled the profession’s greatest fear regarding 
MAS; namely, that competing professions would take the work 
if CPAs did not move quickly to establish themselves: “We must 
give more attention to improving this type of service lest the day 
come when we find ourselves doing the hard work of digging out 
and analyzing complex financial facts only to find management 
consultants and others providing the advice, representation, and 
management aids based on those facts” [Witschey, G9, b3, F16, 
1956, University of Florida Archives; see also “Management Ser-
vices,” 1946, p. 5]. Finally, CPAs’ work in the MAS field touched 
on the campaign to end reliance on temporary workers as firms 
hoped to find more year-round work for staff by securing con-
sulting engagements [Previts, 1985, p. 80].
CONCLUSIONS
Public accountancy in the U.S. modernized and profession-
alized in the mid-20th century as a result of several forces – gov-
ernment regulation, unwanted publicity from the M&R scandal, 
the demands of World War II, pressure from competing profes-
sions, and, not least, by the vision of several leaders who pushed 
and prodded U.S. accountancy to meet the demands these forces 
placed upon it. This evolution was not without its consequences 
for the profession. A new business model was created for U.S. 
public accountancy in the 1950s, one that aggressively and effec-
tively wielded power in the nation’s capital. The AICPA “and its 
generally ferocious lobbyists” became “accustomed to getting its 
way in Washington” [Spinner, 2002, p. E1; Stone, 2002, p. 793]. 
In 1973, proposals in Congress to expand auditors’ indepen-
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dence and to create stronger audit committees failed when the 
AICPA weighed in with assurances that self-regulation remained 
effective [Turner, 2006, p. 383]. Over the next three decades, the 
profession continued to fight restrictions on accounting firms’ 
expanding scope of services, particularly MAS work, and “in 
2000, the accounting industry’s potent lobby trained its big guns 
on Securities & Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt 
Jr. – and blew him out of the water.” When they continued this 
strategy after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, “the hard-
line strategy backfired,” and the profession was shut out of the 
negotiations that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
“effectively ended” the profession’s self-regulation [Henry and 
McNamee, 2003, p. 56, Glover et. al., 2009, p. 222]. As George 
May had warned, the AICPA had become an advocate for its 
members rather than an arbiter of accounting practice.
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Newcastle University Business School is delighted to be hosting the 2012 World 
Congress of Accounting Historians which will take place in St Jam es’ Park, home 
of the Newcastle United football team. Newcastle is conveniently located 3 hours 
from London by tra in  and connected to all international routes via its in terna­
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stract w ritten in English is required. The presentations should also be delivered in 
English and m ust be based on completed papers.
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thors will be notified if their paper has been accepted by 15 March 2012. Offers 
of acceptance will be made subject to receipt of a completed paper. These should 
be emailed to WCAH@ncl.ac.uk by 30 April 2012.
The abstracts will form the basis of acceptance decisions although we reserve the 
right request further inform ation where there is uncertainty. The abstracts should 
cover the key areas of aims, method, findings, originality and research lim ita­
tions. Accepted papers and their accom panying abstracts will be published on the 
Congress website.
A special section dedicated to a selection of papers presented at the Congress 
will be published by the British Accounting Review (BAR). Delegates wishing to 
be considered for this will need to subm it their papers in English following BAR 
guidelines. Such papers will undergo the BAR's norm al reviewing procedures.
148
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/12
Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 38, Number 1
June 2011
pp. 141-158
INTERFACES
Aida Sy
MARIST COLLEGE
and
 Tony Tinker
BARUCH COLLEGE, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
From Mellmott to Madoff:
History in the (Re) Making
“History” has never enjoyed a peaceful existence. There has 
been a constant struggle over the primacy of ideas. The tacit 
agenda of mainstream history is often to elevate the version of 
the victors and to defend the status quo. A few years ago, doc-
toral students attending an American Accounting Association 
(AAA) colloquium were informed by an eminent, tenured profes-
sor that nothing in The Accounting Review (TAR) older than five 
years was worth reading.1
Editors of TAR and the Journal of Accounting Research 
(JAR) did not always express such distain for past scholarship. 
JAR was a joint creation of the University of Chicago and the 
London School of Economics (LSE). The latter was dominated 
by historians such as Will Baxter and Harold Edey. Their gradu-
ate disciples came to dominate chair appointments in the U.K. 
and beyond. Most notable were Peter Bird, Sir Brian Carsberg, 
David Solomons, Robert Parker, Geoffrey Harcourt, and Tony 
Lowe. 
While archivalism/empiricism typified the research focus 
of the LSE’s “Godfather-Originals” (Edey and Baxter), their 
first-generation students diversified into quite eclectic direc-
tions (managerial economics [Sir Brian Carsberg]; managerial 
economics, philosophy, general systems theory, and cybernet-
ics [Tony Lowe]; and, inter alia, income theory and economics 
[Robert Parker]). 
The transition from history to market studies proceeded at 
different speeds in JAR and TAR. TAR, a “public society” jour-
nal, was slower to embrace market studies and abandon history. 
1  We challenge any reader to recall the titles and authors of the first article of 
the first 2005 issue of TAR.
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However, 1965 marked a turning point in bringing TAR to heel. 
Pressure from the then Big Eight accounting firms and their 
clients forced the editor of TAR to tell Abraham Briloff “never to 
submit his work to TAR again” [Tinker and Puxty, 1995]. Briloff 
was the bête noire of the Big Eight and their clients.2 
The capitulation of TAR to market forces was accomplished 
directly and indirectly. Directly, the AAA became increasingly de-
pendent on non-membership fees as a source of revenue [Tinker, 
2001]. Indirectly, the Big Eight and their clients colonized the 
professoriate with funding of chairs and research. This gave a 
“chosen few” an elevated status and access to research finance 
and, therefore, publications. This “edge” allowed market-friend-
ly professors access to positions of influence via publications, 
editorial-board memberships, and executive-committee appoint-
ments at the AAA [Williams, 1980, 1985]. 
The rush to “market” was a lot easier for a private journal 
like JAR under the tutelage of its editor, Nicholas Dopuch. 
Dopuch was based at the (private) University of Chicago that 
openly courts market sources of funding from the Big Eight, 
their clients, and anyone else willing to pay. Private sources are 
the lifeblood of private universities. 
Dopuch had no qualms about dumping JAR’s connection 
with the LSE’s quaint history and adopting a new research order 
of pseudo-scientific rigor of regression-based market studies. As 
shown later, this self-declared brand of positivism and empiri-
cism in accounting is philosophically naïve [Tinker et al., 1982; 
Christenson, 1983]. 
Importantly, for historians who might lament the demise of 
accounting history, as Marx pointed some 160 years earlier, the 
struggle for ideas was no longer an intellectual contest about the 
merits of ideas, but had been replaced by “prizefighters” [Marx, 
1977, afterword]. For Marx, from around 1850 onward, the mar-
ket was beginning to assimilate “political economy.” 
Changes in the accounting realm were accompanied by 
parallel movements elsewhere in the university. In the U.S, the 
Cyert Report elevated the business school MBA as the premier 
qualification for populating the upper echelons of America’s cor-
porate management.3 In the U.K, there were no indigenous busi-
2  Briloff promptly switched to Barron’s to continue his critique of the Big 
Eight and their corporate clients. With a much larger circulation than any aca-
demic journal, TAR’s rejection was a blessing in disguise. 
3  The insertion of “business” into the U.S. university campus was not accept-
ed without reservation. To this day, Harvard University only allows the Harvard 
Business School to award a DBA, not a Ph.D. 
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ness schools of consequence; economics departments typically 
controlled any business and accounting curricula. Accordingly, 
the U.K. government provided seed-money of £30 million to 
establish the Manchester and London Business Schools. These 
were the bellwethers for others to follow. One consequence of 
this growing commodification of U.K. education was the eclipse 
of economic history, epitomized by the decline of history at the 
LSE which has been replaced there as a training ground for the 
sons and daughters of the rich and famous around the globe.4 
History, philosophy, and “the classics” no longer appear on 
the usual business doctoral curriculum. Aristotle, Plato, and 
Socrates are dead and buried. These, and their fellow texts, 
have been displaced by “modern math” that has erected its own 
hermeneutically sealed, home-spun standards of “relevance,” 
“truth,” “validity,” etc. Mainstream market studies routinely 
report R-squares, often of minuscule explanatory size, as “con-
firmation” that their hypotheses have not been rejected and, 
therefore by implication, remain “true.” 
These tests are nicely isolated from the established stan-
dards of epistemic appraisal [Whitley, 1972, 1973, 1986]. Even 
Karl Popper [1957], a conservative philosopher of note, dem-
onstrates that any brand of empiricism/positivism that seeks 
to “confirm” an hypothesis is not tenable from a philosophical 
perspective. In his Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper argues 
that the empirical finding of one black swan (analogous for us 
to a failed bank with a particular leverage ratio) does not allow 
a researcher to conclude that all swans are black (or that all 
banks with a particular leverage ratio are doomed). Inference to 
a truth statement is a fallacious philosophy.5
Market-studies confirmationalists perpetrate tests that are 
akin to trying to affirm/confirm that finding one purple swan 
reinforces the dogma that all swans might be purple. This has 
the convenient ideological purpose of affirming the status quo, 
including the tacit thesis of market studies. The monotonous re-
use of regression studies with familiar market variables tacitly 
affirms that the market is equilibrating and therefore working 
well in providing a proper allocation of society’s resources and 
4  Seventy % of LSE students are now from wealthy overseas families. The 
LSE is now the intellectual West Point (Sandhurst) of the U.K., training the next 
generation of an indigenous elite that is friendly to the West. 
5  For Popper, researchers should frame their hypothesis for refutation and 
strive to refute the thesis with evidence. So, for instance, a hypothesis framed that 
there are no purple swans that is refuted by the discovery of a purple swan allows 
the researcher to conclude definitively that the hypothesis is refuted. 
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functions best without regulatory interference. 
Confirmationism serves mainstream accountants by pro-
tecting the reigning dogma (market studies). As long as the 
contention that markets are “okay,” there is no need to consider 
“inferior” literatures (history) that can be dismissed as “not de 
rigueur.” Dissident research is censored because it might sup-
plant the mainstream sovereign thesis and provide the tools for 
unearthing “disturbing truths” that would trouble the status 
quo. 
The so-called top three journals, JAR, JAE, and TAR, all 
play the same jingle, expressed in their own allegorical form and 
delivering the same message with resounding consistency that 
markets are “good” because they are efficient and are the best 
adjudicators for promoting the social good (with the corollary 
that state interference and regulation are “bad”). What is mini-
mized and excluded by this sovereign position [Ryan, 1982] are 
contrary viewpoints, those expressed in public interest, taxation, 
interest, gender issues, history, management accounting, etc. 
[Whitley, 1972, 1973, 1986; Tinker, 2001].
In the mid-19th century, Marx produced his opus Capital 
[Vol. 1, 1977]. Adverse to the popular ideology, Capital is not a 
eulogy to Communism, living socialism, or any other version of 
“Mickey-Marxism” [Tinker, 1999]. These were self-serving ap-
propriations by dictators and mass murderers who, according to 
modern historians, never actually read Capital. 
Fortunately, there is a change of heart regarding the lit-
eratures (including history) that are relevant to deciphering the 
present. Desperate times call for desperate measures, and in the 
intellectual realm, this means accepting the unacceptable. And if 
the New York Times issues an edit, it is worthy of attention: 
The financial meltdown has sent the literary-minded 
scurrying back to the classics for insight and suc-
cor. The dastardly exploits of the Ponzi artist Bernie 
Madoff call to mind The Last Tycoon (Fitzgerald and 
Wilson, 1941) or The Way We Live Now (Anthony Trol-
lope, 1941). At a time when hard-core free-marketeers 
like Richard Posner (2009) are questioning the efficacy 
of capitalism, the works of Karl Marx are being fished 
out of the dustbin of history. Most classic critiques of 
capitalism are much-mentioned but little read, the sort 
of books people routinely cite without really knowing 
what’s in them [Daniel Gross, 2009]. 
Anthony Trollope wrote The Way We Live Now in the 1850s. 
His anti-hero, Augustus Melmotte, pre-dated Ponzi by 80 years 
152
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/12
145Sy and Tinker, From Mellmott to Madoff
and Madoff by over 150 years. If scholars and regulators had 
read Trollope, Madoff might have been on their radar screens 
and many other con-artists who preceded him. 
Melmotte’s scam was far more outlandish than Madoff’s 
operation; indeed, by comparison, Madoff’s operation appears 
quite amateurish. Madoff preyed on Jewish philanthropic organi- 
zations, the Jewish communities in New York, and the snow-
birds who flock to Palm Beach to escape the northeast winter. 
Melmotte entered London society with a dubious pedigree. 
He was a foreigner with a murky past who left Paris under the 
shadow of a financial scandal. On his arrival in London, Mel-
motte underwent a complete makeover, burying all traces of his 
past dossier and weaving his magic by playing on the greed of 
the English landed gentry. Many of the latter were under finan-
cial distress because the primary source of their wealth, agricul-
ture, was in the doldrums because of the influx of cheap corn 
imports as a result of the Corn Laws.6
The landed gentry were desperate for new opportunities 
to rectify their deteriorating financial condition. Melmotte ap-
peared on the London scene like a knight in shining armor. 
Like Madoff, he promised gullible investors spectacular returns. 
Melmotte used the promise of undreamt riches from a railroad 
venture connecting the U.S. to Mexico. Of course, unbeknownst 
to the investors, not a line of rail track was ever laid. Instead, in-
vestor monies were used to create an aura of matchless success. 
Melmotte took care to assuage any doubts about the integ-
rity of his activities by displaying all the trappings of success, 
providing comfort and reassurance to all those who had unwit-
tingly bankrolled his venture. Madoff used his wealth to secure 
gold-brick credentials. He built a new mansion in the center of 
London, unparalleled in splendor and extravagance. He spared 
no expense on the furnishing. He invited London’s upper-crust 
to a banquet celebrating the opening of his new mansion, star-
ring the Emperor of China. He financed a coming-out ball for 
his daughter to launch her into English society and to introduce 
her to eligible marital suitors. Finally, Melmotte used “other 
peoples’ money” to bankroll a successful run for a seat in Parlia-
ment. Melmotte was “gold” and Londoners flocked to share in 
his success. 
6  The Corn Laws were a legislative coup for the emergent industrial classes 
who were seeking cheaper costs, including labor costs that included the cost of 
food used to reproduce their labor force. The wealth of the landed classes was 
seriously impaired as a result of the Corn Laws. 
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Like Madoff, Melmotte’s pack of cards collapsed with prob-
lems of liquidity. He was required to honor a promissory note 
that he had issued in exchange for title to the mansion that he 
had renovated and occupied. Melmotte had funds to cover the 
obligation, but he had transferred his entire fortune out of the 
reach of his creditors into a safe-harbor of his daughter. The lat-
ter had been abused by Melmotte for years and avenged herself 
by denying her father access to the funds in his time of need. In 
18th century parlance, Melmotte did not have “the readies” and 
was not able to meet the call on the note. He was destroyed by 
a liquidity crisis and shortly afterwards committed suicide with 
poison, a more spectacular exit than the ignominious departure 
by Madoff. 
Like Trollope (Melmotte), Marx is also recommended read-
ing by Daniel Gross. Gross [2009] cautions that texts like Capital 
(and we might add, Keynes’s General Theory [1936]) are “…
much-mentioned but little read…routinely cited without really 
knowing what’s in them.” 
At this point, Trollope and Marx part company. Trollope was 
the victim of “historical forgetfulness”; Marx, however, was the 
victim of “historical revisionism.” Marx, in western literature, 
was never even “much-mentioned” because during the Cold War, 
Marx and Marxism were taboo. The mere mention of Marx was 
to risk the wrath of McCarthyism. 
In the U.S.S.R., Marx was “much mentioned and routinely 
cited” by Stalin, Mao, Poll-Pot, and other mass murders. They 
shared with western historians the bad habit of never actually 
having read the original. Indeed, in the U.S.S.R., leading Marxist 
economists and high-school students only read received texts, 
usually simplistic renditions commissioned by Joe Stalin. It 
was Stalin’s contention that since the U.S.S.R. had transcended 
capitalism and had inaugurated “living socialism,” Marxism was 
no longer relevant. Marx’s primary text, Capital, the analysis of 
capitalism was no longer pertinent to the U.S.S.R. 
Like Trollope, Marx’s Capital speaks eloquently about our 
present predicament. Contrary to popular belief, Marx’s Capital, 
Volume 1, is neither a diatribe against capitalism nor a cel-
ebration of Communism. As Ernest Mandel [1975] notes in his 
introduction, “…the fundamental aim was to lay bare the laws 
of motion which govern the origins, the rise, the development, 
the decline and the disappearance of…the capitalism mode of 
production….It is…an analysis of the Anatomy of Capitalism” 
[Marx, 1977, p. 12].
How does Capital address today’s world-wide malaise? Marx 
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begins with capitalism’s elemental or cellular form, the com-
modity. The “commodity” for Marx is not just the commonsense 
notion of a thing that is bought and sold; its most important 
variant is the labor commodity. Marx’s commodity possesses in-
herent contradictions and, therefore, inherent instabilities. This 
is not just the vulgar or simplistic notion that labor is “exploit-
ed” (which, of course, is correct), but much more importantly, 
the market quest for surplus value (profit) frequently stands in 
opposition to the socially valuable aspect of a commodity (its 
use value). This contradictory feature is the source of social 
eruptions. 
Instances of the opposition are legion; e.g., U.S. healthcare 
for profit; banking for profit, and education for sale. Another 
example is Enron’s cutting off electricity supplies in California, 
nicely timed blackouts in the height of summer, to blackmail 
California into accepting punishing price increases. Enron also 
pulled the same stunt on 29 third-world (vulnerable and eas-
ily corruptible) countries. Enron hijacked the water, electricity, 
and gas supplies of these countries, using contracts established, 
sanctioned, and enforced with the blessing of the IMF, which 
then aided and abetted the compelling of punitive price in- 
creases.7 The West Virginia mining disaster “pit” costs against 
safety. Exxon Valdez and BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill ex-
posed the tension between fuel needs and safety/nature/liveli-
hoods. Finally, there is the case of the pollution of Paris’ public-
water supply that stampeded citizens into purchasing (privately 
owned) bottled water. 
While American and some European workers cower at 
threats of redundancy and off-shoring their jobs, there is under-
reported labor unrest in China, Greece, Spain, and other regions 
of the globe. The inherent instabilities of the labor commodity 
are on the rise in different parts of the world.8 Like Trollope, the 
lessons from Marx’s analysis are as pertinent today as they were 
7  There were street riots protesting the increases in some countries. Enron 
police assisted in putting down the riots and a number of protestors died. 
8  The U.S. Administration was slow to grasp the significance of the financial 
instabilities in the euro-zone to protect U.S. interests. Eighty % of IMF capital is 
financed by the U.S., and the IMF was a major partner in imposing an austerity 
package in the Greek rescue. Spain, Portugal, and Ireland are waiting in line. 
Street rioters in Greece openly branded the U.S. for the austerity deal. American 
banks came a close second as the institutional villains who had precipitated the 
crisis. To add a further systematic risk complication to the mix, the Greek banks 
owed nearly $100 billion to German and French banks (The German-led rescue 
was not entirely altruistic.). 
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in 1860. 
Marx’s opus is a careful analysis of Capital(ism). Develop-
ing from our earlier work [Neimark and Tinker, 1987], we show 
that Marx [1977, 1992] and his modern-day “students,” notably 
Theodore Adorno, cited extensively in the original 1977 text, 
has, like Anthony Trollope, a great deal to say about the present 
crises [Ryan, 1982; Dews, 1986].
First and foremost, both Marx and Adorno argue that 
capitalism’s crises cannot be resolved or cured; they can only be 
postponed, deferred, or transformed. This is because the under-
lying contradictions of capitalism remain undisturbed, so that 
the deep-rooted antinomies remain ever-present [Gamble and 
Walton, 1976].
Before proceeding, it is important how much we can take 
from Marx directly and how much we must draw on those who 
use his mode of analysis. Marx wrote at a time when European 
nations were still predominantly agrarian economies with a 
growing migration of labor from country to town. The industrial 
bourgeoisie was still an emergent class. There were no monopo-
lies on today’s scale. 
Notwithstanding the temporal limitations of Marx’s Capital, 
Vol. 1, his legacy is a mode of analysis that endures and allows 
contemporary Marxists to deploy in examining the present. For 
instance, his identification of surplus value (profit and taxes) 
as an expropriation from “productive” activity is expressed 
today in the generation of massive quantities of surplus values 
by corporations and the state. Modern-day analysis focuses on 
where the surpluses (profits and taxes) are deployed [Sweezy 
and Baron, 1966; Mandel, 1975]. For Mandel, for instance, the 
military has become the primary recipient of the surplus-value 
largesse, thereby creating a new “department” in the economy 
and offering an analysis not too remote from Eisenhower’s 1961 
warning about the Military-Industrial Complex. More recent 
studies concentrate on the speculative destabilizing movements 
engendered by the surpluses extracted by the banking sector, 
used to pump-and-dump entire stock markets [Cooper, 2008; 
Balakrishnan, 2009]. 
We begin by reviewing four contradictory dimensions of the 
present crisis. Each positions the issues using the classics (Marx 
and Marxists) and extends the discussion to the present crisis. 
The four dimensions are the realization crisis, the concentration 
of capital, the centralization of capital, and the misalignment 
between identity and non-identity.
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THE FOUR DIMENSIONS
The Realization Crisis: “Pump-and-Dump,” “bubble-blow-
ing,” and “bubble-bursting” are not phrases invented by the 
“loony-left” but are deployed by contemporary economic com-
mentators when pondering the state of the world-wide economic 
crisis [Krugman, 2009; Posner, 2009]. Their meditations focus 
on bubble-blowing by banks and, more recently, bubble-blowing 
by nation states and their multiple stimulus packages [Tinker, 
1992; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. What these analysts fail to ask is 
why bubble-blowing was such a vital and necessary part of the 
modern capitalist enterprise?9 The answer is to be found in the 
forbidden texts. 
Competitive capitalism strives for greater profit, either 
through socially destructive speculation or by seeking ever 
greater efficiency by producing “more-with-less” [Allen, 1975; 
Shaw, 1975; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Braverman, 1998]. 
“More-with-less” means shedding labor. To avoid adding to the 
masses of unemployed, capitalism must absorb the discarded 
laborers, either by finding them gainful employment (economic 
growth is the prime candidate as long as this can be sustained 
by “bubble-blowing”) or by absorbing surplus labor by using 
public-sector employment (the U.S. Postal Service, the military, 
etc.) [Mandel, 1975; Gamble and Walton, 1976; Braverman, 
1998]. 
The problem with the second solution is that it has a finite 
limit. The U.S. Postal Service is seriously overstaffed, and fur-
ther expenditures would inflame congressional fears of a new 
inflationary crisis, instigated by government deficit spending 
that would earn the wrath of the bond market.10 Nor is military 
spending a sustainable option. Drone and other labor-saving 
technologies reduce the required number of military person-
9  Alan Greenspan opined as such in his testimony before Congress where he 
ridiculed members for their hypocritical change of heart. When the bubble was 
swelling, he was their darling and had their undying support. When the bubble 
burst, they turned on him like a pack of wolves. Senator Dodd of Connecticut, 
where all the bank and insurance lobby money resides, performed a spectacular 
somersault on these issues. 
 
10  Inflation increases the rates that the bond market must pay on new issues. 
Bonds issued prior to the inflation period will fall in value to give returns com-
mensurate with the new market rates. Bondholders of those portfolios would suf-
fer major losses. Accordingly, the bond market, four times larger than the market 
of stocks and shares, hates inflation and lobbies heavily against deficit spending 
[Cooper, 2008]. 
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nel for absorbing surplus labor. As public disquiet about the 
death-toll of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan rises, there is growing 
pressure to replace “men with machines” [Mandel, 1975; Braver-
man, 1998].
We are also hitting the wall for the first option on the list 
– inflating demand with credit or bubble-blowing. Maynard 
Keynes is dead! Anyone who has read The General Theory 
[Keynes, 1936] would know that Keynes only advised using a 
stimulus in the nadir of a depression (never preemptively) and 
that a Keynesian stimulus only works in a semi-closed economy. 
Today’s economies have extensive import-export relations, there-
by mitigating the effects of a state-induced stimulus. This is the 
reason for the tepid impact of the current stimulus packages 
[Balakrishnan, 2009]. 
The first option, credit expansion by bubble-blowing by 
corporations and banks, is also unavailable as these avenues 
are closed-off. The real-estate bubble has burst, the housing 
market is languishing, credit cards are over-extended. Dubai’s 
real-estate now sports more cranes than building occupancies, 
student loans are a slow-burning crisis, the Shanghai real-estate 
bubble has been pricked by Chinese authorities. In the U.S. and 
the U.K., mortgage delinquencies threaten to escalate as citizens 
without jobs face come-due, first-time balloon payments. 
One prognosis as to the future of capitalism may be found 
in the writings of Adam Smith and his contemporaries that, in 
the long term, capitalism will gravitate to a steady-state [Bal-
akrishnan, 2009]. What this thesis fails to grasp is the dynamic 
character of capitalism, its ability in the past to “invent” its way 
out of crisis by destroying and then replenishing the capital 
stock of entire countries like Germany and Japan with Marshal 
Plan and today Iraq. However, today seems to be different with 
stubbornly high levels of unemployment and the ominous pos-
sibility of social unrest in the U.S. already evident on a global 
scale, led perhaps somewhat ironically by Greece, the cradle of 
western civilization [Marx, 1977; Braverman, 1998].
The Concentration of Capital: The concentration of capital refers 
to the growing size of banks and corporations.11 The savings and 
11  Marx [1977, Vol. 1, p. 887] elaborates on these contradictions as they ap-
plied in the 1850’s (and as they relate now): “...The concentration of capital with-
in a country and the dissolving effect of this concentration present nothing but 
positive sides to him [Carey]. But the monopoly of concentrated English capital 
has a dissolving effect on the smaller national capitals of other countries and is 
disharmonious….these world-market disharmonies are merely the ultimate ad-
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loans crisis of the 1970’s was “deferred” by absorbing bad banks 
into good and larger ones. The same tactic was redeployed for 
engaging the current crisis. To avoid bank collapses and a sys-
temic meltdown, presaged by Lehman Brothers, banks were per-
mitted to engage in an unprecedented program of mergers and 
acquisitions. Bear Sterns was absorbed by J.P. Morgan for $29 
million; Bank of America “saved” Merrill Lynch for $130 mil-
lion; Northern Rock, the Abbey, and Bradford and Bingley were 
absorbed in the U.K.; Wakovia went to Wells Fargo; WAMU to 
Bank of America; Morgan Stanley to Mitsubishi; and Fortis and 
Dextor were swallowed in French, Dutch, and Belgian bailouts. 
Consolidating banks does not “solve” problems; it merely 
transformed them into new and larger contradictions, setting 
the scene for future crises. These new mega-banks are now even 
bigger, too big to save by their host countries, and their size 
magnifies ever further the degree of systematic risk. A mega-
bank collapse will have unprecedented reverberations through 
the world financial system because bank interconnectedness is 
now pervasive. 
 Figure 1 is a “too big-to-save” table. It assigns the world’s 
largest 25 banks to their host country and expresses their com-
bined leverage of that country’s GDP. Ireland and Greece do not 
appear, not because their situation is not dire, but because their 
banks and GDP are not large enough in absolute terms to quali-
fy for consideration. This is a limitation of Figure 1, a drawback 
with these data because, as we have seen in recent months, the 
euro can be jeopardized by a minnow like Greece and via the 
IMF, there is a contagion effect that threatens to embroil the 
U.S.
The voracious, expansive proclivities of capitalism are 
represented by the expansion of the commodity form (Marx, 
1977, pp. 700-883). Congress because of lobbying is now com-
moditized such that banking regulation is subordinated to the 
dictates of market forces, personified by “the lobbyist” [Stigler, 
1971; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. Even the Volker rule (the firewall for 
segregating high-risk investment banking from federally insured 
deposits in commercial banks) has fallen afoul of the powerful 
banking lobby [Stigler, 1971; Sy and Tinker, 2009]. Thus, if a 
equate expression of the disharmonies which have become fixed as abstract rela-
tions with the economic categories or which have a local existence on the smallest 
scale. No wonder, then, that he [Carey] forgets the positive content of these pro-
cesses of dissolution...” 
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FIGURE 1
Too-Big-To-Fail Index: Top 50 Banks’
Leverage as a % of Their Country’s GDP
COUNTRY
TOP 50 BANKS’ LEVERAGE 
AS A PERCENTAGEOF THEIR 
HOST COUNTRY’S GDP
Switzerland 595.32
Netherlands 336.86
Belgium 318.84
United Kingdom 
 
206.21
France 198.07
Hong Kong 154.74
Spain 
 
107.77
Japan 102.16
Sweden 82.96
Australia 82.07
Italy 70.32
China 63.26
Germany 49.88
United States 44.19
Canada 28.80
Source:
Eurobank 
http: / /www.euromoney.com/
Article/1961042/Worlds-largest-
banks-2007-Global-bank-rank-
ings-Top-20-global-free-to-access.
html
Source:
Euromoney
http: / /www.euromoney.com/
Article/1533691/Worlds-largest-
banks-Global-bank-rankings-Top-
50-by-shareholder-equity-free-to-
access.html
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future Goldman Sachs suffered catastrophic losses in, say, the 
Hungarian, Russian, or Romanian stock markets, wiping bil-
lions of assets off its balance sheet, it would be U.S. taxpayers 
who would be obliged to pick up the tab to protect U.S. federally 
insured depositors.
The travails of the euro began with Greece, but grumblings 
in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal have spooked international 
financial markets, including the U.S. The IMF (with its U.S. pay-
master) saved Greek banks which owed $50 billion and $80 bil-
lion to French and German banks respectively. So the U.S. is in-
directly, but very significantly ensnared, in euro travails. And in 
Germany, the bailout is costing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party 
dearly in the polls. The German voters do not like the Greeks! 
Back in the U.S, the stock market dimly perceived that the 
fate of the euro is not just a “foreign” problem. The geographical 
growth of the commodity form in banking means that when the 
euro sneezes, the U.S. will catch cold.
The Growing Centralization of Capital: Centralization of capital, 
in popular parlance, refers to the manner in which control of 
capital is in the hands of fewer and fewer persons. In this re-
gard, centralization and concentration move in lock step.12 How-
ever, Marx’s definition of “concentration” is a variance from this 
popular notion. For Marx [1977, Vol. 1, Chapter XXXIII], “…
Centralization of the means of production and socialization of 
labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with 
their capitalist integument. Thus integument is burst asunder. 
The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropria-
tors are expropriated.” 
For Marx, in his time, his notion of centralization focused 
on the revolutionary potential of increasingly socialized, in-
creasingly socially conscious, factory labor. In his era, the so-
cially disruptive potential of factory labor was amplified through 
trade-union organization and even political representation (e.g., 
the Labour Party and the Fabian Society in the U.K.). 
Today’s trade unions in the U.K. and the U.S. are a shadowy 
version of their earlier potency. It is easy to rush to the conclu-
sion that Marx’s tocsin is no longer relevant today given the 
12  This popular definition serves the convenient ideological purpose of per-
sonifying the source of crises in terms of “villains and bad people,” to paraphrase 
President Bush. This ploy diverts attention away from the real source of crises, 
not “bad people” (the market can simply replace them with more highly qualified 
bad people) but contradictions in the underlying social system. 
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emasculated condition of trade unions. However, this misappre-
hends Marx’s analysis that does not depend on the presence and 
form of the trade-union movement. The basic social antinomy to 
which Marx refers is not socially and institutionally specific but 
is capable of assuming different institutional guises at different 
points in history. 
The basic dissonance persists today, but today assumes new 
forms. The social self-consciousness that evolves from Marx’s 
“centralization of the means of production and socialization of 
labor” is reflected in the awareness displayed by rioters in Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece (“IMF, go home”). The insurrectionists 
at Toronto’s G8 meeting (“kill the bankers”) and the agitators 
behind the growing number of strikes for better wages and ben-
efits in China echo similar sentiments.
The Misalignment between Identity and Non-Identity: The “clash” 
between identity and non-identity is perhaps the most pertinent 
and theoretically challenging addition offered in this update. 
Best elucidated by Adorno [1973] and Adorno and Horkhiemer 
[1979], this “clash” describes the rupture between a social self-
consciousness (whether of an individual or a collective) and the 
historical milieu in which that self-consciousness is embedded.13 
The rupture or clash refers to the manner in which conscious-
ness or self-awareness always lags behind its evolving historical 
milieu. 
Hegel [1967, p. 13, 1975, pp. xiii, 4, 70; see also Lukacs, 
1971, p. 59] expresses this relation succinctly: “Only when dusk 
starts to fall does the Owl of Minerva spread its wings and fly.” 
In the same vein, Marx notes that “…the conventional philoso-
pher always arrives after the feast has ended.” (“post-festum”).14
 In contrast with this backward-looking recollection “at 
dusk” (the “post-festum” analysis of the traditional intellectual), 
Gramsci’s [1971, pp. 404-405] organic intellectual is an active 
ingredient in social change (a dialectical dynamic of interven-
13  “An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains some-
thing other than the subject whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset 
an object as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an 
object, but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is 
part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subject” [Adorno, 1973, p. 183].
14  “Hegel’s…absolute spirit qua absolute spirit makes history only in appear-
ance….For, as absolute spirit does not appear in the mind of the philosopher in 
the shape of the creative world-spirit until after the event, it follows that it makes 
history only in the consciousness, the opinions and the ideas of the philosophers, 
only in the speculative imagination” [Marx, quoted in Lukacs, 1971, p. 16].
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tion and change; not a static, bifurcated Cartesian subject-object 
split, but a philosophy where object and subject constantly re-
constitute each other, albeit imperfectly): 
…the philosophy of praxis is a reform and a develop-
ment of Hegelianism; it is a philosophy that has been 
liberated (or is attempting to liberate itself) from any 
unilateral and fanatical ideological elements; it is con-
sciousness full of contradictions, in which the philoso-
pher himself, understood both individually and as an 
entire social group, not only grasps the contradictions, 
but posits himself as an element of the contradiction 
and elevates this element to a principle of knowledge 
and therefore action.15 
The essence of the proposition that “reality” always exceeds 
consciousness means that reality is always capable of delivering 
nasty surprises. In the language of dialectics, the “negation-of-
negation” is never a complete apprehension of reality but always 
something less, a synthesis with remainder. This remainder is 
the unexplained residual (surprise) that provides the accelerant 
for the next historical movement. 
Today’s world-wide crisis provides a practical example of 
dialectics in action. The crisis was precipitated in no small mea-
sure by a banking crisis. This “negation” has been “negated” by 
a faint-hearted regulatory reform, an imperfect expression of 
Adorno’s public consciousness. The negation-of-negation never 
provides a definitive, final, or absolute closure, but always leaves 
a remainder or a residual out of which future crises will emerge. 
These insights from Marxist dialectics, as formulated by 
Theodore Adorno and cited extensively in our 1987 text [Nei-
mark and Tinker, 1987], articulates in a systematic matter what 
is suspected in popular understandings of the banking crisis. 
Banks successfully resisted the Basle lll efforts to impose higher 
equity cushions. They defeated restrictions on leverage levels 
and a collective levy to fund the cost of future bailouts. U.S. 
banking legislation is also floundering in Congress, with the 
Volker rule seemingly dead in the water already. The banking 
lobby successfully resisted these regulations by arguing that, in 
their present parlous state, any restrictions might fatally desta-
bilize the entire banking system, precipitating a new and even 
15  In such a fashion, Hegel/Gramsci’s Organic Owl appears on time for Marx’s 
banquet and enjoins the guests with a “steak” in the future (becoming an histori-
cal player in making history). 
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greater crisis.16
The result of these insipid, negation-of-negation reforms is 
to set the scene for the next financial crisis. Since the previous 
crisis, systemic risk has increased. Banking entities are now 
really too big to save, and the firewalls between high-risk invest-
ment banking and commercial (high street) banking have been 
dismantled. These were provisional “solutions” that sewed the 
seeds for the next crisis. 
Yet, banks may not be the epicenter of the next crisis. Na-
tion states, including the euro-zone, are increasingly vulnerable 
to defaults, not just for their sovereign government debt, but 
also for default of their private banking sectors, as in the case 
of the loan exposure of German banks to Greek banks. Already 
bailout fatigue is setting-in in Germany, and new euro-zone 
zombies (Spain, Portugal, Ireland) may be thrown to the wolves 
by German voters. 
The outcome for these “the three amigos” may not be pretty. 
Their government and bank bonds will be downgraded to junk 
status with increasing interest rates to prohibitive levels. This 
will impose additional severe burden on their government defi-
cits with likely violations of the debt covenants of IMF and euro 
loans triggering further penalties. And so the dialectical round-
about begins again, this time with greater speed. 
Citizens are not likely to sit quietly by and accept draco-
nian cutbacks in jobs, social services, and benefits. People who 
lose the ability to pay the rent, buy food for their children, and 
maintain healthcare payments, etc. are unlikely to remain qui-
escent in a crisis not of their making. At the time of writing, the 
renewal of unemployment benefits has stalled in the U.S. Con-
gress, with Republicans demanding that the benefits be funded 
from cuts elsewhere. Street protests in Canada against the G20 
and those in Greece were not amicable. It would be foolish to 
continue to deny that social instability is not a real possibility.
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